Re: MD Rhetoric

From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Thu Nov 17 2005 - 21:14:40 GMT

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    Erin,

    Erin said:
     I don't understand the tetrathingy clearly but
    something you said really resonated:

    The key is the fourth point. The LCI is, by and
    > large what one CAN say, or
    > at least, try to say. For instance, that the more
    > one puts X under the
    > microscope, the more it starts looking like Y, and
    > vice versa, and that X
    > and Y create each other in mutual opposition

    Scott:
    Well, I don't understand it "clearly" either. Here's an example of it as
    insofar as I do understand it (in the example, X is duration, Y is change,
    and Z is consciousness) (this is from an old post to Platt):

    "The closest I have been able to come to what I think [Merrell-Wollf] is
    referring to is when I think about consciousness, in particular to its
    durational and changing aspects. To be aware of a change (say one note to
    another in a melody), something had to endure across the change. But to be
    aware of the enduring (both notes as one melody, or even one continuous
    note), something had to change. So conscious is not changing because it is
    changing, and it is changing because it is not changing. One can't get out
    of this contradictoriness with the idea that a part is staying the same
    while a part is changing, since that just pushes the problem back to the
    part that is staying the same: how can it be aware of change without
    changing, and if it is enduring through the change, how can it be changing?"

    Erin said:
    This reminds me about the discussion of
    intellect...... I feel the moq treats value as
    "desire" for the first three levels and then "value"
    at the fourth level becomes "belief".
    To me this is creating a belief/desire division. But
    as the above says the more you put belief under the
    microscope the more it resembles desire and vice
    versa. So to me if it is "value" at one level and
    "value" at another level then it is the same.
    I was just wondering if you thought belief and desire
    could be seen as contradictory or not..that is I see
    values as 'desire/belief'

    Scott:
    I find this very interesting, but I don't see it as a CI. The two terms,
    belief and desire are at the least mutually implicative, but I don't see
    them as mutually contradictory, as 'enduring' and 'changing' are in the
    example above. However, I think there is a CI involved, but not between
    desire and belief. See below.

    Erin continued:
    I think this helps me with all the pre-intellectual
    stuff too.... I feel people act that their desires are
    being filtered through beliefs and so are not living
    as passionately as they would "pre-intellect/beliefs".
    If you recognize "values" on all the levels the
    division of desires/beliefs becomes just a matter of
    degree....whereas we use desire for lower level of
    values and beliefs for higher level of values.

    Scott:
    I see the relation between beliefs and desires differently. As I see it,
    desire is the value that occurs when a sign invokes a belief (or the desire
    contributes to the value involved in actuallizing a belief). The amoeba has
    a belief (more carefully stated: the species amoeba has the belief, called
    an instinct) that vinegar is harmful, so on encountering vinegar, the amoeba
    has the desire to withdraw. Neither the encounter nor the belief on their
    own constitutes value, but the encounter with vinegar is a sign that invokes
    the belief about vinegar, and that results in the desire, or value. The
    amoeba has filtered the encounter with vinegar through the belief. So we
    have: no belief, then no desire, and no encounter, then no desire, in both
    cases, implying no value, implying no experience.

    There is no difference in this with the human case, except that each
    individual human has the freedom to question the relevant belief, and so
    overcome the desire. The hot stove example is not a case of a "pre-belief"
    experience subsequently filtered by a belief, but of two filtered
    experiences: the biological one that gets one off the stove reflexively
    (same as the amoeba encountering vinegar) and a fourth-level one of thinking
    about the biological encounter. It is conceivable that a human would
    dynamically *stay* on the stove, that is, question the belief that s/he must
    get off immediately.

    So if there is a CI here, it would be: X is the encounter, Y the belief, and
    Z the desire. This is a variation on signifier/signified/meaning, though
    showing how the signifier and signified are mutually opposed while mutually
    constitutive, and how they "turn into one another" is a bit of a chore (it
    is discussed in part I of Magliola's "Derrida on the Mend", though he
    doesn't use the phrase "contradictory identiy", instead he is talking about
    Derridean *differance*, which I believe to be the same thing.)

    - Scott

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