Donald T Palmgren (lonewolf@utkux.utcc.utk.edu)
Wed, 18 Feb 1998 00:51:28 +0100
On Tue, 17 Feb 1998, Magnus Berg wrote:
> >
> > O-kay we have two possibilities about what counts as understanding
> > in philosophy: (1) seeing where it all fits in relation to itself --
> > somebody once said "Philosophy is the study of its own history," and (2)
what I call the "machine idea" --
> > that a philosophical system is like a machine that, if you've understood
> > it, you can climb inside and make it run for you -- if you understand the
> > MoQ then you can, say, explain Chaos theory in MoQ terms. Can anybody
> > name other tests of understanding?
>
> Not really, just that (1) is what we call philosophology and (2) is what
> we call philosophy. Pirsig uses those terms and we tend to follow him in
> these matters.
Okay, if you want to use those names, that's fine. There are
still others out there.
How about: Does philosophy make predictions? Back in the 60s the
big question was, "Is Marxism true?" Marx's dialectic materialism (more
-ism's) took us through history to the (his) present and showed how The
Age of the Working Man would nessecarily be the next historical era. So if
Marxism was true it would carry the same power of prediction which science
carries (and from which, by the way, gains it's MIGHT, it's compelling
FORCE.) Through Marx's understanding of philosophy he was able
(alledgedly) to generate accurate predictions.
So that's 3. I can think of a fourth. Does anybody whose read the
GUIDEBOOK TO ZMM remember the discussion on Eastern and Wester definitions
of "Enlightenment?" (Hint, hint.)
> This is not that strange really. Remember that philosophy is a meta science,
> it's on a different level of understanding than i.e. medicine. What Pirsig
> counts as understanding in philosophy IMHO is that you can heal science.
Pretend all of you that you are the head of a university
philosophy department (a fate I wouldn't wish upon my worst enamy), and
the dean comes in and says, "I'm real sorry Professor Knows-a-lot, but
we've got these terible budget problems and I'm going to have to get rid
of the entier philosophy program."
And you say, "But Dean Tightwad, we need to study philosophy!"
And Dean Tightwad says, "Well, perhaps you can help me. See I was
a bussiness major, and I've never really understood what you do here."
Now, how are you going to respond? This guy wants to know,
bottom-line, what's the pay-off, and your job depends upon your answer.
What are you going to say?
>
> I substitute subject with knower, mind, subjective, insubstantial etc.
> I substitute object with known, matter, objective, body, substantial etc.
>
> I sense that you might not, please elaborate.
Certainly. Pirsig makes the same equation you do without thinking
about it, and that's what I'm trying to show (else my discussion of Kant
will seem meaningless -- well, understanding Kant is a worthy goal in
itself, but it woun't seem especially connected to MoQ).
The differance is, as I said earlier, an idea is not a body --
it's not spacially extended. But it is a Gegenstand (an object).
Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox:
*** Whenever you have a dichotomistic distionction (everything
is either A or B) iterate it -- that is, apply it to itself and see where
it falls. ***
So: MBd is clearly a thought or system of thought. It is not
spacially extended, MBd has no body. It's an element of Mind.
But what about SOM (knower-known)? It's obviously not a knowing
consciousness; it's something (namely an idea) we know/are aware of. SOM
is an object -- a Gegenstand (literally "stands onver against"
consciounsness).
So I hope now that it's clear that SOM and MBd are different.
Pirsig missed that little point.
>
>
> > The purpose of LILA was to account for the apparent subjectivity
> > in taste -- to explain, as it were, the koan of the brujo. Regardless of
> > what he says, Pirsig is constantly trying to make Quality, goodness,
> > excellence... into a brute fact -- to render it objective.
>
> No, your reasoning just shows that you are still submerged in SOM. What
> Pirsig means with "Quality can not be independently derived from either
> mind or matter." is precisely that Quality *can not* be rendered objective,
> because objective, and subjective, are derived from Quality.
If subjective and Mind are the same, and objective and Body are
the same, then I'd agree. But what I was trying to get at through all that
cloud watching is: they are not. Pirsig was held captive by a picture and
we all fall into the same "hypnossis" as he when we read him.
But "objective" means "brute fact." Objective-subjective are types
of truth not types of things. So, I don't say Pirsig wants to make
Quality a (known)object or a Body. I'm saying he wants to give it the
truth status of a brute fact. He himself says that this is how it all got
started -- How do you assign grades in a rhetoric class? Is it
subjective? Dosn't he clearly react against that? Dosn't he out-right say
he wants Quality to be absolute?
>
>
> > Okay, now I promise, next time: Kant! And I'll show you how Kant
> > re-defines "object" in a pretty wild and original fashion (much like
> > Pirsig did w/ his "static patterns of value").
>
> Pirsig did not define object with SPoV. SPoV is both subject and object.
I did not mean to imply an "only." I agree w/ you. My point is
that Pirsig has a novel definition for what a glass of water is, and so
does (as we shall see) Kant ...
Donny
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