andsRe: MD Two Theses in the MOQ

From: David M (davidint@blueyonder.co.uk)
Date: Sun Nov 27 2005 - 17:19:00 GMT

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    Guys

    The hot stove thing. Is it not obvious that reflex
    actions are a form of SQ, i.e. something DQ laid down
    along time ago about the value-quality of hot surfaces coming
    into contact with merely warm bottoms? The whole point
    of SQ is that it becomes object-like, unconscious, mechanistic,
    and that the oldest SQ is what we refer to as matter. So that
    what is now matter-form is the SQ that DQ laid down longest ago
    for the quality-value-reasons that were available at that level/time.
    SQ is what we might call fixed-values or values-frozen into matter
    or behaviour. Some SQ of course can be changed by becoming open
    to DQ and quality choices once again.

    DM

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Platt Holden" <pholden@sc.rr.com>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>; <owner-moq_discuss@venus.co.uk>
    Sent: Wednesday, November 23, 2005 2:42 PM
    Subject: RE: MD Two Theses in the MOQ

    > Paul:
    >
    > Thanks for explaining your position on some of the questions I asked. It
    > appears our differences boil down to a single key idea that you set up as
    > follows:
    >
    >> I think judgement implies an element of reflection or consideration . . .
    >
    > Contrast this to Pirsig's description of knowing the value of a situation
    > without any reflection or consideration:
    >
    > "Any person of any philosophic persuasion who sits on a hot stove will
    > verify without any intellectual argument whatsoever that he is in an
    > undeniably low-quality situation: that the value of his predicament is
    > negative. This low quality is not just a vague, woolly-headed, crypto-
    > religious, metaphysical abstraction. It is an experience: It is not a
    > judgment about an experience. It is not a description of experience. The
    > value itself is an experience." (Lila, 5)
    >
    > Note particularly Pirsig's caution, "It is not a judgment about an
    > experience." Yet, the individual "knows" (without judging) that the
    > situation is low quality.
    >
    > Here then is the crux of my confusion. It seems I can know I'm having a
    > low quality experience without making a value judgment, i.e., I'm able to
    > instantly evaluate a situation without thinking.
    > .
    > To put it another way, art critic Clement Greenberg describes the esthetic
    > experience: "Esthetic enjoyments are immediate, intuitive, undeliberate
    > and involuntary leaving not room for conscious application of standards,
    > criteria, rules or precepts."
    >
    > I've always felt that Greenberg and Pirsig were describing the same
    > phenomenon.
    >
    >> Paul: I think your confusion comes from conflating Dynamic 'value' with
    >> static 'value judgements'.
    >
    > Indeed, that may be the problem. Do you see experiencing Dynamic 'value'
    > the same as Greenberg describes the aesthetic experience?
    >
    > Thanks.
    >
    > Platt
    >
    >
    >
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