From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Sun Feb 20 2005 - 20:27:36 GMT
Ant,
Rather than reply to your replies individually, let me give an overview of
where I am coming from. Most of your comments can be addressed with this
overview,though I respond to some specifically below.
Most of my criticisms of the MOQ derive from two sources. One comes from my
thinking about consciousness and language, and the other comes from the
Buddhist doctrine that form is formlessness, formlessness is form. It is my
opinion that the MOQ has not grasped this latter, and that in its thinking
about consciousness and language it is stuck in materialist beliefs.
Nishitani Keiji's "Religion and Nothingness" identifies three stages:
- the field of reason and the senses
- the field of nihility
- the field of emptiness
SOM is a case of the first. The second results from rejecting SOM, and finds
that everything and the self are non-substantial, that all "thingness"
arises as Kant observed, from the self's organization. Add that the idea of
substantial self is also a construction and you get nihilism. This is where
I see the MOQ as sitting, in the field of nihility.
But the Middle Way is intended to avoid both extremes, substantialism (as in
SOM) and nihilism (as in MOQ). The rheomode is a nihilist philosophy, as is
non-substantialist materialism (such as Dennett's -- when I mentioned
Dennett I should have said that his philosophy is compatible with a
rheomode, not that he advocated a rheomode.)
Nishitani argues that the nothingness of the field of nihility is still,
very subtly, an object. It is nothingness on the "far side", as he puts it,
something that exists prior to the self's putting it into somethingness
(this last is my phrasing, not Nishitani's). This means it is a relative
nothingness. To move to the field of emptiness, or Absolute Nothingness as
he also calls it, one needs to empty out the concept of nothingness. Then
things and the self come back into existence, but in the field of emptiness,
instead of in the field of SOM. They now have what he calls "non-substantial
substantiality", or they exist because they do not exist. And all things are
seen as selves (no more SOM, or absolute division into mind and nature). In
other words, one needs the logic of contradictory identity to say anything
about the field of emptiness to avoid falling into a substantialist or a
nihilist error. To speak of reality as the rheomode is to fall into nihilist
error.
But this can be seen without resorting to "formlessness if form, form is
formlessness" as revelation, but only if one purges one's thinking of the
SOM materialist prejudice that ordinary awareness or consciousness (I use
the words interchangeably) could have arisen out of a world without it. That
belief that there was a world without consciousness arose from the SOM split
into mind and nature, where nature is seen as non-conscious and
non-thinking. Materialism then tries to explain mind as developing out of
mindless nature. *So does the MOQ*. (Actually, neither the MOQ nor
materialism has an "explanation". They simply assume it.) I have tried to
argue that this can't be done, but it is a difficult argument to get across.
Here is one attempt (from a post to Platt on Merrell-Wolff's referring to a
"kind of thinking" where the law of contradiction doesn't apply -- i.e.,
contradictory identity):
"The closest I have been able to come to what I think M-W is referring to is
when I think about consciousness, in particular to its durational and
changing aspects. To be aware of a change (say one note to another in a
melody), something had to endure across the change. But to be aware of the
enduring (both notes as one melody, or even one continuous note), something
had to change. So conscious is not changing because it is changing, and it
is changing because it is not changing. One can't get out of this
contradictoriness with the idea that a part is staying the same while a part
is changing, since that just pushes the problem back to the part that is
staying the same: how can it be aware of change without changing, and if it
is enduring through the change, how can it be changing?"
In the rheomode, change is taken as fundamental, which means that continuity
could never come into existence, and so there could be no awareness. In a
substantialist philosophy, continuity is taken as fundamental, which means
change is seen as "accidental". What is fundamental can only be thought of
in terms of contradictory identity, as in "form is formlessness,
formlessness is form" or in this case "consciousness is not-changing because
it is changing, and changing because it is not-changing".
A couple of other remarks.
Actually, I like Bohm's distinction into the implicate and explicate
order -- just his rheomode underwhelms me. And the implicate and explicate
need to be treated as a contradictory identity.
Ant McWatt states:
This doesn't follow. Buddhist philosophy and modern physicists point
towards reality being primarily in the rheomode.
Scott:
Physicists ignore consciousness. On Buddhist philosophy, we are clearly
seeing it differently.
Ant McWatt states:
So awareness (which is an experience) requires intellectual constructions to
operate? That's a bit like saying a motorcyclist needs to be able to
explain the workings of an internal combustion engine in order to ride a
bike or an apple falls downwards because of the theory of gravity. A rider
rides, an apple falls irrespective of the theories concerning why and how
these events happen.
Scott:
I argue that awareness is an act of intellect which is a manifestation of
value. An apple falls because it is manifesting a SPOV, a universal. You are
making a materialist assumption that nature has no intellect.
Ant McWatt states:
Well, I think this is the crux of the matter. Pirsig is assuming that all
there has been and all there ever will be are values. If awareness is
defined as self-consciousness it has only developed relatively recently and
will possibly disappear at some point in the future.
To deny that values are self-contained is to re-introduce SOM via having a
"senser" and "something sensed".
Scott:
"only developed recently" is a materialist assumption. I argue that
consciousness, value, and intellect are ultimately the same (non-)thing: the
field of emptiness in which there *are* selves, though they exist by
negating themselves.
Ant McWatt adds:
Why I think this is happening is because Scott still hasn't got his head
around the fundamental tenet of the MOQ i.e. that (ontologically) values
come before subjects and objects, not simultaneously with them and certainly
not before them. Without taking this tenet fully on board, confusion
regarding Pirsig's work will follow.
Scott:
I understand the tenet, but I reject it. Pirsig assumes that values come
before subjects and objects, but why should I accept that assumption? To
place undifferentiated value before thingness and selfness is to remain in
the field of nihility. It is a subtle dualism, because it has reified (and
perhaps deified) Nothingness. Until value/nothingness and selfness/thingness
are identified in contradictory identity, one has not moved to the field of
emptiness.
- Scott
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ant McWatt" <antmcwatt@hotmail.co.uk>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Sunday, February 20, 2005 8:18 AM
Subject: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic
Scott Roberts stated February 18th:
>I've read Bohm's book, and am underwhelmed.
Ant McWatt states:
Scott,
Sorry to hear to hear you were "under whelmed" by Bohm's "Wholeness & the
Implicate Order". I wonder if Krishnamurti felt the same way.
>What this and other process philosophies overlook is awareness.
Ant McWatt states:
I think it would be helpful if you could explain why in greater detail.
>If reality were entirely in the rheomode, there would be no awareness.
Ant McWatt states:
This doesn't follow. Buddhist philosophy and modern physicists point
towards reality being primarily in the rheomode.
>which requires the contradictory
>identity of things versus events, or continuity versus change.
Ant McWatt states:
So awareness (which is an experience) requires intellectual constructions to
operate? That's a bit like saying a motorcyclist needs to be able to
explain the workings of an internal combustion engine in order to ride a
bike or an apple falls downwards because of the theory of gravity. A rider
rides, an apple falls irrespective of the theories concerning why and how
these events happen.
>If all is flux, how is there awareness of flux?
Ant McWatt states:
A part of the flux becomes aware of another part of the flux?
>How is it that rain can be considered to be *still* happening?
Ant McWatt states:
Scott. Your phrasing is ambiguous here so it is not clear what you are
trying to convey.
>Ant McWatt stated:
>
>The MOQ's use of the four static levels and Dynamic Quality does not
>preclude it from using the rheomode. I'd love to see an SOM philosophy
>even
>attempt to.
>
>Scott:
>Materialism, a la Dennett is a SOM philosophy that does.
Ant McWatt states:
It would be helpful if you could please state the particular text where
Dennett uses the rheomode. Seeing is believing!
>Ant McWatt stated:
>
>I think the differences between materialism and the MOQ are actually
>fundamental.
>
>Firstly, materialism tends to take statements about reality literally while
>- instead -the MOQ takes statements about reality as provisional high
>quality ideas i.e. more figuratively.
>
>Scott:
>I don't see this, at least since Kuhn. Pretty much any thinker is aware of
>the provisional nature of all theoretical constructs.
Ant McWatt states:
I still think that the emphasis on the provisional nature of our thoughts
about what constitutes reality is stronger in the MOQ than most modern
philosophies. Moreover, notice the word "tend" and "more" in my original
paragraph.
>Ant said:
>Secondly, materialism sees everything in the universe as being composed of
>physical substance while the MOQ sees it as composed of value - physical
>substance being just one (probable) manifestation of value.
>
>Scott:
>True, this is different. But as I have argued, a manifestation of value
>only
>makes sense if there is awareness of value.
Ant McWatt states:
Well, I think this is the crux of the matter. Pirsig is assuming that all
there has been and all there ever will be are values. If awareness is
defined as self-consciousness it has only developed relatively recently and
will possibly disappear at some point in the future.
To deny that values are self-contained is to re-introduce SOM via having a
"senser" and "something sensed".
David Buchanan stated February 20th:
Scott is exactly wrong. In fact, one could make a case that the MOQ takes
much of it shape by opposing materialism and theism. To accurately describe
materialism and theism is to accurately describe what the MOQ is NOT and is
against. It's remarkable, really. It's like Scott has made a game of it and
has devoted himself to avoiding correct interpretations at all costs.
Ant McWatt adds:
Why I think this is happening is because Scott still hasn't got his head
around the fundamental tenet of the MOQ i.e. that (ontologically) values
come before subjects and objects, not simultaneously with them and certainly
not before them. Without taking this tenet fully on board, confusion
regarding Pirsig's work will follow.
>The MOQ is silent on this.
Of course it is because it isn't a form of SOM!
>Was there consciousness before the biological level came into being?
No. But of course, like "awareness", consciousness is one of those slippery
words in philosophology and philosophy. To return to my point with
"experience", this is why it is important (if wanting to avoid the
production of nonsense) to place a particular's philosopher understandings
of terms in the context of their own paradigm.
>Ant said:
>Thirdly, static quality patterns and DQ are both designed to take account
>of
>value not just DQ alone
>
>Scott:
>But my complaint about the MOQ is that DQ is seen as simply that which
>makes
>new SQ out of old. How is this different from an Intelligent Design theory?
Intelligent Design Theory has pre-set static ends. The MOQ has an
open-ended Dynamic "end". A critical difference in my opinion.
>Ant said:
>Fourthly, the chasm caused by the mind-matter split in SOM is bridged in
>the
>MOQ by its reduction of mind and matter to value patterns. Chapter 3 of my
>PhD thesis goes into this in great detail.
>
>Scott:
>But (as I have argued) value implies awareness of value,
Only if you take an SOM stance. The MOQ is intuitively "wrong" for the
typical Western mind and it is this priority of subjects and objects before
values which need to be mentally broken. Pirsig argues that metaphysics is
improved by placing values first and I think you should examine the
pragmatic results and consequences of his "Copernican inversion" in order to
judge the merits of his system rather than begging the question in the first
place.
>which is the
>interplay of universals and particulars, which is intellect. As long as the
>MOQ sees intellect as only one hierarchical level, it has split mind and
>matter a la SOM.
No, it hasn't because unlike SOM, the MOQ perceives mind and matter as the
same type of fundamental 'substance'. Similar looking pews but different
churches.
>Ant said:
> >the MOQ has added DQ to account for value and as a means for development
>up
> >the levels (in which role it seems to me to be theistic).
>
>I don't think "theism" is a good term to apply in the context of the MOQ.
>It implies incorrectly that Dynamic Quality has a personality or is
>supernatural or can be prayed to or is fundamentally separate from the
>static quality patterns.
>
>Scott:
>Something that can make new SQ out of old is supernatural, unless you say
>it
>"just happens", as a materialist would.
So if I build a motorbike from various mechanical components or make an
omelette from two eggs this is supernatural? You're expanding the term
"supernatural" so much as to make it meaningless. Anyway, that static
patterns value a new state of being does not entail a supernatural element.
>Scott said:
> >With respect to what you say here, I will point out that you emphasize
> >language's role in discriminating, and hence limiting the full panoply of
> >that of which it is possible to be aware. This can be turned around, by
> >saying that language (or better, intellect) creates *by* discriminating.
> >Without it there is only chaos. By making distinctions, reality comes
>into
> >being.
>
>Ant McWatt stated:
>
>I think this is an SOM (and incorrect) way of looking at things. In the
>MOQ, "Being" (i.e. Dynamic Quality) is primary, out of this "Being" arises
>intellectual patterns which in turn create distinctions. If "Being" was
>chaotic (rather than composed of values) then the intellectual patterns
>couldn't arise (because they would not be valued) and, in consequence, the
>distinctions would not (eventually) arise.
>
>Scott:
>I fail to see how saying that DQ is "composed of values" is compatible with
>DQ being "undifferentiated".
Ant McWatt states:
"Composed" probably wasn't the best term in this context. However, the fact
remains that DQ (understood as the totality of existence) appears to be a
process of value evolution rather than a state of chaos.
>As I see it, what you have said here is on the
>slippery slope to Platonic Ideas (or at least Plotinian Intellect), but
>since that is more or less what I think -- subject to 2000+ years of
>development --, then that is all to the good.
Ant McWatt states:
A conflation of intellect (as understood by Pirsig) with Dynamic Quality
will be confusing if applied to the MOQ. A real spanner in the works which
I oppose to.
>Ant said:
>Finally, Scott, I don't know if have got round to reading the Copleston
>annotations by Pirsig yet (as Paul Turner and David Buchanan have recently
>shown in their excellent posts over the last six weeks) but these may help
>clear-up a few aspects of the MOQ for you.
>
>Scott:
>I've read them. They haven't changed my view of the MOQ.
Ant McWatt states: OK.
>And that you call
>posts in which the author (DMB) calls me "confused", "having a blindspot",
>"hypnotized", "unable to read", because he misreads what I have I said,
>responding abusively to imagined disagreements and not actual ones -- that
>you call them "excellent" boggles my mind.
Ant McWatt states:
When I stated that David Buchanan's posts were generally excellent I was
referring to their intellectual content - the way David clarifies and
expands various parts of the MOQ rather than referring to his insults.
However, I can see why he (and Marsha) are frustrated with your recent posts
because you are tending to distort the MOQ rather than clarifying or adding
to it. Of course, that's a generalisation as, on the other hand, you have
made some very good observations. You wouldn't be quoted twice in my PhD
if that wasn't the case!
>Paul's though, are generally
>helpful, though he has not of late responded to my criticisms, for example,
>of whether or not the MOQ should be called empirical, by any definition.
Ant McWatt states:
I think the above paragraph comes back to what a particular philosopher
understands by the term "empirical" rather than the generalisations of a
standard undergraduate textbook. I therefore tend to agree with Ron
Winchester's line with this particular debate.
Best wishes,
Anthony.
www.anthonymcwatt.co.uk
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