Re: MF Discussion Topic for February 2005

From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Sat Feb 26 2005 - 07:42:04 GMT

  • Next message: Sam Norton: "Re: MF Discussion Topic for February 2005"

    Dear Sam & others participating,

    Sam formulated his primary concern 14 Feb 2005 09:58:26 -0000:
    'the pre-intellectual understanding would seem to be equated with biological
    quality. If so, then there is no independent access of the intellectual
    level to DQ.'
    and concluded
    'if we are to stick with the definition of "feeling" as biological Quality,
    we must be careful to use some other term when describing our primary
    discernments of value'.
    In betweeen he suggested "emotion":
    'We need to distinguish "emotion" from "feeling", simply because, ... there
    are many ways in which we understand emotion which cannot be equated with
    biological quality.',
    'What is interesting, however, is that there are undoubted biological
    manifestations of these emotions',
    'This suggests to me that if we are to take on board an equation of
    "feeling" with biological Quality, then we need to use "emotion" as a
    broader term, transferable across the upper three levels.' and
    'what is primary is the emotion (an effect produced by the interaction
    between different patterns of each level) with the biological quality
    following on afterwards.'

    I don't see the problem:
    Intellectual patterns of value don't need "access" to DQ, because they
    already embody static intellectual quality, which is (an embodiment from the
    point of view of other levels and a measure of) DQ. Neither do patterns of
    value of the other levels. Taken together all static quality can be
    (contradictory) identified with DQ...
    I don't like the suggestion that "emotion" rather than "feeling" should be
    understood as a broader term for "primary discernment of value", at least at
    the upper three levels. "Experience" (without "sensual" or "sentient") and
    "quality" are perfect broader terms. The idea that something should be
    primary to something else in the MoQ is for me a wrong extrapolation from
    Pirsig's argumentation in "Zen ...", 'Quality first, objects and subjects
    derived' (yes, also by himself). The MoQ as elaborated in "Lila" doesn't
    need DQ to be primary to sq or (some parts of) sq to be primary to DQ. DQ
    and sq are a contradictory identity.
    The wrong turn in your argumentation above is where you talk about
    "biological manifestions of these emotions [at higher levels]". These
    manifestations are not "biological" in the MoQish sense of the word, as then
    don't affect the biological patterns of value, the patterns of value
    configured by DNA.

    With friendly greetings,

    Wim

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