LS Re: The Intellect from Society "Theorem".


Magnus Berg (MagnusB@DataVis.se)
Thu, 18 Sep 1997 02:26:36 +0100


Hi Diana and the rest of the squad. I was waiting for the rest of
your reply Diana, but I might as well comment on this for now.

Diana:
>Whether something is being used or is a user is of no relevance in my
>definition of the levels.

Magnus:
Well, it's very crucial to mine. It decides whether the pattern is of
the
higher or lower level.

Diana:
>Hmm. We're really stuck here you know. So if the chair is part of a
>society called a restaurant it is also an "organ" of the restaurant no?
>And if the restaurant is part of a society called hotel it is an organ
>of that hotel. It seems that the way you analyse it everything is going
>to be organic value.

Magnus:
Everything used by a society, yes. But note, as I've said before, that
this subdivision of societies within societies stops where the function
stops. If a society is composed of two organs. The organs will lose
their
organic status when they are separated and only have their inorganic
properties left.

Diana:
>It bothers me that you use the social level as part of your definition
>of the biological level. If biological patterns are only identifiable as
>organs of social patterns then if we have no social patterns how can we
>have biological patterns? As the biological patterns came first you must
>be able to identify them without social ones.

Magnus:
That's a very good point Diana! The thing is, I can't. My suggestions
about what a specific level needs from its lower are not complete. I
think the social level needs the function of the organic. And I think
the intellectual needs the language provided by the social. But I
can't put my finger on exactly what the organic needs from the
inorganic, that's why asked you guys about it last week.

I do think, however, that it's the only way to define the levels.
To determine exactly what one level needs from the lower. What
made a certain level appear when it did? What patterns of the lower
level existed after but not before that instant?

You made me realize this though. If social patterns need the
function of organic patterns, then both are defined, not only the
organic. Social patterns are what uses the function provided by
organic patterns.

Diana:
>In Lila, Pirsig gave us three human examples of the top three levels.
>Lila is ruled by Biological, Phaedrus is ruled by Intelletual and Rigel
>is ruled by Social. (All of them have all three running through them but
>in each character one level was dominant.) Lila was dominated by
>Biological value because, well, she was a hot chick wasn't she (at least
>when she was younger). She was good for bearing children. Reproduction
>is what biological value is all about.
>
>Can you explain why Lila is representative of Biological value, in terms
>of your organic theories?

Magnus:
No, reproduction is biology's only access to dynamic quality, and
"my" theories only concern static quality. I'm sorry if that sounds
elusive, I'll try to elaborate. Using static patterns, we should be able
to describe *any* static observation, and by static, I mean repeatable,
free from dynamic quality intervention. But the very purpose of
biological
reproduction is to evolve and make the static patterns that originated
it, obsolete. That's why reproduction can't be involved when defining
the static organic level.

Diana:
>Having gone through the book again it's clear to me that biological
>patterns are about biology and social patterns are about society. Pirsig
>even admits that the classification "isn't very original". I think he
>means that we should use these words pretty much as we usually do. In
>all his examples it's clear that that is the way he is using them. Maybe
>I'm exaggerating our differences, but if you don't accept that
>biological value is biology then it throws the whole MoQ out of sync.

Magnus:
What can I say? I think our differences are that your view involves
dynamic quality and mine doesn't. You take the evolution, and that's
the evolution here on earth, into account and I don't, on purpose.

Diana:
>I was making the point (or trying to anyway) that societies/communities
>propagate social value. That is their fundamental purpose. I did also
>say that societies work against biology. But what I mean is that they
>*can* work against it. I don't mean to suggest that the purpose of
>societies is to destroy biology, only that it is not their purpose to
>propagate it. As an example take a country with high social value, say
>Sweden with high taxes and efficient public schools/hospitals/nurseries.
>Then take, say, Zimbabwe (or any chaotic African state) and, I don't
>have figures here but, isn't it true that the population of Zimbabwe is
>growing at a faster rate than that of Sweden?

Magnus:
Most likely, and I'll speculate very loosely on the cause. It could be
that since Sweden are socially more evolved than Zimbabwe, it has more
access to DQ through the social patterns and don't need access to DQ
through biology. It still needs biology, or some other kind of organic
patterns, to sustain itself though.

        Magnus
>

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