LS Re: Conceptions of Dynamic Quality


Keith A. Gillette (gillette@tahc.state.tx.us)
Sun, 1 Mar 1998 19:57:26 +0100


PART II: Ontological Aspects of Dynamic Quality

No one has jumped on any of the statements in my original post concerning
the identification of Dynamic Quality with value. As a result, I haven't
had the opportunity to explore that aspect of Dynamic Quality as I did with
the epistemology of DQ (see my overblown exposition in Part I). Since I
personally have a more difficult time seeing the justification for this
identification that with the justification for the limits of intellectual
knowledge, I'd like to spend a little time on it (I promise, less than in
Part I!).

To my understanding of MoQ, Pirsig makes exactly one ontological assertion:
Reality is Quality, that is, value. (See diagram, Chapter 20, *ZMM*, or the
concluding paragraph of Chapter 7 of *Lila*: "Quality is morality. Make no
mistake about it. They're identical. And if Quality is the primary reality
of the world then that means morality is also the primary reality of the
world. The world is primarily a moral order."

My question: What is our justification for accepting this?

In *Lila*, Pirsig starts by merely asserting reality = quality as fact. He
does, of course, provide many examples that seem to support his contention.
In Chapter 5 of *Lila*, for example, Pirsig discusses the example of the
hot stove, "value is more immediate, more directly sensed than any 'self'
or any 'object'". Chapter 8 of *Lila* is devoted to showing how a
value-centered metaphysics dissolves the 'platypi' of a Subject-Object
Metaphysics. Likewise, in following chapters, especially Chapter 12,
examples of other dilemma's resolved by MoQ are discussed.

However, all of the many examples throughout *Lila* seem to beg the
question of whether reality = quality. Assuming the premise may be fine
rhetorical strategy, but it does not make for a strong logical argument.

The only place I've found something of a positive case for the identity is
in Chapter 19 of *ZMM*, where Pirsig takes us through Phaedrus's reasoning
in rejecting each of the two horns of the subject/object dilemma. In
capsule form, a proof version of Pirsig's reasoning in Chapter 19 goes
something like this: If something exists, it is either objective or
subjective or reality itself. Quality exists. Therefore, Quality is either
objective or subjective or reality itself. Let's consider the case where
Quality is objective. Now, if quality is objective, then x,y,z follow. Ah,
but it's not the case that x,y,z obtain. Therefore, Quality is not
objective. So, let's take the case that Quality is subjective. If quality
is subjective, then p,q,r. Ah, but again, not p,q,r. Therefore, Quality is
not subjective. Therefore, Quality is not subjective or objective.
Therefore, Quality is reality itself. (This formulation of Chapter 19's
argument has my own spin on it. Pirsig's actual argument only concerns
whether Quality is objective or subjective, not whether it's reality
itself. I added that assumption because I think it's implicit in Pirsig's
reasoning and it's clearly needed to make the identity statement true.)

Now this is all sound reasoning and we've got a good case for reality =
quality assuming the reasons for rejecting both subjectivity and
objectivity (p,q,r and x,y,z) are really *not* the case. In my estimation,
though, Pirsig glosses over p,q,r and x,y,z. To be sure, I need to perform
a closer analysis of his arguments in Chapter 19 than the scope of this
post allows. I think it's clear, however, that the arguments Pirsig makes
here are essential to justify the belief that reality = quality, assuming
I'm correct that this is the only place a real argument is given.

I want to close this section by asking the group what justification you
have for believing Pirsig's identity quality = reality. Do you find the
reasons Pirsig gives for rejecting subjectivity and objectivity in Chapter
19 compelling? Are there arguments (even beyond Pirsig's works) that don't
beg the question other than the the one identified in Chapter 19? More
broadly, do you think proper justification requires dialectic precision or
is any rhetorical argument sufficient? Is this point a matter of faith?
(Are we really building a Church of MoQ?) On a side note, is the reality =
quality identity at odds in any way with the epistemological consideration
that reality is not completely knowable intellectually?

In a previous post in the "What's wrong with the SOM?" thread, Diana raised
an ontological question that I thought would be appropriate to address
here, given the discussion in PART I and PART II above ...

At 1:35 PM +0000 2/11/98, Diana McPartlin wrote:
>In the meantime while we're on the subject of trying to explain the
>MoQ, another thing I've always found difficult is trying to explain
>exactly what "value" is.

Since value is quality is reality, this *is* an especially difficult
concept to explain to someone! All of the discussion above should inform
the answer to this problem.

First, there's the epistemological consideration that would lead you to
explain that value/reality is not ultimately explicable in intellectual
terms, partly because it includes the subjective character of experience,
which is irreducible to a rational description. Taking this view to the
extreme, however, would lead you to say simply "value is" (or to say
nothing at all), as your response to Ken on understanding reality suggests.
This mystic approach is not very useful in getting the idea across to
someone, though.

Second, the ontological consideration that identifies value with reality
would lead you to explain value in the same way you'd explain reality to
someone. "Well, I conceive of it as divided into four ethico-evolutionary
levels: the inorganic, the biological, the social, the intellectual. Value
(reality) that can be conceived of through these fixed concepts is 'static
value'. The sum total of these patterns and that which does not fit into
these categories is the totality of reality, or 'dynamic value'." People
will look at you strangely.

Probably the only way you can describe what you mean by value is by guiding
the listener through some of the considerations that brought Pirsig (and
presumably you) to the conclusion that reality is nothing but value. "What
do you think value is? Is it in an objective fact about the universe? Are
some things actually *better* than others? Are values just things in our
minds, just individual preferences and beliefs? Or is value not subjective
or objective but something on its own?"

The concept of value really is a conundrum for a believer in MoQ because
it's at once the undefinable flux of direct experience which is also
understood through all the concepts of individual things, and events, and
static levels, that we use both in everyday life and in MoQspeak. It *is*
all of the stuff in the world, but it only makes sense when we start, as
Pirsig did, by saying that it's not (just) value in the traditional
religious-edict or social-order or individual-preference sense, but it's
reality itself, whatever *that* is, and then go about explaining how we can
conceptualize a chair as a collection of dharmas (Chapter 30, *Lila*) and
how that might help us overcome some problems in causality and then saying
that it also manifests itself as biological drives, and elaborating on how
that conception might help us fix some holes in evolutionary theory. And on
and on. Hmmm. Might as well just hand them the books.

Looking back on this response, I have the feeling that I shouldn't have
gone down this path and instead should've simply stopped with the questions
in the first section, as I don't think I've added any clarity to the
situation with my answer. Ah well, it's late ... enough weekend
philosophizing.

Cheers,
Keith

______________________________________________________________________
gillette@tahc.state.tx.us -- <URL:http://www.detling.ml.org/gillette/>

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