Diana McPartlin (diana@asiantravel.com)
Sat, 17 Jan 1998 16:39:25 +0100
Hi Hugo and the LS
Hugo Fjelsted Alroe wrote:
>
> On the principles:
...
> And I think this is very close to what Doug R. says below. Is this correct,
> Doug?:
> >My literal interpretation of Pirsig's words, cast forward in time from
> >1974 to now tells me that he is saying this: Quality is definable and
> >undefinable. The part which is definable is Static Quality. The part
> >which is undefinable is Dynamic Quality.
I've just sent out a response to Magnus regarding defining Dynamic
Quality. Just because you can't define it doesn't mean you can't say
anything about it. Please, please, please, please, don't let's get back
onto the to define or not to define debate. I've lost count of the
number of times I've been over this. You can't give precise definitions
of many things in the MoQ because of the Language Problem but you still
can explain them to a certain extent.
> >5. Static awareness.
> >Each higher level evolved from the lower level but has become a discrete
> >level. From the point of view of any level it is only possible to
> >evaluate phenomena at that level.
>
> I don't quite understand the last sentence - is this the same as the
> argument that higher levels cannot be seen from lower, or does it go in the
> other direction as well? I think higher levels do value elements of lower
> levels.
It goes in both directions. What I was trying to get at was that
although you can see aspects of biological and social value, from the
intellectual point of view you can't say whether or not they are good.
For example, you can measure the loudness and rhythmn of music. You can
write down the musical notation on a piece of paper. But you can't tell
whether or not you like it until you experience it in biological mode,
ie you listen to it.
Obviously as long as you are alive you'll never experience inorganic
value. You can measure it and manipulate it but you'll never actually
know what it's like to be inorganic.
The same distinction exists between intellectual and social value
although it's not so easy to see because the two are still very mixed
up. For example suppose you see someone famous, not someone you admire
but someone famous nevertheless. You probably couldn't help looking at
them just because of the charisma that celebrity creates. Intellectually
it doesn't make sense, why pay attention to someone you're not
interested in? But socially you experience the pull of celebrity and it
makes perfect sense.
> >8. Dependency.
> >When a higher level attempts to assert its moral dominance over a lower
> >level, it must be careful that it does not endanger the stability of the
> >lower level on which it ultimately depends for survival.
>
> This could perhaps be formed as a rule, I dont like the 'must be careful'
> form; something like:
> A higher level can only dominate a lower level in so far as it does not
> endanger ...
Yes that's better. (Platt, you'd better start shouting if you don't want
all your words to be edited out)
In fact it might be better to put the dependency bit first as that's the
key point. As I said in my other post to Magnus, I'd like to change
"level" to "quality" because dependency also applies to Dynamic-static
dependency, but Dynamic Quality isn't usually described as a "level"
Higher qualities depend on lower qualities for survival. Thus a higher
quality can only dominate a lower one in so far as it does not endanger
its stability.
> >9. Evolution.
> >To create ever higher levels of awareness, Dynamic Quality strives for
> >freedom from all static patterns. Freedom is the highest Good in the
> >Metaphysics of Quality. Life is migration of static patterns of quality
> >toward Dynamic Quality.
>
> I would say the exact reverse of the last sentence ( Life is migration of
> Dynamic Quality toward static patterns of quality) and yet the first form
> has some merit too. This has to do with the distinction between a primeval
> sort of dynamic quality and a conditioned sort of dynamic quality, or
> rather, this has to do with what the static-dynamic split tends to hide of
> the nature of quality. Dynamic quality is the potency of becoming,
> initially unbounded, but as the reality becomes real, dynamic quality is
> bounded by, as well as founded on, what has become real. Yes, the dynamic
> quality of intellectual freedom has arisen through evolution, but it has
> arisen only because the necessary static patterns which may support (give
> rise to) such intellect have evolved. Perhaps we could say that Life (here
> taken to be something like the creative evolutionary processes of our
> world) is the migration (or a movement or simply evolution?) of Dynamic
> Quality from the uniform unlimited (in both senses, without any bounds on
> what it can be and without any innner limits or differences,
> un-differentiated that is) towards the complex unlimited.
> This is only a tentative formulation, but the issue is pivotal in my
> understanding of Metaphysics of Quality.
"Life is a migration of static patterns of quality toward Dynamic
Quality" is a direct quote from Lila and it's repeated several times so
it would seem to be something Pirsig feels strongly about.
I do see your point that it is also a migration of Dynamic toward
static. I think this is the same problem that Bodvar pointed out and
which I'm eagerly awaiting Anthony's reply to, ie that Dynamic Quality
is both the origin and the goal of static quality. Static quality
emerges in the wake of DQ and it also follows DQ. But a wake moves away
from the boat. It seems that SQ is moving away and towards at the same
time. I'd like to wait for Anthony's response on this one.
Diana
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