From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Tue Sep 02 2003 - 21:56:44 BST
Realizing that bashing heads on walls is optional, I start looking for new options,
DMB said:
The final judge and jury of truth is Nature, the World, something out there that is not us. Hmmm. Why does that ring a bell? Could it be that you're talking about objectivity, which is Pirsig's great white whale? I think so. (Wish you'd use Pirsig's terms.)
Matt:
Oh, right, sorry. Wait, no I'm not. I've talked quite a lot about objectivity and why it leads to some pretty silly consequences.
DMB said:
I suppose its possible that you think you're talking about something else, but it seems pretty clear to me. Pirsig and Rorty don't agree about the source or the solution to the problem and so they use different terms, but the both identify the same problem. - as do many (post-modern) others.
Matt:
No, Pirsig and Rorty both agree that Plato is partly at fault for our present philosophical state. But yes, Pirsig and Rorty both take off in different directions after making that negative point.
DMB said:
Again, I would only point out that you are not talking about anything other than the various forms of SOM and it would be very helpful if simply called it that. Not because it is the only term, but simply because it is a term we Pirsig readers all have in common. Such "linguistic practices" only make sense, no? I mean, isn't it much easier for everyone to trade in the coin of the realm?
Matt:
Right, various forms of SOM. Except that I've never been satisfied with the explications of what SOM is and I haven't given it my attention yet (besides that earlier attempt from October). Maybe the apperance/reality distinction is the exact same thing that Pirsig calls "SOM", but I don't think so. I think there are a bundle of enemies that Pirsig packages into "SOM" and I'm not so sure that the conflation helps. Given that, I feel the need to continue with someone else's vocabulary to get a handle on Pirsig's. I wouldn't want to mislead anyone, would I?
DMB said:
Language as coping? This is where you start to lose me. Sounds bizzare, quite debateable and very un-Pirsigian.
Matt:
It is debatable, but it isn't necessarily un-Pirsigian. Rorty identifies one of the things we do as leading to "one true intellectual construction of things" as the idea that language is a mirror that we hold up to the world. Transposing that to Pirsig, then, doesn't seem that far a leap given their common enemy.
DMB said:
I gather that Rorty would like us to take a Darwinian approach to language, and that language as a coping mechanism comes out of that notion, but it is not at all clear to me what that means as a practical matter.
Matt:
It doesn't mean that much in the way of practical-eating-with-a-spork-running-away-from-tigers kind of things. However, it does mean something to our linguistic practices.
DMB said:
I imagine there are ideas behind these slogans and I would very much know what they are. Beyond realism and idealism is... Darwinisms? I don't get it. How does one cope with an enviroment that can not be represented? A whole lotta groping and stubbed toes, I guess? :-)
Matt:
Yes, that is exactly it. That is a good summation of the Davidsonian picture of language. The problem with the question "How does one cope with an environment that cannot be represented?" is that it begs the question. You are assuming that language represents things and that its a problem if we start thinking that language doesn't represent things. When you move from representation to coping, that question won't come up. Why? Because it is a change in our linguistic practices, not a change in our practice of running away from tigers. Our day-to-day activities won't change that much, but we will stop thinking that metaphysics is an activity we should be doing.
DMB said:
The pragmatists "solution" seems to beg the orignal question and raises a whole host of new questions.
Matt:
Yes, now you are starting to get it. It does beg the question over the representationalist because the assumption about language is different for both. Because it is different, different questions will come up, just as new paradigms of knowledge generation are expected to do.
DMB said:
For example, how to we transpose biological mechanisms into the cultural realm without distortion of misappropriation? It seems that Pirsig's levels sort out that kind of confusion...
Matt:
What? Was that an extremely subtle joke? If so, very funny.
DMB quoted Matt:
So, we are caught, in Fredric Jameson's phrase, in the "prison-house of language". Having knowledge is being familiar with a certain way of speaking. For instance, I have knowledge of pragmatist philosophy and you, DMB, admittedly, do not. And you have knowledge of mysticism and mystic philosophy (to employ Scott's helpful distinction) and I, admittedly, do not.
DMB replied:
I don't buy it. You, Scott and I all speak standard American English, we all own dictionaries and we've all read Pirsig. I honestly don't see why we shouldn't be able to explain even unfamiliar ideas to each other. The only thing required is a willingness and ability to clearly express yourself. It doesn't help to pretend we're trapped in some solipsistic black hole. If we had much less in common I might believe that.
Matt:
Phew, you almost got me there. Its a good thing I didn't say that we would never be able to understand each other. Let's roll back the tape:
Matt said soon after the earlier part:
As we learn more about the other we are able to make better and better judgements as to which is more useful.
Matt:
I don't know about anybody else, but "learn more about the other" sounds like being able to understand each other better and better.
DMB said:
Again, these are the problems that Pirsig addresses but your jargon has
hidden that fact from me until now.
Matt:
Right, right, sorry. I'll add a post-it to my computer to remind me to explain things so that you can understand them.
DMB said:
Rocks and objective, God is subjective and round and round she goes. And again, this confusion is sorted out by the levels. Even the ocular metaphors. Pirsig explains how the physical sciences have no problem with sensory perception and the extension of it through microscopes, telescopes, etc.
Matt:
Wait, wait, wait. When did ocular metaphors mean sensory perception? It is the reliance on ocular metaphors when describing knowledge that leads us to say things like "I see the Truth" or "I see God's Way". That has nothing to do with sensory perception because nobody takes it literally. We use that metaphor because we continue to think of True Knowledge as something "out there" that we will someday be able to penetrate to and see, like taking a peak at the Book of Nature. Metaphors, nothing literal.
DMB said:
Knowledge and truth is mediated through 2nd, 3rd and 4th level patterns. This realization is not framed in Pirsigian terms, but it is behind the linguistic turn all the same. In effect it is an examination of the social and intellectual filters instead of just the sensory organs, which has been moved from philosophy to medical science in our post-modern times.
Matt:
Oops, wrong answer. Knowledge and truth are not objects that have to travel through social and intellectual filters. This seems to imply that there are unfiltered objects called Knowledge and Truth. This leads us to hope we will someday have unfiltered access to Knowledge and Truth. This leads us to making a distinction between appearance and reality. This leads us to metaphysics. This leads us to Platonic sickness, which is what pragmatic medicine is supposed to cure in our post-modern times.
And this eschewal of language-as-a-filter has nothing to do with the linguistic turn. As I said in the last post, it has everything to do with the eschewal of representationalism.
DMB said:
Again, we're still talking SOM. In Pirsigian terms, it seems you're saying that pragmatisist drop objectivity (realism) in favor of collective subjectivity (intersubjective agreement within various communities). It might be interesting to explore the differences between this move and Pirsig's.
Matt:
I'm not so sure that Pirsig disagrees with me, exactly. And, if Pirsig doesn't agree with me, I fail to see how Pirsig caught his white whale if both Rorty and Pirsig are talking about the same enemy.
DMB said:
Pirsig sorts out rocks and God in a different way. And since pragmatisim seems unable rank such beleifs, I think Pirsig's is far more "useful".
Matt:
Not so sure about either proposition.
DMB said:
Yes. I finally see what in the world you're talking about. Thanks.
Matt:
I'm not so sure that you do.
And don't get caught with your ocular metaphors showing.
Matt
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