Diana McPartlin (diana@asiantravel.com)
Mon, 26 Jan 1998 18:53:51 +0100
Hi Hugo and squad
Hugo Fjelsted Alroe wrote:
> I personally dislike the lumping together of quality, value and moral. To
> me quality is a monad, a 'firstness', in Leibniz' or Peirce's sense, value
> is a dyad, a 'secondness', and moral is a triad, a 'thirdness'. Value is
> 'quality for some other' (someone, something .. some) and moral is 'quality
> for some other, evaluated by some third' or simply 'value for some third'.
> (This view follows Peirce's triadic structures of logic, - semeiotics. I
> may diverge from Peirce in using them in an ontological/metaphysical
> analysis.)
I'm not sure that I really understand your objection. Perhaps it's
because I'm not familiar with Peirce's work. I realize that quality,
value and morality have different meanings in everyday terms but in MoQ
terms they are precisely the same thing.
In normal terms, a value is the result of an evaluation, but the whole
point that Pirsig is trying to make is that it's actually the other way
round. The evaluation is in fact the result of the value. Similarly
morality isn't the result of a moral judgement, the judgement is a
result of the morality.
Quality, value and morality are all monads, or rather they're all the
same monad. They're just different terms for the same thing.
Diana
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