Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Fri, 7 Nov 1997 17:35:25 +0100
Bodvar, I would love to discuss the Peirce-Pirsig relation, but I am not
quite ready yet, - later?
>Take a look at my response to Martin Stritz about the Big Bang
>theory. Comments?
Bodvar--> The way you (and Hugo speak) about the event that allegedly took
place when the singularity expanded into the present universe is very
SOM-causation-like: In LILA (p.107) Pirsig mentiones a quality
version of various scientific disciplines; for instance quality
physics where " A causes B" is replaced by: "B values precondition A"
without it changing any facts of science at all. What this will have
to say for the speculations about the emergence of the material world
I only have some faint outlines of, but as usual does the Quality
notion turn everything inside out and upside down.
<--Bodvar
Well, I see my ideas on this as very un-SOM-causation-like! :-) What makes
you consider them causation-like? To me the causal is everything that
lasts, causality only considers the static patterns of nature. And hence
there has been much debate on how new things can become in a world of
causality, emergence and so on, - and on the interpretation of the quantum
collaps. Apart from QM it seems like any event can be given a causal
explanation, yet we have this definite feeling that something is missing
from this mechanistic picture - when and where do the new arise?
I find the simple answer in MoQ and Aristotles potency-act distinction. The
actualization of potentiality, the quality event, is the answer, and the
reason why a causal explanation can be given is that causality neglects the
becoming, it neglects that there were other possibilities. Hence 'A causes
B' always refers to something being preserved - like the preservation of
momentum, while (I guess) 'B values precondition A' is different in not
being closed towards other possibilities like 'C values precondition A'. In
the (too?) simple example of a die being thrown, a specific throw 'causes'
a six, period. But five or four valued the precondition of the throw of the
die just as much as six, this is the essence of throwing a die being random.
This is not very clear, let me give another example: Let us make some
genetically engineered vegetable, with the essentially random process of
genetic manipulation (or a natural mutant for that matter). Now will this
vegetable be nutritious and good for you or will it be poisonous? Either
way, the genetic engineer can give a causal explanation upon doing some
research. The gene seems to have been modified in this or that way,
producing this or that protein, which upon entering your body has this or
that effect.
The problem is, that the 'causality' of this explanation is all due to the
neglect of all the other possibilities in each step of the process. There
were elements of chance in all the steps that led to the production of the
vegetable, and finally there were an element of chance in the being eaten
of the vegetable. For instance we have here in Denmark a new weed becoming
a threat due to the introduction of fallow fields in order to diminish
agricultural production, this weed is immensely poisonous to cows and
horses (they accumulate it and finally die) but evidently sheep have the
ability to break down the would-be poison - now, will it be poisonous to
humans?
Off course science can treat the non-causality of the simple throwing-a-die
sort by focusing on the statics one or two levels below (the die), but it
cannot handle 'emergence', the sort of chance which is not repeatable
because it is part in an evolutionary process.
Any thoughts?
Hugo
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