Re: MD Making sense of it (levels)

From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Tue Feb 11 2003 - 14:58:17 GMT

  • Next message: Kevin: "RE: MD NAZIs and Pragmatism"

    Hi Wim:

    > If the last quote does not express fundamental disagreement, it at least
    > expresses considerable misunderstanding of what I wrote: 'We CAN interpret
    > specific, individual 'things' to be patterns of value. ... Doing so doesn't
    > bring us much advantages compared to Subject-Object Thinking. It is very
    > hard to categorize this type of patterns of value.'
    >
    > Your answer to my questions whether a bike is an inorganic, a biological, a
    > social or an intellectual pattern of values mistakes them for real
    > questions, while I meant them only rhetorical. Their point was that the
    > word 'bike' can refer to inorganic, biological, social AND intellectual
    > patterns of value. In my point of view there IS no 'bike' (somewhere in
    > 'reality') that IS ONLY a pattern of value of ONLY ONE type. 'Bike' is just
    > a word, a 'symbol created in the brain that stands for patterns of
    > experience'. Mind you: a symbol that can -in different contexts- stand for
    > DIFFERENT patterns of experience. To some extent you recognize this by
    > writing: 'intellectual artifacts (thoughts frozen as objects in inorganic,
    > biological or social form, or in combination)'. In other words: you too
    > recognize that these 'frozen objects' 'are' intellectual patterns of value
    > AND 'have' inorganic, biological and/or social 'form'. Doesn't 'having an
    > inorganic form' mean that a bike is also an inorganic pattern of value?
    > What's the difference between in intellectual pattern of value with an
    > inorganic form and an inorganic pattern of value with an intellectual form?

    To determine at what level a certain object, artifact or action belongs I
    ask myself, "What is the highest moral pattern I can reasonably
    attribute to it?" If the answer is biological, this will automatically include
    the inorganic since the biological is dependent on inorganic patterns.
    Likewise, if the answer is intellectual, the social, biological and
    inorganic patterns are also included because the intellectual pattern is
    dependent on these lower level patterns. So of course a bike is "also an
    inorganic pattern of value" as are all artifacts I can imagine. But what
    distinguishes it as a bike are the intellectual patterns that designed and
    produced it.

    > Do you really mean to say that all words that can stand for human artifacts
    > always only stand for intellectual patterns of value (only artistic
    > productions excepted, that -besides standing for intellectual patterns of
    > value- 'also reflect the beauty of higher level art')? What about the
    > (words for) human artifacts from before the first intellectual pattern of
    > value (whenever you wish to date that)?

    Yes, all human artifacts are intellectual patterns of value that either
    serve society or go off on purposes of their own, like protecting the
    intellect from domination by social patterns (for example, the Bill of
    Rights to the U.S. Constitution). What artifacts did you have mind that
    were built before the first intellectual pattern? Recall that Pirsig said that
    the intellect's evolutionary purpose was "to help a society find food,
    detect danger, and defeat enemies." (24) Doesn't this mean that
    intellectual patterns (language and such) were around since the
    beginning of human society? Their "independence" from social patterns
    and becoming an entirely separate level comes much later.
     
    > You replied to my proposal
    > 'to reserve the term "pattern of value" for phenomena that are not linked
    > to specific, individual "things", but that ... have "things" as elements.'
    > with: 'Sorry, I'm lost. All parts (elements) are also wholes (things) made
    > up of other parts. I can't imagine a thing that isn't also an element of
    > another thing. And whether you identify something as a thing or an element,
    > they are both phenomena.'
    >
    > Yes, it is indeed difficult to find a word that doesn't stand for BOTH a
    > part AND a whole. My proposal is to always choose the latter type of
    > interpretation when we are trying to categorize our experience in terms of
    > levels, so we can use the way these 'wholes' are held together to
    > categorize them. A 'bike' does not stand for an intellectual pattern of
    > value then, because it can hardly be understood as a whole consisting of
    > 'symbols created in the mind that stand for patterns of experience'. It is
    > much more obvious to understand it as a whole consisting of components held
    > together by the properties of their materials (e.g. the specific resistance
    > of the iron of its nuts and bolts).

    Guess we'll just have to agree to disagree on your bike. For me, it's
    much more obvious to understand it as something the intellect has
    formed from disparate materials and forces for the purposes of getting
    the body from one place to another faster than walking.

    > The pattern of value that gets me off a hot stove with relatively little
    > delay is usually called a 'reflex'. Understood as a whole it is a series of
    > nerve actions resulting in some muscular actions (with as characteristic
    > that there are relatively few brain nerves involved). This whole is
    > obviously held together by DNA codes and can thus be categorized as a
    > biological pattern of value.

    Understood as a whole this "reflex" is symptomatic of the body's ability
    to sense the quality of situation as it impacts its own health and well-
    being. Your "whole" understanding consists of many interrelated parts
    and "mechanisms." I prefer the former interpretation.
     
    > I don't mind leaving out the word mechanism:
    > 'Such "patterns of value", repetitive experiences with "things" as
    > elements, are much easier to categorize. We can ask why these elements form
    > and re-form or maintain this repetition. The explanation for that
    > repetition is different for each level.' I'm just as prejudiced against
    > mechanistic science as you are.

    What you call a prejudice I call a rational judgment. :-)

    > What meaning and importance do those ideas you never share with anyone
    > have? They -obviously- cannot offer freedom to the next lower level, to
    > social patterns of value, and help a society find food, detect danger and
    > defeat enemies. They probably go off on (your) 'own purposes' that are not
    > shared by others, therefore cannot be explained to others, who therefore
    > will never agree with you about their being meaningful and important...?

    Unless something is meaningful and important to you personally and
    privately first it can never have meaning or importance when "shared"
    with others. I must be missing your point here.
     
    > You wrote at last:
    > 'The social level undergirds the intellectual. The intellectual level could
    > not exist without society'
    >
    > Yes, maybe that's the way my descriptions of the different levels should be
    > read. I wrote: 'how to categorize patterns of values: by the way they are
    > maintained/latched. (inorganic: unequal probability distributions in the
    > quantum behavior of subatomic particles; biological: DNA stabilized by
    > protein structures around it; social: unconscious copying of behavior;
    > intellectual: conscious motivation/justification of actions in a way that
    > is acceptable to others).' So: Probabilistic quantum behavior of subatomic
    > particles (= chance) undergirds inorganic patterns of value. Chemical
    > reactions undergird biological patterns of value. Biological, instinctual
    > (unconscious) behavior like curiosity and mimicry undergirds social
    > patterns of value. Social interaction undergirds intellectual patterns of
    > value.
    >
    > The distinctive 'latches' (explanations for repetitiveness) for each type
    > of pattern of values are thus: The unequal probability of different quantum
    > behaviors. The unequal stability of different chemicals (i.e. DNA and
    > proteins) carrying the same information. The unequal status (copy
    > worthiness) of different behaviors. The unequal 'success' (range of
    > dissemination) of ideas/motives/justifications.
    >
    > A definition of a level should contain a link with the next-lower level to
    > reflect the evolutionary aspect of the MoQ.
     
    Yes, but as explained above, I "categorize" levels somewhat differently.
    As for your "unequal probability of certain quantum behaviors" and such,
    I confess your explanation is way over my head.

    Platt

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