From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Fri Nov 04 2005 - 16:00:28 GMT
Hey Ham,
[Ham}
> Let me try to show you how Pirsig's deceptively simple prose begs the
> question on this issue.
>
> > "This may sound as though a purpose of the Metaphysics of
> > Quality is to trash all subject-object thought but that's not true.
> > Unlike subject-object metaphysics the Metaphysics of Quality
> > does not insist on a single exclusive truth.
>
> Why not? Why isn't his Quality thesis "a single exclusive truth"?
Because, as Pirsig explains, "There are many sets of intellectual reality
in existence and we can perceive some to have more quality than others."
And that's the truth. :-)
> > If subjects and objects are held to be the ultimate reality
> > then we're permitted only one construction of things-that which
> > corresponds to the "objective" world-and all other constructions
> > are unreal. But if Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate
> > reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths
> > to exist. Then one doesn't seek the absolute "Truth."
>
> If "excellence" were the ultimate reality, then existence would be
> perfection. Obviously, this is not the case. Pirsig is implying a higher
> realm of reality than Quality operating in existence, yet he doesn't posit
> it. Instead he imputes relativity to Truth, asserting that there may be
> numerous truths and that seeking the "absolute Truth" is futile. There's
> where he blows his metaphysics.
To quote from my favorite physicist, Paul Davies: "In the end a rational
explanation for the world in the sense of a closed and complete system of
logical truths is almost certainly impossible. We are barred from ultimate
knowledge, from ultimate explanation, by the very rules of reasoning that
prompt us to seek an explanation in the first place. It we wish to
progress beyond, we have to embrace a different concept of 'understanding'
from that of rational explanation."
Ham, I'm sure you understand better than most the meaning of Godel's
Theorem whereby he proved that making logical deductions from given
assumptions cannot in general provide a system which is both provable and
consistent. That's why logical thought inevitably leads to such paradoxes
as "Rational proof cannot be proved rationally" and "The principle of
objectivity is not an objective fact." What in essence you are criticizing
Pirsig for is the paradoxical necessity of expressing his beliefs using
the assumptions of SOM even as he rails against its shortcomings. He
admits as much: "A metaphysics of Quality is essentially a contradiction
in terms, a logical absurdity." (Lila, 5)
[Pirsig]
> > One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual explanation
> > of things with the knowledge that if the past is any guide to
> > the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as
> > useful until something better comes along.
>
> According to Pirsig, personal beliefs are chosen from a philosophical menu
> based on how "useful" they are at a given time. What does this say about
> philosophical integrity? How are we to know which choice is the "better"
> one for all time? Why bother? -- it's all relative anyway.
Better for all time? I'm surprised you think philosophy's purpose is to
inform us what is better for all time. Seems to me that's an answer only
known to God. Surely you don't want to replace Him with yourself. Or do
you? :-) As for all being relative, in the Pirsig metaphysical structure,
"betterness" is relative only to the moral levels, where intellectual
ideas are better than social traditions, and social traditions are better
than biological lawlessness.
> > One can then examine intellectual realities the same way
> > he examines paintings in an art gallery, not to find which
> > one is the "real" painting, but simply to enjoy and keep
> > those that are of value. There are many sets of intellectual
> > reality in existence and we can perceive some to have more
> > quality than others, but that we do so is, in part, the result
> > of our history and current patterns of values." (Lila, 8)
>
> In order words, we can choose any ideology that "feels good". And what
> feels good depends on our cultural heritage, personal history, and current
> value orientation.
Not what feels good. What we perceive to have intellectual quality can
cause pain when our perception of truth conflicts with social quality.
Galileo suffered when his quality ideas came up against the social
ideology of his time. The French impressionists were hooted out of the
Academy. Those who find quality in Pirsig's ideas have to put up with the
slings and arrows of those who accuse us of being a cult. In fact, many
times when people find that their concepts of truth come in conflict with
social patterns they are so threatened that they go along to get along,
especially on the job. Nothing "feels good" about such compromises.
> I expect a philosophy to be more substantive than that,
> Platt. And, for someone who believes in absolute moral standards, you
> would seem a most unlikely advocate of such relativistic nonsense.
Indeed I do take an absolutist moral position against rape, kidnapping,
lynching, slavery and murder as commonly defined. If you believe the same,
the question I would pose to you is: "On what basis did you establish that
belief?"
> > Obviously you judge your "proprietary self" to be
> > an extremely high quality concept, a Rembrandt as t'were
> > of ontology.
>
> It isn't MY self that I place on a column for others to revere. (Indeed,
> I'm hardly the egotist some of you paint me as.) I don't know about the
> "quality" of proprietary selfness, but I do know that it is empirically
> valid.
Pirsig never claimed otherwise. He also claimed that morality is
empirically valid. Do you agree? (I don't see how you disagree without
making a moral judgment that instantly disproves your disagreement.)
> What Michael has declared is that "the subject/object divide is fundamental
> to what we are." That statement by itself is notable for its insight.
> When we understand that subjectivity is the foundation or our experienced
> reality, we can proceed on the logical assumption that the "objective
> world" is our differentiated, finite perspective of its absolute Source.
What you assert is simply that there is no experience without an
experiencer -- an assertion unfortunately you cannot prove without
assuming the assertion. However, I admire your faith.
> (By the way, I happen to be an admirer of Rembrandt's paintings.)
Me, too. Yet you say there's no such thing as perfection? :-)
Warm regards,
Platt
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