From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Mon Oct 27 2003 - 18:54:46 GMT
Andy,
DMB said:
The Pragmatists think the choice is between intersubjective truths and the ultimate absolute truth, and that we really have no choice because there is no such thing as the ultimate truth.
Andy said:
I think this is right--what you say about pragmatists, and I am waiting for you to enlighten me on a possibility of a third choice.
Matt:
Wait, wait--it isn't quite right. First, the choice, I would say, is more properly between "truth" as property of sentences and "truth" as an object of inquiry. From there, the other two are construed. However, and this is where I think DMB is wrong in his characterization, the pragmatist does not say "we really have no choice because there is no such thing as the ultimate truth" and mean it literally. If he meant it literally, then he would rightly be construed as piercing behind appearances to something real. We do have a choice, and the choice is between two kinds of conversations: anti-dualist, non-metaphysical conversations and representationalist, metaphysical conversations. In the latter, "there is a thing as ultimate truth" is taken to be a true proposition. In the former, "there is no such thing as ultimate truth" is taken to be a true proposition. Further, the latter conversation takes this proposition to be true: "Propositions that we take to be true, we t
ake to be ahistorical truths, bedrocks for our lives. And if they are later to be found false, that means we simply had not yet found the true ahistorical truths." The former conversation takes this proposition to be true: "Propositions that we take to be true are contingent upon our place in history. As history moves, so does the truth-value of propositions."
When we move from epistemology to conversation, we move away from the thought of people being forced into certain conversations whether they have a choice or not (outlining the limits of possibility), to the thought that we are simply redescribing what we've been doing for centuries anyways. Pragmatists redescribe "truth" from an object of inquiry into a property of sentences.
There are no transcendental limits of possible conversations, only historical ones.
But otherwise, I think Andy's pretty much right on target. I don't see how what anybody has outlined as Pirsig's third option for "truth" is differentiated from the Kantian ahistorical one or the pragmatist contingent one.
Matt
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