Martin Striz (striz1@MARSHALL.EDU)
Fri, 12 Dec 1997 06:26:42 +0100
I posted this about a week ago but it was never delivered
because I was being ostracized for using html. Thanks Diana
for pointing that out. So I'm reposting it:
In case any of you are keeping up with the Mike Hardie
debates, I received the following message today:
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>I may be doing this in vain because you may not care
anymore,
Nah. Actually, I had stopped talking about Quality,
because I got the
impression that you were no longer seriously espousing it.
In any case, no,
I'm not bored yet.
>but I was
>re-reading "Lila" today and came across some passages that
seem to clear up
>the objection you had that "Pirsig had discovered that
people agree on what
>Quality is even though they can't define it." Remember the
essays he had
>his students rate, and how you said they came from the same
cultural
>background so they tended to have similar interests and
make similar
>Quality-decisions. Well, here's what I found, it's a
conversation in
>"Lila" between Pirsig (the author) and Richard Rigel (a
lawyer acquantance,
>I could substitute Mike Hardie in for this guy :-):
>
>--------------------------------------Pg. 87, 1992
Paperback version.
>
>"Well there are some of us left," [Rigel] said, returning
to the author,
>"who are still holding out against your hedonistic
'Quality' philosophy or
>whatever it is."
I, for one, have yet to see any explicitly "hedonistic"
tendencies in
Quality -- that is, I don't see it really directly
intersecting with moral
philosophy in any noticeable way.
>"I was just asking a question, " the author said.
>
>"But it's a question that expresses a certain point of
view," Richard Rigel
>answered, "and it's a point of view that some people,
including myself,
>find loathsome."
I don't find hedonism loathsome, so there. :)
>"I'm still not sure why."
>
>God he was insufferable. "All right, I'll tell you why.
Will you listen?"
>
>"Of course."
>
>"No, I mean really listen?"
>
>The author was silent.
>
>"You made a statement in your book that everyone knows and
agrees to what
>'Quality' is. Obviously everyone does not! You refused to
define 'Quality,'
>thus preventing any argument on the subject. You tell us
that
>'dialecticians' who debate these matters are scoundrels. I
guess that would
>include lawyers too. That's pretty good. You carefully tie
your critics'
>hands and feet so that they cannot give you any opposition,
tar their
>reputations for good measure, and then you say, 'Okay, come
on out and
>fight.' Very brave. Very brave."
I would go a little further than Rigel here. If indeed
Pirsig said "we
all know what Quality is" without in any way suggesting what
Quality is,
then Pirsig has claimed precisely nothing. It would be the
equivelant of
my saying "look, we all know what fleeb is, and I'd like to
see the
dialecticians weasel their way out of that"! Any
dialectician with half an
ounce of grey matter would just look at me funny and say
"well, present an
actual argument, and we'll see how well we do at weaseling
out of it."
This comes down again to the fact that a word without a
meaning cannot
correspond to a "variable" in a philosophical argument,
hence making
sentences composed of such words non-arguments.
But as I noted before, I think Pirsig does try to define
Quality to some
degree... i.e., as an event which does certain things, has
certain
properties, is a certain way, etc. I think this whole
"Quality cannot be
defined" thing is more a literary than philosophical
device... i.e., an
allusion to the Tao te Ching. Compare:
"The way that can be spoken of is not the constant way. The
name that can
be named is not the constant name."
>"May I come out and fight?" the author said. "My exact
statement was that
>people do disagree as to what Quality is, but their
disagreement is only on
>the objects in which they think Quality inheres."
>
>"What's the difference?"
>
>"Quality, on which there is complete agreement, is a
universal source of
>things. The objects about which people disagree are merely
transitory."
Well, this makes no sense. If we all agreed that Quality
were the
universal source of things -- as indeed we must -- then we
*would* have
exactly the same opinions about which objects Quality
inheres in. i.e., we
would say "Quality inheres in EVERY object", presuming that
Quality
creating something is a sufficient condition for Quality
inhering in it.
The fact is, though, not everyone does in fact agree that
Quality is a
universal source of things. This "universal / transitory"
distinction is
meaningless, because that disagreement is regarding *the
nature of the
thing in question* (i.e., Quality).
>My oh my, what 'smart talk,' Richard Rigel thought. "*What*
'universal
>source of things'? Some of us can do without that universal
source of
>things, that no one else seems to be able to talk about but
you. Some of us
>would rather stick with our good old-fashioned transitory
objects. By the
>way, how do you keep in touch with that marvelous
'universal source of
>things'? How do you keep in touch?"
Rigel is investing more significance in this "universal /
transitory"
thing than I think is deserved.
>. . . .
>
>"Well, we've been talking in a rather general way so for,
now let me ask a
>rather specific question: Did the universal source of
things, that is
>responsible for the creation of Heaven and Earth, broadcast
on your radio
>receiver as you stumbled across my boat at two a.m. this
morning that the
>woman you were stumbling with was an Angel of Quality?"
>
>"*What*?" the author asked.
>
>"I'll repeat," he said. "Did God tell you that Miss Lila M.
Blewitt of
>Rochester, New York, with whom you stumbled across my deck
at two this
>morning, has *Quality*?"
>
>"What God?"
>
>"Forget God. Do you personally think Miss Lila M. Blewitt
is a Woman of
>Quality?"
>
>"Yes."
>
>Richard Rigel stopped. He hadn't expect this answer.
>
>Could the Great Author really be so stupid? . . . Maybe he
had some trick
>up his sleeve. . . . Richard Rigel waited but nothing came.
Not sure what that has to do with anything. The debate is
about why we
must believe Quality, not whether it does in fact apply to
"Lila M.
Blewitt" or anything else. Besides which, it's dense to ask
"is X a thing
of Quality" when Pirsig just said quite explicitly that
Quality is the
universal source of all things. Frankly, I think Rigel is
more a
Thrasymachus here than a genuine objector -- or so it seems
from these
excerpts. I mean, he argues strenuously, but ultimately he
just accepts
the other debator's fundamental point while quibbling about
the
specifics... and hence gets dragged down the slippery slope
to agreement.
In other words, he's disagreeing in the wrong places.
>. . . .
>
>He leaned forward and addressed the Great Author with deep
gravity. "Please
>will you, in future days, consider the possibility that the
'Great Source
>of All Things,' that speaks only to you and not to me, is,
like so many of
>your ideas, just a figment of your fertile imagination, a
figment that
>allows you to justify any act of your own immortality as
somehow God-given.
> I consider that undefined 'Quality' to be a very dangerous
commodity. It's
>the stuff fools and fanatics are made of."
I don't think Quality is a figment of anyone's
imagination, per se. I
think it's an attempt at an all-inclusive explanatory tool
that just
doesn't work, because its attempts to be all-encompassing
only actually
manifest as increasingly vague and meaningless
non-statements -- again, I
get the sense that allusions to Taoism have become
hopelessly intermixed
with genuine points. In brief, it seems like something that
Pirsig arrived
at by playing semantic games -- and don't get me wrong, I
don't mean to
suggest he did so on purpose. Anyways, that's the tactic I
would employ if
I were debating with Pirsig, not this slippery-slope "well,
if we believe
in Quality, then morality gets shot to hell" approach Rigel
seems to be using.
>-------------------------------------------
>
>Well this dialogue goes on for a few more pages where Rigel
continues to
>thorougly destroy Pirsig/Phaedrus. This dialogue is used
to introduce the
>main objections to ZMM, which Pirsig spends time
explaining, along with the
>addition of Static and Dynamic aspects (and the
subdivisions of Static
>Valeus) which I may have mentioned already. These topics,
strewn with many
>tangents and asides (just like ZMM), make up the bulk of
the book. I think
>if you want your objections answered, it would be best to
read "Lila." The
>book essentially concludes after Pirsig goes around the
world of
>metaphysics and creates the Metaphysics of Quality, and
finally is able to
>answer why he thinks a "bar-whore" like Lila has any
Quality.
I'm not sure that's the most important point he should be
making, though.
I mean, if Quality works as a sensible and all-encompassing
explanation
for everything, then it follows that Lila has Quality,
because Quality is
defined as the universal source of everything. That might
be
counterintuitive to some people's notions of what a "quality
woman" would
be, but if Pirsig had already established the validity of
Quality, he could
just thumb his nose at such obviously irrational prejudice.
>That's where
>the title of the book comes from, Lila Blewitt is an
adulteress who broke
>up a family. Rigel was the lawyer who defended the wife
who divorced the
>man who had the affair with Lila. In Rigel's eyes Lila has
no Quality.
>But then again, Rigel isn't in touch with Quality. :-)
But what Rigel is implying is that she is an immoral
woman. Is that
really the same as saying she has no Quality, in the sense
that Pirsig uses
Quality? I mean, if Pirsig means only "she has qualities",
then Rigel
would be hard-pressed to disagree... because he already
assigned her a
quality himself (i.e., the quality of being immoral). What
exactly *does*
Pirsig mean, anyways?
Mike
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Here is my reply, tell me if I misrepresented the MOQ:
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>What exactly *does* Pirsig mean, anyways?
That's a good place to start. I think the problem is I kept
using ZMM too much as a tool, when it's really just an
introduction. You kept asking for a definition for this
elusive yet all-encompassing "Quality" and ZMM doesn't
provide that. Pirsig just left it undefined there and at
the time it was published, 1974, people were into liberalism
and hippyism and mysticism, and they caught on. We're back
down to earth now and we want real answers. Those answers
are provided in "Lila" (1991).
Pirsig explains in "Lila" that there were two main objectors
to his Quality idea: 1) the logical positivists 2) mystics.
Now I know you wouldn't want to be called a positivist
because it usually has negative connotations these days and
is usually associated with people who throw out philosophy
and call whatever science discovers 'absolute truth.' What
Pirsig says about the positivists is that they were the
dialectitians, the people who analyzed (like scientists) and
wanted answers for everything. Well-defined scientific
answers. Obviously they were the materialists too. He said
it wasn't hard to argue against them when it came to
philosophy and metaphysics. The problem was with the
mystics. Idealists are kind of like mystics in their
refutation of hard matter, although not quite. He meant the
eastern mystics who practice zazen and such, and believed
the source of all things was unspeakable. That mystical Way
described by Lao-Tzu. You picked up on that, very
perceptive of you.
Well, because the mystics gave him the most trouble, because
they would throw out the first objections if he tried to
define Quality, he left it undefined at first. I mean, what
kind of an all-encompassing philosophy is it if it doesn't
encompass the asian mystics who make up half the world's
population? But eventually he comes to realize that by even
naming the 'universal source of all things' Quality, he has
broken the mystic's rule and has started giving a definiton,
because there are certain connotations invovled when we
think of 'quality.' He toys with the idea and finally
decides it would be Better if he did go ahead and define it.
You can read the struggle to define on your own. The result
is the Metaphysics of Quality. It is Pirsig's 'definition'
of Quality, at least as much of a definition as can be
given. It doesn't say what the 'underlying fundamental
nature' of Quality is, Quality IS the underlying fundamental
nature of everything, Pirsig would say. I can give you a
summary of the MOQ, but again, the best thing would be to go
ahead and read "Lila." I think you're at a point where you
could skip ZMM and still understand it perfectly. You're
right there with Rigel, you could basically start on page
87. :-) Nah, start on the first page.
But first lets clear some things up.
>Well, this makes no sense. If we all agreed that Quality
were the
>universal source of things -- as indeed we must -- then we
*would* have
>exactly the same opinions about which objects Quality
inheres in. i.e., we
>would say "Quality inheres in EVERY object", presuming that
Quality
>creating something is a sufficient condition for Quality
inhering in it.
No no, you haven't considered how our minds change our
perceptions. No one in their right mind would disagree that
what we perceive can be tainted by our memories, biases, and
imaginations. Now, the object, constructed by the values
that it is made of, rests there objectively. We come along
and see it and one person says it's an ugly object, another
says it's a pretty one. Now, the object that has become
real to us, the one that exists temporarily in the history
of the universe, the one that is a temporal pattern of
values, the one *when it is perceived*, THAT is the object
we disagree upon. The Zen mystics have an answer to this of
course, they say that if you really want to know reality you
should meditate, erase all thoughts and prejudices, and then
you will be seeing things at the pre-intellectual moment of
awareness. When reality is perceived objectively. Most
westerners think that's nonsense but Pirsig sees that the
mystics have stumbled onto something. We could learn from
them.
Pirsig says our world is really composed of two things (this
is where he begins to define Quality by making the first
dichotomy). He says that instead of subjects and objects,
the best division is Dynamic and static. What is more
primary than the fact that there is change and there is
sameness? Dynamic Quality is that pre-intellectual moment
of awareness, it is the cutting edge of experience. In
fact, it is ALL that exists. How? Because our reality
exists only right 'now.' We live in a continuous succession
of 'nows.' However, if you consider the fact that it takes
a split second to think about our situation and recognize
it, to judge it, it takes some time for an image to register
in our brains, then you realize that we are always living a
split second in the past. Only that preintellectual moment
described by the Zen mystics, that original moment of
awareness, untainted by our brains, is the real moment we
call 'now.' It is Dynamic Quality, and since we only exist
'now,' Dynamic Quality is the only reality! Dynamic Quality
is the source of reality! I'm probably going too fast.
Static values are continuous through many 'nows,' they are
more boring, conservative, repetitive, learned, but they are
stable. That is the most important thing. Reality is not
absolute chaos because static values exist and keep it from
being so. Dynamic Quality would probably be total chaos.
Static quality is also a part of our memories and biases and
judgements, it is formed from our intellectualizing too.
(Note, Pirsig capitalizes Dynamic Quality but not static
quality. He also capitalized Quality in ZMM. So I think he
has made ZMM's Quality into Lila's Dynamic Quality, you
know, the source of everything. Static values are secondary
to it, just as reality is secondary to the source.
"Subjects" and "objects" are ideas so they are intellectual
static patterns. Atoms are physical static patterns. They
are secondary to the fact that there is a 'now' and there is
perception at the 'now.')
Pirsig points out that it is the struggle between Dynamic
Quality and static quality that has made the universe
evolve. And not just the evolution of life, the evolution
of everything. A new trait is found in an organism, this is
Dynamic, if that trait is successful it stays and becomes
static. It becomes stable. Nothing can exist completely
Dynamic because it doesn't last long and is chaotic, nothing
can exist completely static because new Dynamic things take
its place. The Roman Catholic Church is a very static
pattern of social values. When Martin Luther came along his
protestantism was a collection of new, dynamic values.
Things evolve, that which is better replaces the old, and
Dynamic Quality is the most Good of all, after all, it is
pure Quality in ZMM.
Now what else does this mean? Pirsig shows that there are
paradoxes and problems with subject-object metaphysics that
can be resolved by Quality metaphysics when you consider
that there are several kinds of static quality. Pirsig
defines them as physical, biological, social, and
intellectual. He says that the reason why physical things
can exist and yet free will can exist, is because each level
functions by its own rules. (The paradoxes disappear when
you realize there are many laws, not just one, many truths,
not just one.) Free will is a law of intellectual values,
causation and determinism is a law of physical values. And
so the free will problem of the materialists is solved. The
same goes for a lot of things. Truth and goodness are
merely a matter of which level you're looking from and which
set of rules you're going by. Each level has its own rules
which means each level has its own Morality. That's right,
reality can be described as being a "moral order." We
typically thing of morality as something only for society,
but Pirsig points out that is morality only for social
patterns. Morality also exists with physical, biological,
and intellectual things, and moralities conflict. It is
moral for an atom to behave by the laws of the universe, in
fact that's all it can do. It is moral for your body to
want to have sex, fart, piss, shit, vomit (and Pirsig uses
these terms :-) and all kinds of things, but it is obviously
not moral to do these things in public. i.e., they are not
morals for social static quality. Thus morals conflict.
The evolution of new values, the struggle of dynamic values
against static values, and the struggle of the four static
levels against each other, these are the sources of the
world's conflicts and the reason why there is perceived
'evil.' he he, another paradox explained. Are you catching
on? I'm just going off on this now. :-)
The revolution in the 60's and 70's was the emergence of
intellectual static patterns, which didn't really exist in
many places and were not dominant anywhere. The Greeks
evolved intellectual patterns first with their philosophy,
and it came and went in several places. But in the 60's and
70's the cultural revolution placed intellectual values on
top for the first time. Intellectual static quality finds
"reason," "rationality," "individuality," "liberty," and
other things as being very moral. It completely conflicts
with social static quality's morals. And so the two levels
had a conflict in the 60's and 70's, with intellectual
values overthrowing social values. Along the way, they used
biological values to help them out, breaking Victorian and
Christian morality by attacking from top and bottom (if you
consider each value to be higher than the one before, in
turn). The result is that social static quality has been
made less important than intellectual static quality, which
is good because it is higher up on the evolutionary ladder,
but we have also made it less than biological static
quality, which is a step down. That is why people say
society today is immoral and cares only about the flesh.
The answer to our 'moral' dilemma these days is to realize
that society is important too. Social values can't just be
thrown out. Intellectual values and biological values have
to find an equilibrium with social values somewhere in
between. We need to bring the family back. :-) Another
problem solved.
Well I'm going to stop here because I could type 500 pages
on the supremacy of the Metaphysics of Quality. it sounds
odd at first to consider the world to be like this, **but
it's just a matter of getting used to.** There's nothing
intrinsically wrong about it since all metaphysics are based
on presupps. But with MOQ, pretty soon everything falls
into place and makes much more sense.
So, then how do traditional western conceptions (SOM) of
'objects' and 'subjects' compare to the MOQ? The MOQ would
say that subjects are conglomerates of social and
intellectual values. It would say that 'objects,' devoid of
minds, are composed of mostly physical and probably
biological values too (you can include or leave out biology
depending on which defintion makes the most sense). I am
not a mind. My mind is not a thing. I am a pattern of
social and intellectual values. My body is a pattern of
physical and biological values. The mind/body problem
solved.
> But what Rigel is implying is that she is an immoral
woman. Is that
>really the same as saying she has no Quality, in the sense
that Pirsig uses
>Quality? I mean, if Pirsig means only "she has qualities",
then Rigel
>would be hard-pressed to disagree... because he already
assigned her a
>quality himself (i.e., the quality of being immoral). What
exactly *does*
>Pirsig mean, anyways?
So does Lila have Quality? No, Quality has her! Lila is a
jungle of physical, biological, social, and intellectual
values. She is a pattern of static quality, and by
perception and contact with her environment, Dynamic values
help to change her. After all, we all change. Social
values (religions, language, culture, societies) evolve,
intellectual values (ideas, beliefs, philosophies,
scientific theories, freedoms, liberties) evolve, they all
evolve under the impulse of Dynamic Quality. And Dynamic
Quality, since it is at the preintellectual moment of
awarenss, being by definition 'preintellectual,' is not
something we can intellectualize and Define. It's just now,
it's the entirey of our existence. You have to be able to
step outside of something and look at it as a whole in order
to define it, we can't step outside of our existence. But
Pirsig definitely shows that we can know what the hell is
going on and we don't fall into vagueness as you said here:
>I don't think Quality is a figment of anyone's imagination,
per se. I
>think it's an attempt at an all-inclusive explanatory tool
that just
>doesn't work, because its attempts to be all-encompassing
only actually
>manifest as increasingly vague and meaningless
non-statements -- again, I
>get the sense that allusions to Taoism have become
hopelessly intermixed
>with genuine points
And we can know a helluva lot more than from any other
ontological or metaphysical position. :-) Just read "Lila,"
then you'll see why it all makes so much sense. I could
talk forever but it's easier to read the book.
Many truths to you,
Martin
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And many truths to you too, Lila Squad,
Martin
-- post message - mailto:lilasqd@hkg.com unsubscribe/queries - mailto:diana@asiantravel.com homepage - http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/4670
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