From: Phaedrus Wolff (PhaedrusWolff@carolina.rr.com)
Date: Sun Dec 12 2004 - 05:52:31 GMT
dmb) -- You gotta remember Kant's place in history. He was writing and
thinking in an atmosphere of materialism, objectivity, the mirror of nature, realism,
rationalism and all those various permutations of SOM. Kant was no mystic
and so his conception of the nomena is not like the "nothingness" of the
East or like Pirsig's DQ. Rather it is more like the assertion that there is
an objective, divided reality out there, but we can never really know it.
The mystic, by contrast, says that we can not only experience reality
directly, but also that we ARE that reality. In Kant's view there is an
impossble gulf between phenomena and nomena, between subjects and the
objective world and never the twain shall meet. Philosophical mysticism
asserts that this is the illusion to be overcome and there is no gulf at
all. See?
Hi dmb, Sam, and all,
May I ask If I understand what you are saying?
Kant's way of looking at this is that the mind asks questions that the mind
cannot answer(?) So if a mystic experience doesn't come from 'sense'
intuition, it didn't happen. Right?
I agree with what you are saying, and do not have that great a recall from
what I read, so anything I offer may be more from a feeling about what I
read than the actual words. Kant seemed to be in arguments with himself, as
he questioned the ability of reason itself.
From what he was saying, as well as what you are saying, it takes a 'Leap of
faith' to believe in mysticism. I don't argue that he disagreed with the
mystical experience, but that was because he saw it as problematic, not that
he felt he had proven it not to be, but that he couldn't prove it to be.
And, as dmb says, if you are going to prove it in dialectic terms, then it
must be reasoned. In order to be reasoned, it would need to be experienced
by all who are involved.
It is kinda like the experience of rape. The raped may not mention it until
a support system has been set up; often when others come forward. It may be
the same with mystical experiences -- the most reasonable are the ones who
do not experience it, so you are silent in fear of being looked upon as a
freak, or insane. But, when a support system like MOQ comes along, then it
frees those who have experienced the mystic to come forward, or of course
just simply those who have experienced it, not being labeled.
The fact that the mind can ask questions that the mind cannot answer would
mean?
If the question can be asked, where did the question come from? Kant never
really finished this(?)
Thanks for letting me try out my new email system. :o)
Chin
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Buchanan" <DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 5:40 PM
Subject: RE: MD Is the MoQ still in the Kantosphere?
> Sam and all MOQers:
>
> Sam Norton wrote:
> Schleiermacher's influence on the way in which mysticism was studied was
> huge, and his conception
> dominated academic studies of the question from his own time until very
> recently. The academic
> studies built up through the nineteenth century all shared an acceptance
of
> the Kantian problematic,
> i.e. that division between the 'phenomenal' and the 'noumenal', and viewed
> mystical understandings
> as in some way bypassing the normal constraints of intellect, in order to
> access reality directly.
> Hence Rudolf Otto, for example, whose 'numinous' is the same as Kant's
> transcendent realm.
>
> dmb says:
> I could have jumped in before this point but picked this late one out of
> mercy for the readers. There are two main objections that spring to mind.
> The first one concerns mixing Kant's epistemology with the assertions of
> mysticism. I think you have confused or conflated some ideas that can't
> rightly be compared. For example, when Kant used the word transcendent to
> describe the categories of the mind, he was NOT refering to the ineffable,
> undivided mystical reality so much as the pre-given filters of perception.
> They are transcendent in the sense that they're concieved as existing
prior
> to experience in the same way eyes exist before we actually use them to
look
> at stuff. The transcendental categories are like the various settings on a
> pasta maker that gives shape to the blob of dough. And so the distinction
> between Kant's phenomenal and noumenal is just a particular form of
> subject-object metaphysics. As I understand intellectual history, Kant
marks
> the shift from Modern to Postmodern with this move. The mirror of nature
has
> taken a serious hit insofar as we do not reflect objective reality, but
> rather shape it with our perceptions, but Kant's categories have been
> replaced by a much rich view of these so-called filters. Matt K will be
glad
> to tell you all about how the "inguistic turn" is the discovery of the
huge
> effect of culture and language on our perceptions. In fact, the more
extreme
> postmoderns will assert that there is nothing else except these filters.
> Kant has been thoroughly out-Kanted. The second objection is that
mysticism
> has to do with your idea of a "modern synthesis"...
>
> Sam wrote:
> It is William James' version of mysticism, derived from Schleiermacher,
> which has dominated the 20th
> century investigations, and for my purposes here I would point out that,
in
> this understanding - let
> us call it the "Modern synthesis" - mystical experience is rare, private
and
> experiential; those who
> enjoy such experiences are spiritually significant and blessed; but they
are
> the inheritors of the
> great spiritual teachers of the past, and they have access to the common
> root which supports all the
> different religious traditions of the world.
>
> dmb says:
> We have language and concepts available to us that didn't exist in the
past,
> but I'm quite certain that philosophical mysticism existed LOOOOONG before
> Schleiermacher. Socrates spoke of that "divine madness" and the new
> testament is littered with references to it. I could dig up a gazillion
> ancient descriptions of the mystical experience and you'd still recognize
it
> as the same experience we talk about today. Its only natural that we use
> modern language to discuss it today.
>
> Sam raised some Philosophical problems:
> - the problem of 'essentialism', that is, the assumption that there is a
> 'common core' underlying all the different manifestations of mystical
> experience. This is an inheritance from the Cartesian program, seeking a
> reductive explanation of phenomena. If you accept, e.g., the
Wittgensteinian
> notion of 'family resemblance' then it becomes problematic to insist upon
a
> common core lying underneath difference;
>
> dmb says:
> I don't see how essentialism, Cartesianism or reductionism enters into the
> equation. The assertion is simply that people have reported and described
> the same experience and that they have done so regardless of their
> particular culture, time and place. This is simply recognizing a pattern.
> The only thing that can be reasonable in dispute is the meaning of these
> reports. Nothing needs to be assumed. One reads account after account and
> notices a common theme. Recognition of this common core is a conclusion, a
> point of view based on evidence, not an assumptiom.
>
> Sam said:
> - in discussing the ineffable characteristics of mystical experience, the
> expression
> 'non-conceptual' (and equivalents) are being used to stand for conceptual
> terms. Put differently, if
> a mystical experience has some impact upon a person's understanding then
it
> must be 'ascribable' to
> that person, by themselves or another, and so the insistence on
> 'non-conceptuality' is
> self-contradicting;
>
> dmb says:
> I don't quite follow the reasoning here. But if I had to guess, you're
> troubled by a seemingly inconsistent assertion that a mystical experience
is
> both ineffable and noetic, that it is beyond concepts and it imparts
> knowledge at the same time. Is that about right? As I understand it, this
is
> only a problem is we are claiming that the knowledge we gain from such an
> experience is conceptual, but its not conceptual. This is why we usually
> talk about it in metaphors or in terms of what it is NOT. And you may
recall
> my explanations concerning epistemological pluralism. In those terms we
> would say that concepts are seen with the eye of the mind rather than with
> the eye of flesh and that the eye of contemplation is a third kind that is
> neither. This 3rd one is the eye with which we "see" in a mystical
> experience. So the apparent conflict here disappears when we say that the
> knowlege gained from a mystical experience cannot be expressed in
concepts,
> but we do it anyway.
>
> Sam said:
> - the "Modern synthesis" depends upon an individualist epistemology, again
> deriving from Descartes,
> which makes what happens to a particular ego central. If this is rejected
> (which it generally has
> been) then, once more, the synthesis breaks down.
>
> dmb says:
> Well, no. Let us not forget that one of the central assertions of
> philosophical mysticism is that ego-consciousness is dissolved in the
> experience. Except for the fact that people have both ego and mystical
> experiences, the mystical conception of self is quite opposite from
> Descartes'. That's the source of the isolated lonliness that Pirsig is
> trying to get rid of.
>
> Sam quoted - The French church historian Henri de Lubac:
> "The links of Denis, the first and most influential of
> the great mystical theologians, with Neoplatonism are undeniable. But
> precisely that which, for
> Denis himself, constitutes mysticism, is not what these experiences which
he
> describes my have in
> common with, for example, those of Plotinus. It is, on the contrary, their
> position at the
> intersection of a whole specifically Christian spiritual tradition of
> scriptural interpretation and
> the ecclesiastical experience of the liturgy, the eucharistic liturgy. His
> mystical theology, as he
> understands it himself, is his manner of recognising the Christ, at the
> breaking of bread, in all
> the scriptures."
>
> dmb says:
> If I understand this at all, Lubac is saying that mysticism is not about
the
> experiences reported by people like Plotinus. He's saying mysticism is,
> instead, reading the bible and participating in rituals? This is where
> Pirsig's comments about shutting out the light come in. His assertion is
> that myth and ritual serve as a static portrait of DQ, but that the
problem
> comes in when those static portraits are not seen as such, are not used to
> guide the practicioner toward an experince of their own but are instead
seen
> as the point and purpose of religion in themselves. This seems to be the
> crime of which Lubac is guilty. As I understand it, Lubac doesn't
understand
> that such rituals are vehicles of transformation and his misunderstanding
> has lead him to worship a stationary car with no wheels rather than use it
> to go some place. This is the attitude that has put the churches up on
> blocks in the front yard. This is what makes the churches broken down and
> obsolete. They don't function as vehicles and do not even understand that
> they should.
>
> Sam said:
> - As more research has been done directly on the Christian mystical
> tradition, it has become more
> and more clear that not only are the Christian mystics themselves not
> interested in their own
> 'experiences' (understood as private, ineffable, noetic etc), but that
their
> precise arguments are
> to undermine and critique the emphasis upon such exotic experiences, as a
> snare and spiritual
> delusion, leading to the vices of self-absorption and Titanism.
>
> dmb asks:
> Delusion, self-absorption and Titanism? Please explain.
>
> Sam wrote:
> If the academic community is right in rejecting the Kantian problematic,
and
> therefore the 'Modern synthesis' understanding of mysticism - and the
> grounds for doing so are really quite overwhelming - where does that leave
> Pirsig and the MoQ?
>
> dmb says:
> I don't think these dominos tumble in the order you suggest for the
reasons
> outlined above. And I'm a bit baffled by the claim that "the grounds for
> doing so are quite overwhelming" and you're being awfully vague about "the
> academic community". May I assume that you mean theological circles?
>
> Sam wrapped it up:
> For the links
> between the MoQ and Schleiermacher's project seem profound, even down to
> some of the language used.
> Is it accurate to describe the MoQ as simply a redescription of
> Schleiermacher's scheme, that is, is
> not Dynamic Quality merely a Kantian 'pure experience', and the levels of
> Static Quality merely a
> redescription of phenomena? If not, why not? This is not to suggest a
direct
> borrowing, only to
> point out that Pirsig's work - probably via William James - has inherited
a
> conceptual shape from
> Schleiermacher, and that conceptual shape is very largely discredited
within
> the academic community.
>
> dmb says:
> Well, yes, its pretty clear that Schleiermacher, James and Pirsig are all
> talking about the same experience, but this is not particularly modern,
does
> not begin with Schleiermacher and doesn't rest upon Kant's epistemology.
>
> You gotta remember Kant's place in history. He was writing and thinking in
> an atmosphere of materialism, objectivity, the mirror of nature, realism,
> rationalism and all those various permutations of SOM. Kant was no mystic
> and so his conception of the nomena is not like the "nothingness" of the
> East or like Pirsig's DQ. Rather it is more like the assertion that there
is
> an objective, divided reality out there, but we can never really know it.
> The mystic, by contrast, says that we can not only experience reality
> directly, but also that we ARE that reality. In Kant's view there is an
> impossble gulf between phenomena and nomena, between subjects and the
> objective world and never the twain shall meet. Philosophical mysticism
> asserts that this is the illusion to be overcome and there is no gulf at
> all. See?
>
> Eyes shape and divide the world. Cultures and ideas shape and divide the
> world. The mystical experience removes those shapes and divisions, not to
> get a clear picture of things, but to dissolve things and see the
undivided
> reality. Its not a matter of a subject getting an unfiltered picture of
the
> objective reality because those are among the divisions that are
dissolved,
> see? That's where the loss of ego comes in, see? And this is where
concepts
> fail because concepts are all about definitions and divisions, see? How's
> that for starters?
>
> dmb
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