Re: MD Bolstering Bo's SOL

From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Fri Jun 03 2005 - 14:28:48 BST

  • Next message: Wim Nusselder: "Re: MD Bolstering Bo's SOL"

    Matt,

    Matt said:
    I would absolutely agree with you Scott that there is a tremendous amount of
    ambiguity between the two senses of the S/O distinction in Pirsig's
    thinking. I don't think, though, that Pirsig simply ignores the second set.
      I would more like to say that he conflates the two meanings, for reasons I
    think that have to do with the way the history of philosophy has conflated
    them (beginning with, I think, Descartes). As far as I can tell, I think
    what Pirsig was talking about in ZMM was primarily concerned with
    subject[2]/object[2]. The S/O Dilemma Pirsig addresses in ZMM is framed in
    terms that are more like subject[1]/object[1], but the consequences he draws
    out, and his tracing of the problem to Plato's dialectic, are almost
    entirely about the problems of subject[2]/object[2] (the problems,
    specifically, in taking it too seriously). The movement of 20th century
    thought has been to distinguish the two distinctions, and I'm not entirely
    sure why Pirsig never really does this explicitly (to my knowledge).

    Scott:
    You're right about ZMM The main thing from ZMM, as I see it, is the
    question of whether Quality is subjective or objective, and for that,
    S[2]/O[2] is meant, since "what I like" can be a thought or a sunset. This
    means that the "resolution" in LILA does not address the original problem in
    ZMM.

    Matt said:
    If I understand Bo's SOL, he's saying that the S[2]/O[2] distinction is
    basic to thinking. I would think this to be a little off. It seems to me
    that a distinction between the center of consciousness and the object of its
    attention is a special case of the more general ability of differentiation.
    The S[2]/O[2] differentiates between you and what you're thinking about, but
    you also need to differentiate between different objects, different possible
    objects of attention, as in, "I'm thinking about X, and not Y or Z."

    Scott:
    Here I disagree. It is true that when one reflects on thinking, one can make
    a distinction between the thinker and the thought, but in doing so there is
    a new O[2], but the same S[2]. S[2] plays a unique role in making any
    distinction, namely continuing "across" the distinction, and so making it
    happen and making it observable, and so, making it valued. I could go on,
    but basically, what you say ignores the difference between ordinary binary
    distinctions, and contradictory identity. The former are addressable with
    Aristotelian logic, but the latter cannot be.

    Matt continued:
    The
    general ability of differentiation seems to me to be basic to the Quality
    thesis, and that's what I think would be basic to thinking, essentially
    binary thinking. The point that Bo would have Pirsig tell us is that we
    shouldn't make S[2]/O[2] into a metaphysics, that it is simply basic to how
    we respond to the world. This, I think, is the same thing as saying that we
    shouldn't be trying to do epistemology.

    Scott:
    Naturally I disagree, since I don't share with you (and Bo and Pirsig) the
    idea that S[1] or S[2] came into existence in a world without them. From my
    point of view (which is Barfield's), epistemology arose because we have lost
    the sense that O[1] is a different order of speech (more precisely, what we
    call O[1] is a different order of S[1], but appears to us as O[1] because we
    have lost that sense), so epistemology becomes more of a religious problem
    (how to regain that sense), than a philosophical one. So in sum, I am saying
    that S[1]/O[1] makes for bad metaphysics, but S[2]/O[2] -- once recognized
    as a contradictory identity -- makes for a good one. I would also say that
    DQ/SQ is an impoverished version of S[2]/O[2], in that the latter has both
    active (creative) and passive (observational) aspects, while the former is
    supposed to be just creative. What this amounts to is that in the MOQ, there
    is no "place" for human creativity or for observation, which is why I call
    it inadequate.

    - Scott

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