From: Scott R (email@example.com)
Date: Fri Oct 31 2003 - 17:51:51 GMT
> Scott (I think):Nevertheless, this attitude seems to me to more than a
> nominalist, since it looks to that which comes from the outside as
> privileged over that which comes from the inside.
> What is this outside/inside distinction, reality=quality=experience
> we experience, there is no inside or outside, it is outsideless.
> We can create a theoretical cosmic story but we can not
> experience anything outside of experience, I suggest, pretty
> obvious really.
By "inside" and "outside" I am referring to the fact that in sense
perception I experience things that seem to be not me, while in thinking I
experience things that seem to be me. Pirsig does not pay attention to the
existence of those two very different kinds of seeming, in effect assuming
that one (sense perception) is basic, and the other an illusion (note that I
am referring to the *seeming* as illusory, not the actual thinking). Hence
my accusation of nominalism, and that by ignoring the two types of seeming
he is not being empirical.
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