LS Explain the subject-object metaphysics


Horse (horse@wasted.demon.nl)
Thu, 21 May 1998 06:36:38 +0100


Greetings Squad

Firstly, I would like to extend an ecstatic welcome to the latest
contributors. Your posts have really added to the debate on defining
SOM. Glad you could make it and I look forward to seeing a lot more of
your posts in the future.
Secondly, I must clear up the confusion regarding the passage that has
been quoted and attributed to me regarding the interface between the
levels of patterns of value. I took it from a post that Maggie Hettinger
made some time back as a reply to her. I merely asked the question in a
reply to her post. I wouldn't want to take the credit for something
which I didn't initiate.

Now on with the show ; )

DIANA:
"The subject-object metaphysics is the assumption that reality is
divided into two separate and irreducible realms of subject and object.
The subject being that which experiences and the object being that which
is experienced. From this assumption arises the idea that there is a
subjective reality experienced by each individual and an objective
reality which exists independent of any individual."

This seems to sum up the essence of SOM and as Theo points out it is an
expansion of the A OR NOT A view of reality.

BODVAR:
"Yes, I buy Diana's definition, but am a little reluctant re. Horse's
minimalistic 'A OR NOT A' which only says that this thing over here is
different from the one over there, but does NOT indicate that one
phenomenon is in a compartment totally different from the other."
 
I agree that A OR NOT A is minimalistic, but I believe it provides an
inclusive and concise base for the definition of SOM. It is also at the
heart of the paradoxical nature of SOM. The platypii of SOM, that Pirsig
pointed out, comes about when something is discovered that is neither A
NOR is it NOT A. As Diana shows in her definition, any phenomenon or
event belongs in EITHER one catagory OR the other. The irreducibility of
subject and object and the insistence that reality MUST fit into one or
the other of these catagories produces two distinct and mutually
exclusive sets. This is in the nature of monist, dualist or pluralist
thinking where, as Bo rightly points out and as Fintan expands, the
primary analytical cut is vertical. The other side of A OR NOT A that I
have been banging on about is also nicely summed up by Fintan:

 "Not vertically- but laterally! (lateral thinking- methinks nice
coincidence of phrase-no?) A different kind of dualism altogether! Not
schizoid dualism - BUT INTEGRATED DUALISM."

which is the form A AND NOT A where the divisions are not exclusive but
overlapping to a degree which fits reality/experience. A AND NOT A is
the MoQ also summed up in a minimalistic form.

Both of these are basic and established logical forms but the value
contained within their use is that by moving to the inclusive form (A
AND NOT A ) from the exclusive form (A OR NOT A) we move from a
discrete to a continuous methodology. This establishes a broad base
from which to work - which I believe gives a more concrete foundation
to the framework of MoQ.

There is also the precedent of the extension principle of multivalent
logic:

"...that the classical results of Boolean logic are recovered from
[multivalent] logic operations when all [multyivalent logic] membership
grades are restricted to the traditional set {0, 1}. This effectively
establishes [multivalent] subsets and logic as a true generalization of
classical set theory and logic. In fact, by this reasoning all crisp
(traditional) subsets ARE [multivalent] subsets of this very special
type; and there is no conflict between [multivalent] and crisp
methods."

In other words a logical and irrefutable means by which MoQ can
legitimately subsume SOM.

THEO:
We should be aware that in doing this we are not in any way in conflict
with materialism or idealism on this fundamental point and further,
that this agreement is not to be feared, but is instead a declaration
of kinship and a foundation for further progress.

BODVAR:
Theo, I smell danger here. If the Quality idea isn't in conflict with f.
ex. materialism and/or idealism my understanding of Pirsig's teachings
must be revised completely. I fear this is SOM trying to get the MOQ
inside its own territory where it can tear it to pieces by dialectic
method (no personal accusation please). On the other hand, if you buy
my assertion that the SOM is the Q-Intellect; the highest evolutionary
rung - well, then I accept your advice unconditionally.

Bo, hopefully, with the outline of my thoughts above this will give you
sufficient reason to reconsider. If we build on this structure then
'SOMites' will have an extremely hard time refuting the validity of
MoQ, as to do so will undermine the foundations of their own position.
It also, I believe, gives greater scope for your SAIOM theory - SOM as
Q-Intellect.

I'd better give it a rest here before I get accused of ranting. I
apologise to those of you that I have not answered - especially Donny -
but to do so would detract from the main points that I want to make.

Horse

"While the ponderous Sir Professor explains the entire mystery
of life, he has in distraction forgotten his own name;that he
is a man, neither more nor less, than a fantastic three-eighths
of a paragraph."

Soren Kierkegaard

 



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