From: Scott Roberts (email@example.com)
Date: Sun Jan 30 2005 - 05:14:47 GMT
> No, the MOQ states that static patterns block the direct perception of
> DQ and are deduced from the primary undifferentiated experience of DQ,
> but it does not claim that static patterns aren't real. This seems to be
> a common misconception, caused, I think, by the attempt to identify
> Pirsig with this and that philosophy.
As so often, to make my main point, I get careless on a minor one. Yes, the
MOQ considers concepts as real as rocks and trees. But the main point is
that "static patterns block the direct perception of DQ" is in the same mold
as Kant's "the human conceptual structure blocks perception of the
real-in-itself". With the difference that the MOQ holds that the block is
removable, while Kant thinks it isn't.
> Scott said:
> The MOQ claim that DQ is "pre-intellectual" is a Kantian pattern.
> No it isn't, Kant maintains that pre-intellectual reality (which to him
> means things-in-themselves which is also not the same as Pirsig) is
> something we cannot experience. DQ *is* experience. This is yet another
> misdirected attempt to pin the MOQ down as Kantian.
Since Kant's "things-in-themselves" is completely unknowable, one cannot say
that it isn't, say "no-thing-ness", or something like DQ. That is, if I have
never experienced pure DQ, then I have no basis for saying that the two
unknowns are the same or different. And, if I have never experienced pure
DQ, how can I say it is experience?
That the claim that DQ is "pre-intellectual" is a Kantian pattern follows
from Kant's position that it is conceptual structure that blocks experience
of reality-in-itself. That is the same thing that Pirsig says, substituting
DQ-in-itself (i.e., unmediated by intellectual SPOV) for reality-in-itself.
> Scott said:
> So in this means of getting back into touch with reality, it also
> reinforces the Kantian duality between the conceptual and reality. As
> James, and most philosophies of mysticism have done since Kant.
> In the MOQ, the distinction is between conceptualised reality (forms)
> and non-conceptualised reality (formlessness).
[Scott:] Yes, but having two kinds of reality, where one is a higher grade
than the other, makes the MOQ dualistic. The MOQ posits the reality of
formless reality *distinct* from formed reality. How, then, can it get to
saying that the formless is not other than form, that form is not other than
the formless? As long as it sees the intellect as SQ, as blocking DQ, this
duality will remain. Instead, I recommend treating intellect (and
consciousness, experience, awareness, perception, etc.) as DQ and SQ in
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