From: Scott Roberts (jse885@earthlink.net)
Date: Tue Nov 16 2004 - 14:48:30 GMT
DMB,
> In the Copleston annotations, on Coleridge, Pirsig says:
> "The MOQ denies this. (That Reason perceives truths which are incapable of
> verification in sense-experience.) Reason grows out of experience and is
> never independent from it.
>
> Scott commented:
> As an immediate counter-example, there is mathematics. Mathematics is
> non-empirical reality. ...In sum, you can choose to stick to the limited
> empirical viewpoint, with its limited view of mysticism, or you can choose
> to
> understand that Merrell-Wolff has rediscovered what Plotinus and others
> mean by Intellect as prior to empirical reality. In my opinion, the MOQ
can
> be expanded into a more adequate philosophy by these kind of insights.
>
> dmb says:
> I think Mark's rational empiricism is two thirds of the way there and
Scott
> is extremely confused. First of all, I'd argue that the MOQ is already
broad
> enough and already includes "these kinds of insights". Also, the MOQ
> expands empiricism way beyond the standard versions so that mystical
> experience can count as a valid form of empirical evidence. This is what I
> was getting at some weeks back with the concept of epistemological
> pluralism. Remember that?
[Scott:] Yes, but he is on dangerous ground here. The value that
traditional empiricism had was that whatever one came up with, one could
then say to a skeptic: Look. But with saying that "the values of art and
morality and even religious mysticism" are verifiable, he is open to
challenge. One cannot deny that value itself is verifiable. But which art
is good, and which is bad? If I say "punk rock is good", how do I defend
that against someone who disagrees? With mysticism, the problem is that not
everybody is a mystic. Further, mystics say different things. Some describe
their experience as "being in the presence of God" and some as "being
identical to God". On what basis should we choose between these two
different descriptions? Wilber's point, that there is a method by which one
can "look", is not the same as the methods of science or mathematics. Even
if a student of mathematics does not make the grade to becoming a
professional mathematician, he or she has still learned mathematics on the
way. The student of mysticism, on the other hand, has nothing if he or she
"drops out" except for the physiological and psychological benefits of
meditation. Those are good, but infinitely less than Awakening. This makes
the analogy with Spencer Brown's injunctive language pretty weak.
For those without mystical experience, one can only accept it on authority,
which is definitely not empirical. For those who have had one kind of
experience, which may be different from what the MOQ assumes, how is the
MOQ to convince that that experience is "incorrect"?
>
> In any case, to take your counter-example for example, its clear that you
> have not noticed what this expanded empiricism means. As MSH has pointed
> out, mental experience counts as experience within rational empiricism.
> Unlike the most narrow kind of empiricism, where only sensory exprience
> counts, rational empiricism would most definately say that mathematical is
> an entirely empirical reality.
That's not what Pirsig said. He said "The MOQ denies this. (That Reason
perceives truths which are incapable of verification in sense-experience."
Mathematical truths are not verified in sense-experience. They are verified
through reason, so if you now say that the rational verification process is
itself experience, in order to keep with the next sentence: "Reason grows
out of experience and is
never independent from it.", then you are saying that, in the case of
mathematics, reason grows out of reason. What is clear from this is that
the way you want to extend "empirical" to include reason makes the word
"empirical" lose any distinctive value it might have. The philosophical
tradition known as "empiricism" arose to distinguish itself from the
tradition known as "rationalism", and both were SOM variants. Just
extending "empirical" to all sources of knowledge is a questionable move.
> But for guys like Wilber and Pirsig, we can
> add an eye of spirit to the eyes of the mind and of the flesh. All
emphasis
> and parenthemtical info is Ken Wilber's...
>
> "As G.Spencer Brown said, its very like baking a pie; you follow the
recipe
> (the injunction), you bake the pie, and tehn you actually taste it. To the
> question, 'What does pie taste like", we can only give the recipe to those
> who inquire and let them taste it for themselves.
> Likewise with the existence of Spirit: we CANNOT theoretically or verbally
> or philosophicall or rationally or mentally describe the answer in any
other
> ultimately satisfactory fashion except to say; ENGAGE THE INJUNCTION. If
you
> want to KNOW this, you must DO this. Any other appraoch and we would be
> trying to use the eye of the mind to see or state that which can be seen
> only with the eye of contemplation, and thus we would have nothing but
> metaphysics in the very worst sense - statements without evidence.
> Thus; take up the injunction or paradigm of meditation; polish and
practice
> that cognitive tool until awareness learns to discern the incredibly
subtle
> phenomena of spiritual data; chech your observatons with others who have
> done so, much as mathematicians will check their interior proofs with
others
> who have completed the injunctions; and thus confirm or reject your
results.
> And in the verification of that transcendental data, the existence of
Spirit
> will become radiantly clear - at least as clear as rocks are to the eye of
> flesh and geometry is to the eye of the mind.
> We have ssen that authentic spirituality is not the product of the eyye of
> flesh and its sensory empiricism, not the eye of mind and its rational
> empirisicm, but only, finally , the eye of contemplationn andk it
spiritual
> empirisim(religious experience, spiritual illumination, or satori, by
> whatever name).
> In the West, since Kant - and since the differentiations of modernity -
> religion (and metaphysics in gernal) has fallen on hard times. I maintain
> that it has done so precisely because it attempted to do with the eye
ofthe
> mind that which can only be done with the eye of contemplation. Becaseu
the
> mind could not actually deliver the metaphysical goods, and yet kept
loudly
> claiming that it could, somebody was bound to blow the whistle and demand
> real evidence. Kant made the demand, and metaphysics collasped - and
rightly
> so, in its typical form."
>
> In sum, a lot more counts as empirical when where talking about all three
> eyss, see? Below, I've added some parenthetical info to Pirsig's comments
to
> show how they connect with Wilber's thoughts...
Then why does Pirsig disagree with Coleridge? The "eye of the Spirit" is
what Coleridge means by "That Reason perceives truths which are incapable
of verification in sense-experience." Pirsig denies this. Remember that
Coleridge uses the word "Reason" in distinction from what he calls
"understanding", which is that which is verifiable by sense-experience. So
for Coleridge, the vocabulary to be used is "the eye of the flesh", "the
eye of the understanding", and "the eye of Reason". The difference between
Pirsig and Coleridge is that for Coleridge, DQ should be named Dynamic
Reason.
Now this is more than just a difference in vocabulary. By treating DQ as
Reason, Coleridge is making a connection between the reason we use to
understand the world of experience with the Reason that makes that world.
This is what I tried to explain in the "A bit of reasoning" thread. It is,
of course, not the case that our understanding is necessarily correct -- it
is often incorrect. But it is the same faculty, just that as it occurs in
us, it is limited and prone to error by being impure (mixed up with
emotions, for example), and the only worlds we make are on the social and
intellectual levels. By purifying that faculty, we improve our reason to
become Reason -- not to make inorganic and biological worlds, but to Know
through Identity the Reason that did. This goes beyond what Pirsig's
vocabulary will allow. Pirsig can only say that ideas are as real as rocks
and trees. He misses that rocks and trees are Ideas (or at least their
manifestation).
The point of the Merrell-Wolff quotes was to bring out that intellect and
Intellect played a central role in FMW's mystical unfoldment. There is, of
course, a great deal of overlap with other philosophical mysticism, but one
gets no sense of this role of intellect in Pirsig's treatment of intellect,
where it is mainly seen as covering up DQ, and Intellect is not mentioned
at all.
- Scott
MOQ.ORG - http://www.m
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