From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Sun Aug 15 2004 - 15:33:14 BST
Hi Ham, MSH, All:
> What Pirsig calls "esthetic experience" I call "psycho-emotional
> sensibility",
> and have defined as Value. Value may be considered "experiential" in
> that it may be "felt" like an itch; but it is typically "desideristic",
> that is, sensed as an affirmative response to something wanted. (This gets
> touchy -- and feely!) In my ontology hypothesis, I attribute Value to the
> Essence negated in creation which is "affirmed" through the secondary
> negation (of. beingness) by the individuated subject.
This is too complex for me to grasp, Ham. Is there a way to express the
idea in simpler terms? Maybe an analogy would help.
> For present
> purposes, let's just say that Value is the "esthetic appreciation" of what
> is presented to awareness. The question is, does Value [Pirsig's Quality]
> depend on a subject/object dualism? I've reviewed Pirsig's ZMM where he
> says "no". I've also reviewed my own hypothesis and am inclined to answer
> "yes" and "no". (How's that for honesty?)
Whatever the answer, I think aesthetic non-dual experience may be
the Rosetta Stone to understanding Pirsig's Quality=Experience
=Reality. I don't know of anyone who hasn't at one time or another
experienced something so good it "stops you in your tracks" and "all your
static patterns (dualities) are shattered." (You'll find Pirsig's
description of such and experience in Chapter 9 of Lila) Whether your
"Value" points to the same sort of experience I'm not sure.
> > "Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that
> > there is a knower and a known, but a metaphysics can be none of these
> > things. A metaphysics must be divisible, definable, and knowable, or
> > there isn't any metaphysics. Since a metaphysics is essentially a kind of
> > dialectical definition and since Quality is essentially outside
> > definition, this means that a "Metaphysics of Quality" is essentially a
> > contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity." (Lila, 5)
> What Pirsig is trying to describe here is what I call call Essence.
> Essence is the uncreated, undifferentiated and absolute Source that most
> people would call God. (Sorry, Platt.)
No need to apologize. I'm not anti-God like some contributors, although I
am anti-God as described by various religions. To me, God is a
simultaneous immanent and transcendent moral force motivated by the
ethical principle of the "Good."
> Value is man's realization of
> Essence, and is both dualistic (empirical) and monistic (subjective). A
> metaphysics of God may be a "logical absurdity". A metaphysics of Quality
> [Value] which encompasses the experiential and esthetic awareness of
> Essence is quite valid. And it's exactly what I have postulated in my
> thesis!
I think Pirsig's point is that aesthetic awareness occurs prior to such
recipe-like intellectualized ingredients as "empirical" and "monistic."
You disagree, obviously.
> > He goes on, as you know, to equate experience with Quality, finding it
> > "indivisible, undefinable and unknowable.".
> Wrong. Experience IS that which is divisible, definable, and knowable!
If you read my posts to Johnny you will see that I'm still wrestling with
this aspect of the MOQ. I'm not ready yet to assert unequivocably that
Pirsig is wrong.
> > In the MOQ there are no differences in the following: Experience,
> > Quality, Value, Reality.
> That's a generalization I can't accept Does it make sense to you, Platt?
It does when I think of my aesthetic experiences.
> > But there is a distinction between those synonyms and
> > "man's reality." As soon as you introduce "man" you introduce the duality
> > of man and not man. Pirsig's reality of Quality comes prior to that
> > duality. Also, Pirsig has said that Quality is the ultimate reality:
> It's pretty tough to exclude man when he is the subject of everything
> experienced.
Believe me, I know what you mean. I'm struggling with that seemingly self-
evident "truth."
> Again, he's defining God. Man's reality is a dualism. But it has an a
> prori source. If Pirsig would accept Essence as the source of Quality, he'd
> have a complete hypothesis. It would be called the Philosophy of Essence
> or, perhaps even, Essentialism.
I tend to agree with Mark Steve Heyman who wrote, "Setting Essence above
Quality complicates the metaphysics without adding any explanatory value."
Quality is Pirsig's "essence," the primary source. It has an advantage over
Essence because it is thought by Pirsig to be a moral force at work creating
the world. In contrast, "Essence" seems neutral, uninvolved, without
purpose.
> Platt, this has been a lengthy exercise, but it's given me the opportunity
> to learn, and hopefully demonstrate, not only the major difference in our
> philosophies but how close we really are.
Yes, Ham, we're close. But still need to resolve the "experience"
question. I appreciate the time you've spent on your replies and look
forward to them.
Best,
Platt
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