From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Sat Jun 05 2004 - 15:46:20 BST
Dear Mark H. (and David M.),
You suggested 26 May 2004 21:00:25 -0700 the following definition of a
'moral society':
'Societal institutions that restrict or impede the free flow and interaction
of ideas are immoral, especially if such ideas are critical of existing
institutions. It is immoral for institutions to in any way restrict
individual freedom to act and react in response to biological drives, or in
response to other institutions, or in response to the free interchange of
ideas, unless such activity threatens morally superior institutions or can
be shown to eliminate
or restrict such freedom for others.'
Whether a society is 'moral' or 'immoral' depends on what (other society)
you compare it with. 'Defining' a 'moral society' suggests that it is a
specific situation or phenomenon.
Restricting freedom can be an aspect of immorality (but see the distinction
I make in my 5 Jun 2004 07:09:30 +0200 e-mail), but it is not the only one.
I propose to define the direction of 'moral evolution of society' rather
than 'moral society' itself. As I suggested 26 May 2004 21:47:01 +0200, that
definition should have more substance than just 'more freedom' (or even more
'free flow and interaction of ideas'). My definition of the direction of
'moral evolution of society' would contain 'stability', 'versatility' and
'harmony with higher level patterns of value'.
So I won't follow your suggestions to discuss your list of possible immoral
institutions and to judge their immorality from their 'immorally restricting
or impeding individual freedom'.
1) Because you don't tell us what to compare them with.
2) Because restricting/impeding freedom in general is not a good criterium
for (im)morality and only a partial one. (In fact your 'immorally
restricting ...' suggests the same: Apparantly it is also possible to
'morally restrict ... freedom'. The real criterium for (im)morality is
missing in your suggestion.)
You wrote 29 May 2004 17:02:00 -0700
'I hope you don't mean by this that we must tolerate immoral static patterns
of value (social institutions) until we can create "better" ones to replace
them.'
How can you call them "immoral" (i.e. relative to an alternative that
already exists or is realizable) when we can NOT create "better" ones to
replace them?
Until better ones are available they are the most moral ones available and
it would be immoral to dismantle them.
You continued 29 May:
'How can the concept of "latching" be understood if DQ is not above SQ? How
is it that when an attempted latching fails, we "fall back" to a lower
value.'
A pattern latches at a specific level of Quality. When it fails patterns at
a lower level of Quality take over. This 'Quality' that measures 'higher'
and 'lower' combines DQ and sq.
We can define sq, but we can't define DQ, so we can't fully define evolution
either. 'Latching' is a metaphor that has only limited validity.
If DQ is the cutting edge of (patterned) experience/reality (another
metaphor), it can't be really distinguished from the sq (the combined
patterns) of which it is the edge.
You continued 29 May:
'Freedom means freedom to create new static value patterns and freedom from
old static value
patterns that are shown to be morally null.'
Yes. I would say '... that are less moral'. 'Shown to be' is redundant, as
the existence of patterns implies experiencing them.
I asked 30 May 2004 00:02:02 +0200:
'At the biological level these Dynamic forces have to invent different types
of molecules. What do they invent at the social level?'
You replied 29 May 2004 17:02:00 -0700:
'Morally superior institutions.'
You apparently didn't understand my point.
Carbon molecules already exist at the inorganic level. Latching biological
patterns of value requires two new types of them: DNA and proteins.
So I asked you for something that already exists at the biological level,
which DQ can use to give one type of it a Dynamic function and another type
of it a static function.
My suggestion would be to see 'behaviour' as the (biological level) parallel
for the (inorganical level) 'molecules'. What type of 'behaviour' can be
used by Dynamic forces to invent different types of at the social level that
have (which) Dynamic and static functions there?
The 'morally superior institutions' are a parallel to 'surviving species' in
biological evolution. That was not what I asked for.
(David M.'s suggestion of 30 May 2004 12:59:43 +0100, 'ideas', doesn't
answer my question either for the same reason. In addition to that I would
rather reserve the concept of 'ideas' for an explanation of the step from
the social to the intellectual level.)
You wrote 30 May 2004 07:42:18 -0700:
'I'm the lonely beacon of non-restraint when it comes to pushing the limits
of the "good" society. I just think that being over-cautious in testing new
ideas will unnecessarily retard progress or, worse, lead to stagnation. I
mean, in biological evolution, a non-viable mutation just dies out, biology
doesn't collapse back to amino acids and lightning.'
No you are not.
Please don't mix up the moral evolution of society with the moral evolution
of systems of ideas. In the moral evolution of society it is not 'new ideas'
that are tested, but new societies and new institutions, as in biological
evolution species and life processes are tested.
Individual specimen of a species that becomes extinct DO collapse back to
amino acids and further. (In the right circumstances them become oil... They
even do when their species doesn't dy out.) A species that becomes extinct
(a latch that fails) leaves space for another one (one formerly less fit for
survival, i.e. biologically less moral). E.g. the dying out of dinosaurs
enabled mammals to start thriving.
A society that fails is not the end of the social level. It disbands and its
individual members start participating or intensify their participation in
other societies.
Our ability to 'test' new societies and institutions is very limited. Social
evolution proceeds in a much lower speed than the evolution of our ideas
about their morality. At the European Cultural Foundation, where I work, we
wish we could 'test' our view of an inclusive, non-agressive Europe that
nevertheless sets examples that the rest of the world wants to follow. But
alas, the actually existing social patterns of value in our part of the
world are not thát much different from those elsewhere and cannot be changed
at will (or only very slowly).
To the (very limited) extent that political ideas CAN influence moral
evolution of society, we can distinguish progressive and conservative ideas.
Progressives tell us to dismantle social institutions before we actually
have new ones, because they can imagine better ones and think the old ones
would prevent the new ones to be realized. Conservatives warn us not to
dismantle the old ones, because they are the best we have and don't trust
those progressive visions to become true. Like you, I tend to be on the
progressive side of most political debates.
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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