From: Matt the Enraged Endorphin (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Thu Dec 12 2002 - 22:54:04 GMT
Hey Platt:
Geez, this is like pulling teeth.
Look, I'll be honest, if I was going to say any of the things you want me
to say, presumably so you can condemn me, I would say them because I don't
fear any condemnations.
So, lets look at what I'm actually saying by looking at the words I'm using:
In my first post I said that Rudy's justified in getting the "creeps." I
say there's a lot that can be "co-opted." Then I say that, "I don't think
[Pirsig's] completely off the mark." I say that his position "lends"
itself to co-optation.
You took me as saying that Pirsig's position leads to more demagoguery then
other moral positions.
I then clarified by emphasizing my original message of "leads" to
co-optation. I also added that the "creeps" hinge on an "objectivity"
argument. That means if you don't make the objectivity argument (as I
later pointed out that Marx did), then much of the "creeps" disappears. I
then said that Pirsig's position "lends" itself to co-optation because of
its recapitulation of The Great Chain of Being. And to have "both" the The
Great Chain "plus" the objectivity argument would "lend" credence to fans
of objectivity. And here's the kicker:
Pirsig's stance "combines" together two stances which "lends" support to
its rhetorical position by possibly bringing together two disparate groups
of people. The two groups: irrational people who think that humans are at
the top of the Great Chain of Being and rational people who want
objectivity and, therefore, no doubt in their moral pronouncements. Let me
reiterate: these are two seperate groups that, when seperated, have no
people who belong to both sides. I don't know if anybody actually exists
who take part in either side, but the rhetorical communities were created
to show how Pirsig's position could bring them together under one banner.
This also means that most people are a mix of the two rhetorical positions.
The seperateness of the two positions was supposed to bring across the
fact that there were two variables at play.
You then asked me some questions about chickens and I tried to further
elucidate the apparently slippery and controversial position I'm staking
out. But most of that has already been added above.
You're new questions are:
1) Am I to conclude that you object to the notion that humans are morally
superior to, say, chickens?
No. As stated, I haven't coveyed my position at all. I have merely
created a rhetorical community that questions whether humans are morally
superior to, say, chickens.
2) Do you also mean to convey that Pirsig's moral system should be shunned
because Marxism also appeals to reason?
No. As stated, "I don't think he's completely off the mark." Its hard to
shun something you like in some fashion. Also, as stated, the link of
Pirsig's moral system with Marxism only occurs if Pirsig's system claims
"objectivity," which is different then simply "appealing to reason." My
feeling on this is quite apparent when I said, "I think you're right to
make a distinction between 'rational' and 'objective'." If you didn't make
that distinction, you should have said something because I was then working
under the assumption that there was a distinction between the two.
3) So if I think humans are morally superior to deadly germs I'm irrational?
No. As stated, I created two rhetorical communities for contrastive
purposes where the people in them, to retain its contrastive power, cannot
participate in the other community. The position that Pirsig occupies is
one that brings together the two contrasting communities, but also includes
people of mixed persuasions i.e. rational people who think humans are
morally superior to deadly germs.
4) Or, that it's wrong for a rational person to be certain about good and
bad, right or wrong?
As you stated further on, "No, that can't be because to define "bad" one
must invoke a moral system of some sort." And as I have stated, I have yet
to state any position I may hold. I fear clever rhetoricians, but only
insofar as they are on the side of evil. But this is because I don't make
a distinction between rhetoric and dialectic. Of course, a clever
rhetorician can take advantage of any situation, that's what makes them
clever. The simple thought I was trying to get across was that Pirsig's
position makes it easier on the clever rhetoricians, thus lowering the bar
of how clever a rhetorician has to be to take advantage of Pirsig.
Am I being evasive? No. The reason why I went through everything I've
said, step-by-step, was to bring across the fact that what I said orginally
to Rudy didn't have any hidden, compacted, loaded meaning about morals. I
don't see it as possible to pull out that I'm a cryto-[insert moral stance]
from the things I've said. You might be able to pull out my position on
rhetoric and dialectic, but that's about it. You say you've been confused
by my "position." Well, I've been confused by the confusion because I
didn't know I was converying a position. The very simple thought I was
trying to push through was:
Be careful about how you interpret Pirsig.
Nothing fancy or subversive about it. It was a simple warning for a
newcomer. My personal advice to Rudy. And because of the length of my
trying to explain myself, I'm sure I'll be blamed for scaring off Rudy and
about 10 other lurkers who we don't know the names of, and never will now
that I've blathered on and on about a short meaningless paragraph.
Matt
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