LS Re: Explain the subject-object metaphysics


Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Mon, 25 May 1998 09:03:07 +0100


Donny, Theo, squad,

Donald wrote, 18.may.98:
> Then there's Horse's idea, which I wish I could do more justice,
>but a major qualifier for a SOM, in Horse's oppinion, seems to be an
>unconscious, UNEXAMINED assumption. Is that right?
> Basically you're taking the two qualifiers derived from Diana's
>definition and adding a third: That the strong dualism of S and O is
>unexamined? (I'm asking.)

I think it was me and not Horse who has pushed for this resolution - if
Horse has written the same, I have embarrasingly overlooked it. See
further in my reply to Bo of today.

On the -ism issue, I agree with Theo, that his take on monism, dualism
and pluralism is a standard philosophical definition. I find pluralisms
in this ontological sense philosophically unsatisfactory, - accepting an
ontological pluralism seems to me to be stopping short of a 'simple'
explanation, the job is not finished.

My use of 'pluralism' as having to do with 'there are more ways to go
from here' is from the pragmatists, especially John Dewey (William
James wrote a book called 'A pluralistic Universe', but I haven't read
it, and cannot say whether James used pluralism in a similar sense), and
I believe the term is commonly used in this sense. In connection with
Pirsig, the idea that there is more than one truth, that truth is but a
kind of good, is pluralistic in this sense. But as I said, I am afraid
that these very general terms can be used in so many ways, that they are
prone with misunderstandings. If we use them, we should qualify the
sense in which they are used.

Welcome to all the newcomers on the Squad!

Regards

Hugo

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Hugo Fjelsted Alroe alroe@email.dk alroe@vip.cybercity.dk

 



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