Re: MD Making sense of the moq levels

From: Steve Peterson (speterson@fast.net)
Date: Mon Jan 20 2003 - 18:53:12 GMT

  • Next message: Steve Peterson: "Re: MD Making sense of it (levels)"

    DMB, Wim, Platt, all trying to make sense out of the levels,

    > Steve asked DMB:
    > Could you explain how you categorize patterns of value?
    >
    > DMB says:
    > Are you asking how to distinguish one level
    > from another? So it seems. It would be an unwise use of our time to discuss
    > the nature of the first two levels because these are fairly obvious. Its
    > safe to assume everybody knows the difference between rocks and animals, for
    > example. There is little dispute about this. The trouble begins when we try
    > to make distinctions between the social and intellectual patterns, no?

    Steve: Yes, I think you understand what I am asking.

    >DMB:
    > One rule of thumb is to ask yourself about the age of the static patterns in
    > question. If it existed before the ancient Greeks, it is extremely unlikely
    > that we can rightly categorize it as an intellectual value. If anyone can
    > think of an exception to this rule, I would be amazed. This rule of thumb
    > emerges from the fact that the static levels represent an evolutionary
    > sequence where each level depends upon the previous ones for its existence.

    Steve:
    This sounds like a useful rule of thumb.

    >
    > When using this rule, it is important to get a sense of the scale of things
    > too. Think of the monkey dance, for example. (The very recent "mentality of
    > apes" post isn't very long. If you havent seen it yet, I'd urge you to take
    > a look.) There we are looking way, way back into pre-history. As Campbell
    > paints it, we were dancing like that some 600,000 years ago. The social
    > level began to evolve a very long time ago. And even if we stretch the birth
    > date of the intellect back to 1000 BC, we're still talking about half of one
    > percent of the total arch of human evolution! Intellect is something like
    > the tip of the iceberg. Beyond our animal selves, something like 99.5
    > percent of who and what we are is social. In historical terms, intellect is
    > a brand spanking new, paper thin layer on top of the extremely ancient
    > social level.

    Steve: I read about the monkey "dance." Interesting. Note that I think
    Wim's formulation would categorize it as "unconscious copying of behavior,"
    thus as a social pattern.

    > DMB:
    > Another way to think about the difference between the social and
    > intellectual level is to take in the many examples cited in Lila and add
    > them up. Putting all these examples together creates a picture of two
    > distinct categories. I find this method to be a little bit more complicated,
    > but the examples are of actual historical events and actual people, so it
    > gives us plenty of meat to sink our teeth into.

    Steve:
    I would be interested in any other rules. I don't like the idea of needing
    to refer to the text to categorize a pattern of value.

    I often think that the distinctions that you make between social and
    intellectual are really social distinctions rather than moq distinctions.
    As in the debate about whether Lila has a part in intellectual patterns of
    value, and your claim that Hitler was not intellectual. I think you mean
    that Hitler was not *an* intellectual which sounds to me like a social role.

    Phaedrus was an intellectual, Rigel was a respectable gentelman, Lila was a
    tramp. IMO these are social roles not metaphysical distinctions. I can't
    understand how you could see them as categorically different things as a
    rock differs from an animal or an idea differs from a person.

    Steve

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