RE: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic

From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sun Mar 13 2005 - 01:44:34 GMT

  • Next message: Dan Glover: "Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic"

    Sam, Ant and all MOQists:

    Ant McWatt quoted Northrop ("Logic of the Sciences & Humanities",p.376-77):

    "The divine object in the West is an unseen God the Father. This means that
    He cannot be known by the aesthetic intuition after the manner of the divine

    being of the Orient. Christ tells us that His kingdom is not of this world.
    St. Paul asserts that the things that are seen are temporal and that it is
    only the things which are unseen which are eternal. All the theistic
    religions affirm in addition that the determinate personality is immortal.
    Certainly this is not true of the self given with immediacy in the aesthetic

    intuition.... Western religion becomes [therefore] defined as one which
    identifies the divine with the timeless or invariant factor in the theoretic

    component [of knowledge]."

    "This explains why the Far Eastern religions do not need a religious prophet

    if the divine is to be revealed to man, and why the Western religions must
    have one. If the divine is given with immediacy then it is here in the world

    of immediate intuition already without the mediation of a divinely inspired
    representative. Thus all that religious sages in the Orient have to do is to

    direct one's attention to the factor given with immediacy [i.e. Kant's
    phenomena] with which the divine is identified..."

    "If, however, the divine is identified with an unseen factor in the nature
    of things, then obviously the only way in which man can know God with the
    immediacy of the aesthetic intuition is by a divinely inspired being
    representing God coming into the world of immediacy. Hence the religious
    prophet without whom man in the theistic religions cannot be saved, becomes
    essential."

    Sam nixed the quote and replied:
    If Northrop is the guide for what the 'tradition of Western religion' is,
    then no wonder there is confusion. Let's just say that if what he said is
    true, then the Incarnation makes no sense (because a human being is clearly
    a visible object). So what Northrop is saying is that the tradition of
    Western religion is one that denies the incarnation..... (Perhaps he was
    just referring to modern American Protestantism, where the point may have
    some force). In any case, his assertion bears no relation to the major part
    of the Western religious tradition and, as it stands, is simply false.

    dmb says:
    He says the tradition DENIES the incarnation?!? Look again. Northrop is
    saying the very opposite. He's saying the Western religious tradition "must
    have one" that it becomes "the only way" and is "essential" to Western
    religions. And why "must" they? And how is it that they "do not need a
    religious prophet" in Buddhism? East and West have very different ideas
    about "God" and our relationship to him. Do you recall my complaints that
    the Western religions are religions of exile? Do you recall my complaints
    that Western religions are concerned with the fate of the ego self while the
    East says that is the very illusion to be overcome? This is what Northrop is
    talking about here in these quotes. You've blithely dismissed it as "simply
    false". But I definately get the impression that you have not even begun to
    see what is being said here. Please slow down and give it some thought.

    I would also draw your attention to the first Northorop paragraph, where he
    is marking the East/West differences in concepts of the self. There he says
    that theism affirms "that the determinate personality is immortal. Certainly
    this is not true of the self given with immediacy". At this point it might
    be good to remember that Pirsig rejects the pre-existing self and theism. It
    might help to recall that Pirsig quotes the Eastern idea that "Thou Art
    That". You might also recall that "Thou Art That" is also the title of a
    Joseph Campbell book that I quoted on this very topic several times.

    Its hard to be explicit about connecting all these dots (without being
    unforgivably long-winded) and there are lots more unmentioned dots that
    would add to this same picture. But basically, these words from Northrop
    touch on many of the issues we've been debating for years. (I don't know
    about you, but I'm convinced time with Northrop would be time well spent and
    intend to pick up some new books. Thanks, Ant!) As I mentioned recently,
    we're only disagreeing about silly little things like God and man.

    Sam said to Ant:
    It's your chapter 3 that I'm wanting to focus in on. My point is a simple
    one: if mind and matter are seen as the same sort of thing (ontologically)
    then Descartes is still the dominant influence. At least, that is what I
    take from the studies I have made on the matter, and what I take
    Wittgenstein to have established, and what Lash is referring to. Hence I was

    quoting your thesis (p168), where you explicitly state that they ARE
    ontologically identical.

    dmb butts in:
    Not that Ant needs any help here, but I wanted to offer one simple idea. It
    seems to me that SOM asserts an ontological line between subjects and
    objects. Its not just that SOM makes a distinction between the two, its that
    one or the other or both are the starting points of reality. By contrast,
    the MOQ draws the line betweeen DQ and sq. And this brings us to the one
    simple idea. The MOQ has shifted subject and objects so that they are now on
    one side of a new line. We can still make a distinction between them, but
    metaphysically speaking they are of one substance. They are both static
    quality and they exist in an evolutionary relationship to each other rather
    than one of correspondence or whatever else SOM tried to do. I think this is
    what Ant means in saying that "mental substances and material substances can
    be perceived as ontologically identical i.e. as intellectual quality
    patterns and inorganic quality patterns respectively." (p 168)

    Ant said to Sam:
    If you get round to read Northrop at some point, you will see that he had
    certainly broken away enough from SOM to avoid the Kantian problems that
    your essay is concerned with so when Pirsig was reading James in the 1970s
    (to research LILA), thirty years had nearly passed since he had first been
    influenced by Northrop's East Asian conceptual framework in "The Meeting of
    East and West", the work on Zen by D.T. Suzuki and the philosophy tutors in
    Benares. There is therefore no substance to the argument that a Kantian
    metaphysic had been transferred to Pirsig via James and Northrop.

    Sam asked Ant:
    You say a few times "Pirsig introduces a new metaphysical system based
    essentially on Mahayana Buddhism" and similar expressions, which seems to
    imply that the problems now identified with the Jamesian approach have no
    purchase on systems based on Easter thought. Yet Pirsig also says that his
    view incorporates elements from James, Northrop etc. and he states quite
    explicitly "The Metaphysics of Quality is a continuation of the mainstream
    of twentieth-century American philosophy". What I want to know is whether
    all criticisms of that mainstream can be sidestepped by a claim that
    Buddhist thought is immune from contamination. What is the relative status
    of these two elements? In other words,...

    dmb says:
    Its not that the East is immune or that all criticism can be sidestepped by
    using it in the MOQ. Its simply that Western systems have not generally done
    what Pirsig is doing. Its simply that we will misunderstand the MOQ if we
    think it is modeled on systems that he has rejected and or if we are
    unfamiliar with the systems he is using. Its simply a matter of having the
    right idea. Its just a fact that East and West have very different ideas
    about silly little things like God and man. And it is these Eastern elements
    that are the hang up, I think. I mean, you can't or won't let go of the
    Western ideas of God and self, but the MOQ does. See? Its just a matter of
    recognizing the shape of these ideas. I think only then can one see "the
    relative status of these two elements". And of course we can go on what
    Pirsig wrote. In that respect, it seems to me that Pirsig takes some
    Pragmatism from James and fixes that up a bit. But in terms of DQ and
    philosophical mysticism, he names names. That would a good place to start,
    at least. We know his intellectual biography to some extent too. I really
    think those kinds of sources should be looked over pretty well BEFORE we go
    hunting for unconscious third party influences like Schleiermacher. I follow
    a wild huch as fast as the next guy, but you're trying way too hard.
    Assuming that you're actually interested in discovering the models and ideas
    behind the MOQ and not just in finding a way to condemn philosophical
    mysticism, there has to be a better way. There has to be a more clear cut
    way to discover Pirsig's influences. It seems that we could invent
    "suggestive geneologies" until doomsday, but what really matters is the
    shape of the ideas themselves, if you know what I mean.

    Take the idea of an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, for example. I
    don't know where it comes from originally, but I know what the words mean
    well enough to get a sort of image or picture of the idea. Then take the
    idea of things-in-themselves. I guess Kant is the original author, but it
    doesn't really matter. I know what the words mean and the context in which
    they are used and so I can imagine what it looks like. I have a picture of
    it and that picture totally clashes with the undifferentitated aesthetic
    continuum. Even without any reference to any books, authors or isms, I can
    just tell that the continuum is smooth and curvy. Its warm and I'm immersed
    in it. Those things-in-themselves, on the other hand, are remote, silent,
    hard and full lines. Does that make any sense? I'm trying to express a sort
    of inner experience that goes along with intellectual analysis. There is
    logic and grammer and all those formal requirements. But on another level,
    the comparison between Kant's noumena and Pirsig's DQ just feels wrong. The
    difference doesn't strike me as something that is discovered by laborious
    intellectual investigation. It slaps me in the face. I know one is not the
    other like I know boxes are not pillows, you know?

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sun Mar 13 2005 - 01:50:25 GMT