From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Thu Feb 13 2003 - 03:02:32 GMT
Matt,
Well, we went over this once before, but why not again :-)
When you say "Scott and Platt want to argue that metaphysics is just another
name for
philosophy", I say, not so.
I would say you are using an incorrect definition of metaphysics.
Metaphysics is usually defined as asking and attempting to answer "what is
real and how do we know it", i.e., ontology and epistemology. So when Rorty
argues that mind and brain are identical, he is attempting to show that the
existence of mind is not evidence of a non-physical reality. That is a
metaphysical answer to a metaphysical question. (And see my post of 1/10/03
for why Rorty is wrong on this point.) An atheist is one who thinks that God
is not real, so that is a metaphysical answer to a metaphysical question.
And so forth.
And so, when Dewey et al claim that the appearance/reality distinction is
useless, they are basically saying that there is no hidden reality that we
need to worry about. Like God. They are proclaiming materialism as *the*
metaphysical answer to Life, the Universe, and Everything. Now I would
modify the old Platonic appearance/reality distinction in one way, namely
replace "appearance" with "reality-1" and "reality" with "reality-2" or
something like that, since I think it kind of silly to deny common sense as
reality as opposed to Platonic Forms or something. But I do think a strong
case can be made that we do need to consider alternate non-commonsensical
arenas as also real, even though they are not (at present) empirical. For
example, quantum non-locality should be raising metaphysical questions by
the bucketload. But also because what is empirical changes over the
centuries (I'm referring to Barfield's thesis, as usual). It is not the case
that 2500 years of searching for hidden reality has failed, but that over
that time span the spiritual has *become* hidden. Of course, it is perfectly
open and evident in one's own mind, but note how the materialist strains to
convince us that this evidence is only apparent, by saying it is "just"
synapse firings, or whatever.
- Scott
----- Original Message -----
From: "Matt the Enraged Endorphin" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2003 5:47 PM
Subject: Re: MD NAZIs and Pragmatism
> Sam,
>
> Sam said:
> Have you given any consideration to the mode of presentation in Lila; that
> is, that Phaedrus is one voice within a larger scheme? Is there any way in
> which this presentation, both of Phaedrus' ideas and of Phaedrus as a
> (somewhat deficient) individual is Pirsig's means of subtly undercutting
the
> status of metaphysics?
>
> Matt:
> Yeah, kinda' like it might be possible that the use of Socrates undercuts
> any Platonic attempt to hypostatize. The subtle undercuttings is in
> particular how I read Pirsig when he says Phaedrus is a "mild-mannered
> hyperintellectual." But even with subtle undercuts, it is hard to keep a
> straight face and say, "Pirsig has zero tensions between a
> post-metaphysical pragmatist pose and a Platonic, metaphysical pose."
> Scott and Platt want to argue that metaphysics is just another name for
> philosophy, thus possibly making some of these tensions disappear, but I
> still hold out for keeping them seperate and I still think that even in
> this reading many of the tensions remain.
>
> Matt
>
>
> MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
> Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
> MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
>
> To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
> http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
>
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Thu Feb 13 2003 - 03:03:44 GMT