LS Re: Magnas


Donald T Palmgren (lonewolf@utkux.utcc.utk.edu)
Thu, 26 Feb 1998 03:37:05 +0100


On Tue, 24 Feb 1998, Magnus Berg wrote:

> > I've got this bit of writting that I'm working on tenativly titled
> > _"Can Logic be Institutionalized? Dunderbeck's Saussage Machine"_ about
> > the Church of Reason. Maybe after I finnish it I'll submit it to the Web
> > page Forum. It would address Platt's questions about why I raise these
> > questions about what's over the fence. I mean if you or I study Phil. just
> > for fun -- Great! More power to us. But this is (for better or worse) also
> > a profesional, institutionalized disciplan. Why? Should it be? I mean if
> > Prof. Knows-a-lot says to Dean Tightwad, "Well, we're just doing this to
> > have fun," -- by-by Phil. Dept. Maybe you think that's a good thing...
> > Maybe it is.
>
> This is a typical SOM question. In SOMese, this is where the discussion
> ends, with a just-what-you-like-subjective question. No more rational
> arguments are possible. In MOQese, this is the start, "...need we ask
> anyone...".
>
        Woe, slow down. I wasn't giving any kind of answer above --
certainly not: "Well, everybody has there own opinion and no one's is
the
same as anyone elses, and..."
        All I did was bring up a question. Here we are "doing
philosophy"
outside of the artificial classroom environment. I'm curious what some
of
you think. Is this "real" philosophy and that: garbage? Is achademia
philosophically bankrupt?

I SAID:
> Can you have knowledge of (the world of) experience prior to
> experience? Hume says no - Kant says yes - Hegel gives a strenuous no -
> Pirsig says yes.

MAGNAS SAID:
I wish you'd stop misquoting Pirsig in each and every post. I guess
you're referring to Quality with this "knowledge prior to experience".
But there's nothing certain about Quality at all. Kant's a priori
knowledge is something which is true, Pirsig's Quality is something
which is good.

I know that "good" in SOMese is very fuzzy and subjective. The church
of reason scorns good and acknowledges only truth. But if you follow
the truth-trail to the end, you discover that all truths are axioms
resting on nothing but themselves, valid in no other context but
within themselves. This goes for metaphysics too. I really like
Platt's answer to "What is philosophy?". Applied to truths it
becomes, "Give me a truth and I'll find the underlying assumptions.".

Good is more real than truth.

NOW MY TURN:
        Good is more real than truth. (and ain't that the truth?) ;)
        O-kay, now there's a declirative sentence -- a proposition. As
such it is either a priori-analytic, emperical-synthetic, or (if such a
thing is possible) a priori-synthetic.
        If it is a priori-anylitic then it is a logical truth, a truth
by
definition. (When a great many people are out of work, unemployment
results.) No, it's not that. If it was there wouldn't have been much to
say in ZMM. The MoQ would be self-evident.
        Well, if it's emperical-synthetic then it is something we learn
inductivly through repeated enconters via sensory perception. Pirsig
rejects this as well. We don't *see* Quality out in the world (because
it's not a thing of or in the world -- it is the world). We don't
observe
- observe - observe and then realize: "Oh, a-ha! Good is more real than
truth, see here it is."
        Pirsig "goes between the horns" by (though he dosn't put it in
these terms) making this knowledge of Quality a priori-synthetic -- it's
an intuitive knowledge we have of the world w/o ever seeing it in the
world. As I said: we know this of exp. prior to any exp.of it.

        Now you might want to cast about and find another catagory of a
proposition (a declairative sentence) and... well, good luck. All
propositions are either a priori or emperical, and all propositions are
either synthetic or analytic. (Oooh, dichotomistic destinctions! And
what
do we do w/ those? Apply them to themselves.)
        Or you might say, "Oh, well that statment isn't true; it's [we
could insert a "merly"] good." But then why should we care. It's like
saying "X isn't true, but it'll make you feel good and cure science,
too,
even though it's not true." P never says the MoQ isn't true. Of course
I'm
giving a characture here, but I hope you see the point. The MoQ (like
any
metaphysics) has to claim to be true to be significant -- for anyone to
care. (Otherwise it's just a self-esteem cult or something.)

        Okay, here's two propositions that you and Platt can hunt out
underlying asumptions of:
        Good is more real than truth.
        The purpose of philosophy is to bring-forth undelying
asumptions.
(I'll give you one: An assumption that philosophy has a purpose -- or a
single unifying purpose.)

                                        Happy hunting,
                                        Donny

 



This archive was generated by hypermail 2.0b3 on Thu May 13 1999 - 16:42:48 CEST