From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Mon Oct 27 2003 - 14:57:31 GMT
Scott,
Platt (previously)
> > But, you say that sure-fire methods already exist for distinguishing
> > the true from the false. If they are 'sure-fire,' they must be
> > unshakable and foundational, right? Or, are the methods that already
> > exist subject to change by one group or another as Rorty would have us
> > believe?
Scott:
> Sorry, I didn't express myself clearly. I didn't intend to say that the
> methods that exist are sure-fire. They are subject to change, according
> to how well they work. Different methods work well or poorly depending
> on how well they are suited to the particular problem. Do you know of a
> method that always works in every situation? Do you not think that they
> should change if they don't give good results?
The problem with pragmatism as I see it is the lack of a moral system
or structure that can determine whether something works well or poorly.
Without such a moral structure, how do you know when methods get "good
results?"
> If a "group" decides to change a method, who is going to stop them? I
> really don't see the significance of that last sentence. Of course you
> are referring to "whatever society lets us get away with", but what is
> your alternative?
Are you proposing rule by majority without any protection for rights of
the minority, especially a minority of one? The alternative, of course,
is protection for minority views, free speech, etc.
> > So you believe that small t truths are determined by scientific
> > methods rather than "useful vocabularies" or "linguistic conventions"
> > as Rorty claims?
>
> By all sorts of methods, scientific being one of them, when the question
> under consideration fits the method. Some things are true because one
> has never questioned them, and they would come under the heading of
> linguistic convention or final vocabulary or some such.
Can you give some examples of things that are true because no one has
ever questioned them?
> > Does Rorty say we possess a sense of value and truth like a sense of
> > sight and taste? Pirsig does.
>
> I hope Pirsig understands that a sense of value or truth has a radical
> difference from those of sight and sense, in that the latter are
> mediated by the body and the former are not. But since Pirsig wants to
> treat 'subject' like 'object' (all SQ) he probably would minimize that
> distinction. I don't.
I think one's senses of truth and beauty are as much "mediated" by the
body as the other senses. I'm sure you've heard of "gut feelings." But
admittedly, I not sure what you mean by "mediated."
> What argument are you going to give when somebody says "it is not
> self-evident that all men are created equal"?
Present the evidence of success of a country whose ideal is such.
> > Like science cannot deny Quality, philosophy cannot deny Truth. Or so
> > a rational, coherent viewpoint would seem to demand.
> It looks to me like Pirsig would disagree with you. If one isn't going
> to seek it (in the sense of trying to come up with a definitive
> statement), then why can't a philosopher deny it? Or rather, to neither
> affirm nor deny. Why not be willing to settle for small 't' truths, as I
> think Pirsig would characterize the MOQ?
I think Pirsig characterizes "Quality" in the MOQ as big T Truth. My
point is behind every assertion of a small t truth is a big T Truth.
The assertion "It's true that there are only small t truths" is a big T
truth. You cannot deny Truth without asserting it.
Platt
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