RE: MD The individual in the MOQ

From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Fri Aug 06 2004 - 08:54:27 BST

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    Hi Scott

    Welcome back!

    Paul previously said:
    > On the other hand (and I have not denied this throughout the
    dialogue),
    > without society, and biology, and matter, there are no intellectual
    > patterns.

    Scott said:
    Why do you (and Pirsig) assume this?

    Paul:
    When I assume this, it provides an explanation which is logical, agrees
    with experience, has great explanatory power for such tricky things as
    good and evil, offers a good interpretation of history and conflict,
    and, although I know you disagree, solves the mind-matter problem.

    The thing to be aware of, though, is that this is the deduced,
    evolutionary, stratified ontology of the MOQ. The MOQ also takes the
    view that Quality creates intellectual patterns which precede everything
    else, and it is from knowledge (ideas) that ontology is created. This
    can get quite confusing.

    Scott said:
    True, our only experience of intellectual patterns is as embodied
    beings, but some mystics (Franklin Merrell-Wolff and Rudolf Steiner, for
    example) have different experiences, of disembodied intellect. There are
    also probabilistic arguments against it from the Intelligent Design
    folks, which, though not conclusive, should at least allow for some
    doubt (though I have different disagreements with them, namely that they
    are too theistic). And there is also my own argument (which I won't
    repeat here) that you can't get intellect out of non-intellect patterns,
    regardless of how complex the latter may be. To say that you can, as the
    Emergence folks do, is so much arm-waving, a non-argument forced by a
    dogmatic adherence to Darwinisim.

    Paul:
    I think intellect can be understood as effectively a learned behaviour
    and this seems to offer the basis of an explanation for how you can get
    intellect out of non-intellect. "Emergence" isn't really necessary, as
    long as you don't deny that learning is real.

    Paul previously said:
    > But, finally, I really think it is important for you to appreciate
    that
    > the individual is not containing the patterns. A glass contains water,
    > when you pour out the water, the glass remains. If you "pour out" the
    > patterns of an individual human, only Dynamic Quality remains, which
    > doesn't contain anything.

    Scott said:
    I agree that the container/contained model doesn't work, but I would say
    that the individual should be seen as a localized version of DQ, and not
    just of static patterns, that the DQ that is left after "pouring out" SQ
    is
    a part of the individual, though it would be better to say that a
    (human)
    individual should be seen as a locus of DQ/SQ interaction.

    Paul:
    I have made that last statement several times, in the post you are
    responding to, in fact. As for Dynamic Quality being *part of* the
    individual, I would say that this is the equivalent to one's Buddha
    nature which is not part of an individual in the same sense as an
    individual body or a job is. As such, I think you have to be careful
    with such statements.

    Scott said:
    But there is "temporary permanence", one might say, that is, duration.
    If you see a light go on, there had to be some continuity from the state
    before the light went on to the state after, or there wouldn't be any
    noticing of a difference. It is a return to (dualist) SOM to account for
    the continuity by saying that there is a self independent of the change
    in light, but it is also a form of SOM (materialist nominalism) to say
    that the continuity is "postulation".

    Paul:
    How so?

    Scott said:
    The irony is that Pirsig had the solution (well, a pointer to it) in
    ZAMM,
    when he said that Quality creates the subject and object in acts of
    perception, but then lost it in LILA when he redefined subject and
    object
    in such a way that it is impossible for the MOQ to account for
    perception.

    Paul:
    Quality *is* perception in LILA as it was in ZMM. The bit that people
    struggle with is that the MOQ denies that there must be a perceiver and
    a perceived that can be said to exist separately prior to perception. In
    LILA, this "conceptually unknown" cutting edge of reality becomes
    Dynamic Quality and the perceiver and perceived are created, by
    perception, in the form of static patterns.

    Paul

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