LS Breakneck Kant 4


Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Tue, 3 Mar 1998 18:45:21 +0100


Donald Palmgren:
> Okay so that's my best Kant, and highly condensed. But given this
>understanding, it is here that I say, "ZMM and LILA are what Kant would
>have said if he studied the Tao Te Ching and wrote like Mark Twain." Is
>that a simplification? A characature? Of course. But I find it more
>accurate than the claim that Kant is the great-grandaddy of S-O thinking.
> Now if you want -- just for closure -- I can probly wrap up the
>rest of German Idealism's life (Ficht, Schelling and Hegel) in two more
>posts. Of course this would be ultra-ultra condensed but it might, sort of
>let you see (or sense) what it was about Hegel that let him put such a
>frighteningly original spin on metaphysics. Interested?
>
> TTFN
> Donny

Donny, as you know I find Peirce valuable in my work. Peirce has on
different occasions stated his philosophical roots in Aristotle, Kant
and
Schelling. So I personally find your postings on these subjects
valuable,
and I hope to be able to give more comments at some point. Hegel is a
pretty empty spot in my brain, and I am glad to get a second opinion on
him, which may allow me to understand his work better - that is - which
may
get me to actually read Hegel :-)

One of Peirce's early works, 'On a new list of categories' (Aristotle
and
Kant's lists being the old ones), which he himself considered
foundational
in his work, is presently being discussed on the Peirce-L. His very
first
sentence there is "This paper is based upon the theory already
established
[Kant], that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of
sensuous impressions to unity,..." , and I found your mail very
interesting
in this respect.
I think the relation between Reason and Feeling or Living is a still
outstanding question, also in Pirsigs thought - as he himself said. I
hope
that MoQ or some relative/derivative will provide Reason with a
different
view of itself, and that this larger self-consciousness of Reason will
leave more room to Feeling and Living, this is a main moral perspective
of
MoQ as I see it. At least MoQ makes Reason, Feeling and Living part of
the
same world, as a first step towards finding a balance.

  
As for Schelling, he insisted that neither 'objectivism' nor
'subjectivism'
provided an answer on their own. His terms for the two were Natural
Philosophy and Objective Idealism, if I recall correctly, and his
thoughts
on their nature and on their relation are most interesting in connection
with Pirsig and Peirce. I can mail you a review by Howard Callaway of a
book on Schelling, which highlights some connections between Schelling
and
pragmatism, if you are interested. Perhaps Schelling is the place to
look
for a forerunner to Pirsig, stating that there is a reality behind the
subject-object split (taking up Bodvars challenge on the thread on
'conceptions of dynamic quality'). Unfortunately I only have access to
one
early work by Schelling, but the review gives some quotes which could
support this claim.

Regards

Hugo

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