LS Re: Explain the subject-object metaphysics


Magnus Berg (qmgb@bull.se)
Thu, 14 May 1998 20:24:41 +0100


Hi Horse and Squad

Horse wrote:
> >> Magnus wrote:
> >> "Thank you for an interesting and important post. However, I wouldn't say
> >> that SOM is synonymous with dualism. At some point or another, I think every
> >> world view is a dualism.
>
> > I agree with Magnus here.
>
> Whoa there! Hold on. If at some point every world view is a dualism,
> then how can SOM avoid being synonymous with dualism. Something is
> amiss!

I guess that depends on how you define "synonymous", as you write below.
SOM implies dualism, but dualism doesn't imply SOM if we see MoQ as a
dualism (at some level). I think "synonymous" should work both ways.

> First point:
> Not all world views are dualist. World views can be either monist,
> dualist or pluralist (dualism is pluralist, I suppose, being greater
> than one ). It also depends upon where or how you consider a world view
> or at which level. MoQ starts with Quality, this is divided into DQ and
> SQ, SQ is divided into Inorganic, Organic, Social and Intellectual. So
> is MoQ monist, dualist or pluralist. It's all three dependent on where
> you look.

My problem here is, how can we even use the terms monism, dualism or
pluralism if every world view becomes all three depending on where we
look?

> Second Point:
> Synonymous does not mean, nor did I intend it to mean, identical or
> exclusive. The phrase itself implies that it is dualist, but is this
> inclusive, or exclusive. Is reality divided into ONLY subject OR object
> or is it subject AND object. In previous posts I have stated that
> Pirsig does not refer to THE SOM, but to *A* SOM. There is a
> difference. Subject/Object, Substance/Form, Mind/Matter, Sense/Idea,
> Living/Non-Living, Person/Non-Person. Are these inclusive or exclusive.
> The SOM seems to indicate that they are exclusive. But this doesn't mean
> that this is the whole of SOM.

I was hoping we could define THE SOM, to see what they have in common
and compare that to the MoQ in different situations. If we have several
SOMs, we'd have to deal with them one by one. I believe Diana expressed
the same thing some time ago and that's why we're concentrating on it
now.

> Pirsig makes the point that SOM is a system which excludes Value/Quality
> as a major part of the metaphysics or at least reduces it to 'mere'
> subjectivity and then reduces subjective to "just what you like" - in
> other words, 'mere' opinion. This is reminiscent of the Logical
> Positivist view. If a statement cannot be tested or measured or
> expressed mathematically then it is meaningless. Philosophy, according
> to the positivists is merely the analysis of language and subjectivism
> is merely emotivist rambling.

A very crucial part of SOM!

> This seems to be at the heart of the problem in defining SOM. Whatever
> you say it is there is always a school of thought that says that this
> not the REAL SOM or that there really isn't a SOM and then in the next
> breath tell you that you are not being objective or rational, or you
> are being emotive etc.

Yeah, we've seen that once or twice...

> Where Pirsig seems to take issue most is where there is a denial of
> value in SOM - hence the example of the stove. This denial of value as
> anything other than 'just what you like' is probably most emphatic on
> the part of the positivists. What he is most frustrated with is not
> just the SOM, but the attempt to reduce everything to Object
> Metaphysics. Subjectiveness is meaningless there forethere is only
> objectivity and hence objects are the whole of reality.
>
> So where does this leave us?
> 1) There seems to be little doubt that SOM refers to any system that is
> at least dualistic.

I agree because I view SOM as a dualism. However, I think many SOMists
disagree. They often realize the impossibilities with a dualism and
converts it to a monism by making one part deducible from the other.

> 2) It would appear that the dualism referred to is of the exclusive
> either/or type.

You answered my assertion that the dynamic/static split of MoQ is an
either/or split in your last post. I feel bad about not having answered
it yet.

You said that the difference between the SOM either/or split and
the MoQ either/or split is that the MoQ split is mutually supportive
(neither one can exist without the other) whereas the SOM split is
exclusive (both sides of the split can exist independent of the other).
If this is what you mean, then I agree. It's the connection I talked
about some week ago, it might be important after all.

> 3) The attempt by the Logical Positivists to reduce the nature of Value
> to emotivism or subjectivism, neither of which have any relevance.

I'm a fan of that one.

I'd like to add number 4 below, it's somewhat redundant actually but it
takes some time in the MoQ to realize that.

4) The attempt to separate philosophy (morality) and metaphysics.

> I would be happy if someone would critcise the above and show me that I
> am wrong, then at least we can start to make some headway. Does anyone
> out there have any alternative ideas as to the nature of SOM which they
> would care to share. Not only what it isn't, but what it is.

I think we're finally starting to get somewhere with this, much thanks
to you.

        Magnus

-- 
"I'm so full of what is right, I can't see what is good"
                                N. Peart - Rush

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