RE: MD Two Theses in the MOQ

From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Sun Nov 27 2005 - 13:43:21 GMT

  • Next message: ian glendinning: "Re: MD FW: The intellectual level and rationality"

    Hi Dan,

    Dan
    > Thank you so much for the welcome (I trust that you mean LILA'S CHILD).

    Platt
    Yes, of course I meant "Lila's Child." I apologize for misnaming your
    wonderful, herculean, (and for Arlo's sake) "individual" effort.

    > I've been crazy busy since early spring but with the holidays coming up
    > things are tailing off just a bit. Thanks again for asking. I'd like to add
    > that I've enjoyed reading your posts over the years as they're always
    > well-contructed, very informative, and a pleasure to read.

    A compliment most humbly and gratefully received. Thanks.

    Platt
    > >Either I've misread Pirsig or he does indeed describe DQ as a creative
    > >power. In fact, throughout the MOQ you'll find forces at different levels
    > >competing one one another as well attempting to smother the creative force
    > >of DQ.
     
    Dan
    > I agree that LILA gives that impression and in LILA'S CHILD Robert Pirsig
    > has this to say in reply to a question of mine in a similar vein:
    >
    > "Yes, my statement that Dynamic Quality is always affirmative was not a
    > wise statement, since it constitutes a limitation or partial definition of
    > Dynamic Quality. Whenever one talks about Dynamic Quality someone else can
    > take whatever is said and make a static pattern out of it and then
    > dialectically oppose that pattern. The best answer to the question, “What
    > is Dynamic Quality?” is the ancient Vedic one——“Not this, not that.”
    >
    > If we attribute creative force to Dynamic Quality, aren't we putting
    > limitations on "it"? That's why I think it best to attribute attention to
    > Dynamic Quality as the creative force rather than Dynamic Quality itself.
    > Attention has limits. Dynamic Quality cannot be limited.

    I see your point. To limit (define) DQ in any way would be a mistake.

    Platt
    > >And who or what created this ability to attend if not DQ?

    Dan
    > That's a head scratcher too. But that's Dynamic Quality -- the ultimate
    > head scratcher.

    Apparently DQ is neither a result of cause or a causative agent. It's
    beyond cause, a mysterious presence whose nature can never be known, only
    responded to. (Sorry. There I go defining it.) Anyway, to me, it sounds an
    awful lot like Beauty. But, as you know, Beauty is my muse.

    Platt
    > >I thought we agreed that value judgments always precede intellectual
    > >patterns? So wouldn't that rule out ideas?

    Dan
    > I think it depends on the context, don't you? For example: When first I
    > could bring myself to read your reply to my post I thought: Is it a good
    > idea to put the effort into answering Platt or should I just go on back to
    > lurking? Going back to lurking would be a whole lot easier but I'm going to
    > try answering anyway. And that would seem an intellectual value judgment.
    > On the other hand, leaping off a hot stove on account that I sat down on it
    > without realizing it was hot is a biological value judgment, or so it would
    > seem. Only later would I make an intellectual value judgment: Next time I'm
    > going to check that stove to see if it's hot before I plop my skinny arse
    > down on it.
     
    I see your point. But it doesn't change my belief that sensing and valuing
    occur simultaneously. But, such immediate valuing is always vulnerable to
    being later overridden by contemplative thought. (There's an interesting
    bestseller that you may have read entitled "Blink" by Malcolm Gladwell
    that attempts to show how instant judgments (gut reactions) are often
    superior to deliberation.)

    Platt
    > > > >Are ideas intellectual patterns?

    Dan
    > > > According to thesis (1): No. According to thesis (2): Yes.
    > > >
    > > > Perhaps this quote from chapter 2 of Buddhism: Plain & Simple by Steve
    > > > Hagen will help to clarify: "We've all heard the expression 'seeing is
    > > > believing.' But the fact is that believing is not true SEEING. In fact,
    > > > they're opposites. Belief is at best an educated, informed conjecture
    > > > about Reality. In contrast, SEEING -- raw, direct, unadulterated experience
    > > > -- is the direct perception of Reality Itself." (Caps originally in
    > > > italics)
    > > >
    > > > So, if we apply the MOQ to the above quote, it would seem that Paul's
    > > > thesis (1) equates to SEEING while thesis (2) equates to believing.

    Platt
    > >Now I'm really confused. :-)

    Dab
    > Oh my! I'm so sorry. That was not my intention. If you have access to a
    > copy of Steve Hagen's book it might help to read it as I cannot properly
    > explain just what it is he's getting at with my feeble words. It's a great
    > book; I think you'll enjoy it. Plus Robert Pirsig recommends it as well.

    Thanks, I'll get it.
     
    Platt
    > >Are you saying a value judgment amounts to the same thing as an
    > >explanation? If so, I disagree. I think explanations are always derived
    > >from intellectual patterns. But "understanding" can come from value
    > >judgments alone.

    Dan
    > I'm unconvinced things are as clear cut as all that. To be sure what we're
    > talking about is the same, I took the liberty of looking up the following:
    >
    > value judgment
    >
    > n. A judgment that assigns a value, as to an object or action; a subjective
    > evaluation.
    >
    > explanation
    >
    > n 1: a statement that makes something comprehensible by describing the
    > relevant structure or operation or circumstances etc.; "the explanation was
    > very simple"; "I expected a brief account" [syn: account] 2: thought that
    > makes something comprehensible 3: the act of explaining; making something
    > plain or intelligible; "I heard his explanation of the accident"
    > (www.dictionary.com)
    >
    > This book explains things very well; now I understand. Is the book an
    > intellectual pattern of value? Yes and no. I understood that the stove was
    > hot when I sat down on it so I quickly moved. Is the stove an intellectual
    > pattern of value? Yes and no. Now, do explanations always consist of
    > intellectual patterns of value? Yes and no.

    Again, I dissent. For instance, I understand the truth of Godel's Theorem,
    but I can't explain it.

    > Thanks once again for writing, and thank you for reading.
     
    Same here. Enjoy the holidays!

    Best wishes,
    Platt

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