From: abahn@comcast.net
Date: Fri Oct 31 2003 - 14:54:55 GMT
Hi Paul and Scott,
Paul said to Scott: "The reification of Dynamic Quality is something I think Pirsig tries to avoid throughout Lila e.g. when he discusses latching and degeneracy in several contexts."
While reading Antmcwatts thesis, Pirsig says in an email to Mcwatt (2001) anwering former moq_discuss member John Beasley's criticisms of the MOQ which are similar to Scott's (as far as I can tell). Beasley said:
"[Pirsig]loses the value of his core term, 'quality', by equating it with too many other terms, and ultimately reifying it; while at the same time asserting that quality cannot be defined, and ignoring the paradox."
To which Pirsig replies (to Mcwatt):
"To reify means to regard an abstraction as if it had a concrete or material existence. You don't lose the value of quality by treating it as if it had a concrete or material existence. You lose the value of quality by treating it as if it had only an abstract existence. That is a fundamental point of the MOQ. Beasley's unease is caused by an inability to understand this basic assertion of the MOQ. He assumes it is in error because it contradicts his prejudices but never explains why his prejudices are superior."
From the above quote it does NOT seem like the reification of quality is something Pirsig is trying to avoid. I am not sure how exactly this relates to your discussion, but I would be interested in your comments on the above quote. One comment I would make is that Pirsig might have been better served by using Rorty or Matts terminology for the last sentence. "Begging the question" seems to be a better phrase than calling another's assumptions "his prejudices." But, of course, the discussion is always open on whose assumptions are superior.
Thanks,
Andy
> Hi Scott
>
> > Paul:
> > Yes, sense perception refers to the creation of biological patterns
> and
> > limits what is meant by "static patterns emerging from Dynamic
> Quality."
> > I think I see what you are getting at. Whilst the MOQ is an empirical
> > philosophy, its empirical reality is value, not just biological sense
> > data. This quote from ZMM..
>
> [Scott:]
> I think you're correct on this, though Pirsig first defines empiricism
> as
> "[empiricism] claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the
> senses or by thinking about what the senses provide." [Ch. 8], though he
> goes on to include art and morality and "even religious mysticism" as
> "verifiable". Nevertheless, this attitude seems to me to [be] more than
> a little
> nominalist, since it looks to that which comes from the outside as
> privileged over that which comes from the inside.
>
> [Paul:]
> From a Dynamic point of view, the MOQ can be called nominalist. There is
> nothing fixed and eternal that intellectual patterns stand for. From a
> static point of view, intellectual patterns help produce and stand for
> structured reality, therefore the MOQ cannot be called nominalist.
>
> [Paul prev:]
> > "In the language of everyday life, reality and intellect are
> different.
> > >From the language of the Buddha's world, they are the same, since
> there
> > is no intellectual division that governs the Buddha's world." [Lila's
> > Child p.567]
> >
> > It seems to me that thinking in "the world of everyday affairs" is
> > entirely different from thinking "in Buddha's world," and as such, I
> > prefer to restrict intellect to the former - conscious, deliberate
> > activity such as planning, predicting, calculating, reasoning etc.
> This
> > is perhaps where our disagreement about intellect lies.
>
> [Scott:]
> Yes. My objection to your preference is that we are doing metaphysics
> here,
> which requires us to leave behind the "world of everyday affairs". To
> carry
> that notion of thinking into one's metaphysics is the problem.
>
> [Paul:]
> I'm not sure I agree that metaphysics requires us to leave behind
> everyday affairs; I think the MOQ tries to ground metaphysics back in
> [static and Dynamic] everyday experience whilst providing a rational
> framework in which to incorporate more exceptional [Dynamic] experience,
> such as mystic understanding. As such, I think it is important to
> distinguish between the types of intellect/mind we are discussing and I
> think the MOQ is right to use the static/Dynamic distinction as its
> primary division to point towards non-verbal, immediately apprehended
> awareness and not have it become pinned down with limiting definitions.
> I also think it is right to limit a static definition of intellect and
> mind - one of my biggest problems with the many different schools of
> Buddhism is the varying and confusing use of "mind" [or at least in
> western translations of Buddhism].
>
> Of course, I think there is an overlap in one's overall experience,
> there is no road sign saying "You are now leaving static reality, come
> back soon," but I think Pirsig acknowledges this inherent problem of
> combining mystical and metaphysical terms...
>
> "Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that
> there is a knower and a known, but a metaphysics can be none of these
> things. A metaphysics must be divisible, definable, and knowable, or
> there isn't any metaphysics. Since a metaphysics is essentially a kind
> of dialectical definition and since Quality is essentially outside
> definition, this means that a "Metaphysics of Quality" is essentially a
> contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity." Lila p.73
>
> ...and goes on and does it anyway.
>
> [Scott to Matt prev:]
> Hence my adoption of the logic of contradictory identity, and why I
> think
> that the MOQ is ultimately a failure. Again, I want to refer to Robert
> Magliola's distinction between 'centric' and 'differential' mystical
> "explanations". Centric explanations are like those you refer to above,
> and
> Pirsig's Quality, DQ, and SQ terminology is a perfect example. As such
> it
> leads the MOQ into error, by stating that mystical experience is "pure
> DQ",
> which leads to the gnostic consequence that SQ is evil, since it gets in
> the
> way of experiencing pure DQ..
>
> Now I don't really think that that (SQ is evil) is what Pirsig thinks,
> but
> why not? Differential mystical philosophy avoids this from the get-go by
> *starting* with contradictory identity. It doesn't allow the reification
> of
> anything (and hence avoids what Rorty doesn't like about metaphysics) in
> one's terminology.
>
> [Paul:]
> The reification of Dynamic Quality is something I think Pirsig tries to
> avoid throughout Lila e.g. when he discusses latching and degeneracy in
> several contexts. However, I think you are right to draw out some of the
> conclusions from a metaphysical system which gives moral superiority to
> mystic understanding. I think the MOQ would say that it is in the
> contexts and circumstances of life that we avoid such outright
> reification and subsequent rejection of static patterns. After all,
> those static patterns include our families, partners, children and
> friends.
>
> Cheers
>
> Paul
>
>
>
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