RE: MD Matt's Critique of the SOL.

From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Mon Jun 20 2005 - 20:51:56 BST

  • Next message: skutvik@online.no: "RE: MD Matt's Critique of the SOL."

    Bo,

    Bo said:
    We are at the end of our respective tethers now. These last questions of
    yours are answered earlier. But again I must thank you for your willingness
    to explore the SOL to its source, never ever before have I seen it laid out
    so perfectly. What a relief! And anyone who hasn't dropped his/her "common
    sense" because Pirsig seemingly has rejected the SOL interpretation will see
    that it is the MOQ.

    Matt:
    Oh no you don't. I'm not letting you go that easily. If people suddenly
    understand what the SOL-MoQ is all about because of my rendition, I would
    think they'd just as easily be much closer to rejecting it or accepting it
    as trivial (which is the crossroads I'm at) then suddenly seeing it as the
    "true" MoQ (which, I would contend, is a silly thing to say anyways; best
    just to say "better MoQ"). I have to say, I haven't found your answers to
    be very clear. I'm still finding it obscure on the points I need
    illuminated. So, I'm going to run through the questions again,
    reformulating our dialogue again in the hopes of getting the answers (or
    appropriate dodges with accompanied explanations for why) that I want.

    Bo said:
    About a need for the "mind". Yes, and the MOQ keeps it as its highest static
    value; the mind/matter duality. If this don't suffice see later.

    Matt:
    Oh boy. I thought we'd laid this issue to rest, though, come to think
    about, I think it just got dropped, rather than addressed. I'd actually
    forgotten about it. One of the first things said in this conversation about
    your SOL, Bo, was from Scott, differentiating between two S/O distinctions,
    one about metaphysics, one about epistemology. Scott had commented that
    Pirsig conflates the two. Scott said that "one meaning is to equate
    'subject' with 'mind' and 'object' with 'matter', which I'll call
    subject[1]/object[1]. The other meaning (which I'll call
    subject[2]/object[2]), covers the X and Y respectively in sentences like 'X
    is aware of Y' or 'X thinks about Y,' or 'X values Y.'" I agree with Scott
    on the point of conflation. He said at the time, "Bo's SOL is talking about
    subject[2]/object[2], not subject[1]/object[1]." I tended to agree, as I
    thought your SOL was about thinking, not a mind/matter dualism. I had
    thought part of the point of trading in the "M" for an "L" was in shedding
    the mind/matter dualism. I'm not so certain on what you think now. You say
    above that the SOL-MoQ keeps the mind/matter dualism as its highest value.
    Supporting this was what I took to be your curious comment that "Mind has no
    substance," which as read as part of Pirsig's conflation mistake.

    The question that is being led to is: are the only "objects" of thought
    material objects in the SOL-MoQ? Because if you conflate the SOL with the
    mind/matter dualism, as you suggest when you say, "a MOQist would stress
    that the mind/matter dualism is intellect," that means you are biting on the
    S/O Dilemma from ZMM: there are only subjects (minds) looking at objects
    (matter). I thought the point of situating Quality behind all that was to
    change the dynamic of the question (if not eliminating the point of it), not
    leave the question intact: "So what is it, in the Subject or an Object?" I
    mean, do you think that question still in point?

    This leads to what I consider the penultimate question(s), "What is the
    SOL-MoQ? Where is it? What are you doing when you argue for it (and
    against SOM)?" I pressed you on it and ended with, "If the SOL-MoQ is
    reality, is the Quality-Reality, the new reality we live in having
    transcended or replaced the SOM-Reality, why wouldn't it contain itself?"

    You replied:
    Why this harping on where things are? As earlier shown the S/O metaphysics
    wasn't bothered with this question because on-one [sic, no-one?] knew of any
    SOM. Now that it is "demasked", if we turn to it and ask where it is within
    itself. Well, what would you suggest?

    Matt:
    SOM exactly _was_ bothered by this question! As I attempted to show with my
    story about logical positivsm, a little reading of history would show one
    that Pirsig's formulation of the downfall of SOM is only imprecisely what
    actually led to the beginning of its downfall. But all of the tools are in
    Pirsig's arsenal: "Hey, SOMist, where is your theory of reality? In an
    object? No? In your head, right? Yeah. And if its all in your head, then
    it must be completely subjective, whatever you like, right? Mmm-hmm. Oh,
    yeah, you're done now, buddy." That's what happened to the logical
    positivists. This is also why it is completely asinine to think that
    _nobody_ had _any_ idea what anything _remotely_ like what Pirsig called SOM
    was. This problem has been working itself out since the beginning of
    philosophy. Some people weren't bothered by the problems Pirsig grouped
    under SOM. Almost all of those people were _lay people_, people who didn't
    care about philosophy, people like John and Sylvia. Some of them, however,
    were philosophers, the ones who recapitulated common sense in fancy, dressed
    up terms like "subject" and "object." But the ones who actually began
    taking apart SOM in the academy, people like Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars,
    Goodman, Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty, these were people who were bothered by
    the problems of SOM. Who the hell cares that they didn't call it SOM?!?
    Reading them would show a common denominator.

    So, if SOM wasn't bothered by not being able to locate itself, the
    dialectical history of philosophy shows that it should have been, because
    that was a huge reason in bringing it down. And if for SOM, then the MoQ.

    When I pressed you specifically on the question of "What are you doing right
    now, arguing for your interpretation of SOL-MoQ?" you answered with what I
    can only figure is a bizarre non sequitor about the evolution of mind and
    language that I don't really follow. But you ended with, "If you now ask
    'Is it here [in the mind half of the mind/matter dualism] that all theories
    including the MOQ are?' ...be my guest. It's the same as asking if they are
    'in' language. We better drop that."

    WHY!?! What the hell is wrong with our theories being made of language
    (since they obviously are)? The only thing I can imagine you are
    laboriously getting around to is some form of epistemological realism, in
    which we have a Knowing Subject and a Known Object (NOT in the sense you are
    using them Bo, as exclusively mind and matter) and the name of the game is
    getting the two to be in touch. That's the only reason I can presently
    imagine for fearing that our theories are linguistic. You'll grant that,
    sure, our theories are linguistic, but the important part is that they get
    us in touch with a reality that _isn't_ linguistic, the QUALITY REALITY,
    the SOL-MoQ! So, for instance, you'd want to say that "values" are not
    linguistic, but our language brings us in touch with the reality of values,
    or even that, while language may never get us in touch with values itself,
    we are in touch with values, though not linguistically, and language only
    partially expresses these values.

    That's then why you accuse us for being subjectivists or idealists for
    following current folk wisdom in thinking that our theories are linguistic.
    Our theories aren't just linguistic, they touch reality, values, too. Not
    only that, but reality is infused with them. Language is laced with values.
      Language isn't reality, but it is laced with it. Is that something like
    what you find so troubling?

    If that's the case, I don't think we are necessarily all that far apart. I
    think "realism" in its traditional epistemological garb is a bad idea, but
    if we have (roughly) a Quality-language-matter trichotomy (which would make
    sense of your insistence on ZMM's formulation of Quality sitting behind
    S/O), where language and matter are different, but both are infused or laced
    with the reality that they are made of, values, then I'm not sure there is
    so much disagreement. I wrote an exposition of this notion in my "review"
    of Thomas Op de Coul's "Herds of Playtpi." Its short, so maybe you can have
    a look at it and see what you think.

    And, again, what are _you_ doing when you argue for the SOL-MoQ, which you
    claim is the sum total of reality?

    Matt

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