LS Re: The dynamic-static split


Ant McWatt (ant11@liverpool.ac.uk)
Sun, 14 Jun 1998 04:20:12 +0100


On Wed, 10 Jun 1998 22:58:34 +0000 Bodvar Skutvik
<skutvik@online.no> wrote...

>
> I virtually see the arguments whizz past each other regarding
> Ken's "sentience" term so the first point is to get this concept
> sorted out. As I see it he uses it in the "consciousness" (of
> SOM) sense while Magnus and Diana sees it in a MOQ (experience is
> value) sense...
>
> To speak about sentient and insentient
> quality will lead us nowhere except back to SOM.

MAYBE NOT, BO!!!

Dear LS,

I haven`t had time (with a large amount of work at the
moment) to contribute recently. However, despite this I
have taken some time out to share an article which I think
might help in resolving the problem of sentinence/
non-sentinence and the MOQ which is currently under
discussion. (It is worth noting that this article concerns
Alfred North Whitehead. There is only ONE post-graduate
dissertation, I know about, that examines LILA and it is
written in relation to Whitehead largely because of his
similarities to Pirsig).

Anyway, I have heavily edited this paper to leave the
sections relevant to the MOQ and especially those on
sentience. I hope you find it worth the effort in reading.
(I HAVE ALSO MADE A FEW COMMENTS IN BOLD, HERE & THERE):

"Whitehead's Even More Dangerous Idea"
by Peter Farleigh (p.farleigh@ieee.org)

...Cartesian substance provides the ground for the
classical mechanistic paradigm, Newton's 'world-machine'-
the 'billiard-ball' universe-a powerful metaphor still very
much with us today (e.g. Dawkins 1995). While, there are
some contemporary forms of materialism that have a less
deterministic view of substance, as modified in the light
of modern physics and biology (e.g. Searle 1992), it is the
functionalists who have gallantly upheld the very
traditional mechanistic concept of matter in motion. The
prime model for them being the computational metaphor for
the mind.

In rejecting our 'folk psychology' concepts, we could
equally make a case for rejecting our 'folk physics'
concepts, too (i.e. the 'billiard-ball' variety). But if
we were to throw out the machine along with the ghost, what
would our starting point be? If it's not substance (READ
MATTER HERE), and if it's not information processing (READ
MIND HERE), what then? (QUALITY EVENTS) Are we to exclude
these concepts altogether, or are they part of a much
larger scheme? (THE LATTER, OF COURSE!)

Whitehead's even more dangerous idea:

Darwin is rightly said to have a 'dangerous' idea with his
theory of natural selection (Dennett 1995). With respect
to the nature of mind and matter, Alfred North Whitehead
has an even more dangerous idea. An idea that he
investigates in enormous detail, particularly in his major
philosophical work "Process and Reality" written in 1929.
It is to reject Cartesian dualism fully, and

...construct a scientific world-view in terms of events and
their relations, rather than in terms of matter in motion.
Certain sorts of events and temporal series of events
(processes), would then hold the status as the fundamental
units or 'primitives' of the universe - a position
traditionally the domain of Cartesian substance. These
(QUALITY) events provide a unity between the observer and
the observed, subject and object...

Whitehead's process cosmology has 'dangerous' implications
in many areas of science and philosophy and not primarily
because he offers us new answers to the old problems.

Rather, it is because we are offered another perspective
- one that includes the observer in our observing.
Dangerous, particularly for dualists, materialists
functionalists and eliminativists as it displaces the
concept of machine as the primary metaphor for our
understanding the world...

THIS SOUNDS VERY MUCH LIKE PIRSIG.

In this short paper I aim to give a very brief introduction
to his event ontology with respect to the philosophy of
mind.

>From Substance-thinking (READ SOM) to Event-thinking (READ
MOQ) Events, as we commonly refer to them, are happenings
in certain places, at certain times, for particular
durations - everything from the fall of an autumn leaf, to
the fall of the Roman Empire. We can discuss such events by
starting with concepts of matter in motion, but such an
approach is a limited case of a more general view that
regards matter, itself, as aggregates of sub-atomic events,
as modern physics has shown. Sub-atomic events are
instances of the fundamental types of events that Whitehead
takes as the basis for his ontology...

"We experience more than we can analyze. For we experience
the universe, and we analyze in our consciousness a minute
selection of its details" (Whitehead 1938).

(GOOD QUOTE)

For instance, we are conscious of the person we are
talking to at a party while at the same time experiencing
the ambience of the crowd. He sees the major role of
consciousness to be the explicit awareness that a present
situation could be other than it is, and so one is
conscious of what it is. We could be talking to anyone at
the party, but we are talking to this person.

NOW THIS IS WHERE THE ISSUE OF SENTINENCE COMES IN>

Broadening the concept of experience beyond the familiar
human realm to include the lowest levels of nature maybe
unsettling but not completely unreasonable. The fact that
many of our day-to-day activities are performed 'without
thinking' (E.G. BREATHING OR EVEN DRIVING A CAR), and that
decisions and judgments are often colored by forgotten or
suppressed memories, indicates that there is a continuity
between conscious and unconscious experience. Ethologists
like Donald Griffin (1992), and Susan Armstrong-Buck
(1989), provide evidence for experience in animals. Others
provide evidence for it in single-celled organisms. (see
Agar 1951) Evidence for even sub-atomic particles having a
very primitive subjective nature is given by McDaniel
(1983)...

THE NEXT COUPLE OF PARAGRAPHS ARE VERY IMPORTANT:

The word 'panpsychism' is often used to describe
Whitehead's position, even though he did not use the word
himself. The word can be problematic. For some, 'psyche',
which usually pertains to the human mind, suggests that
this position would hold that low-grade individuals like
bacteria, or even electrons, are conscious. This certainly
is not the case and David Ray Griffin suggests that
'pan-experientialism' is a more appropriate term (Griffin
1988). One should not expect all of the characteristics of
mentality we observe at the macro-scale to be evident at
the micro-scale, just as we no longer expect the
physicality to be the same at both levels. For instance,
the atoms in a sponge aren't expected to be 'spongy',
themselves.

(A GOOD EXAMPLE)

"...in bodies that are obviously living, a coordination has
been achieved that raises into prominence some functions
inherent in the ultimate occasions. For lifeless matter
these functionings thwart each other, and average out
so as to produce a negligible total effect. In the case of
living bodies the coordination intervenes, and the average
effect of these intimate functionings has to be taken into
account."

(Whitehead 1933)

In other words, in ordinary matter neighbouring occasions
are 'incoherent' and so there is a 'smoothing out' effect
of the tiny freedoms and unpredictabilities that can be
found in those occasions in isolation. The causal chains
are constant and predictable, and so the descriptions
of matter by traditional physical theory are therefore
statistically very accurate and hence, mechanistic
analogies are most useful and appropriate.

In contrast, things like molecules and organisms are
temporal chains of (RELATIVELY) high-grade occasions and
are characterized by their part-whole relations (THERE IS A
SHIFT FROM THE INORGANIC TO BIOLOGICAL HERE). The
organization of their parts is dependent on the mutual
action of those parts on each other, with the consequence
that the whole acts as a causal unit both on its own parts
and on its environment.

A molecule or an organism acts as a causal unit in a way,
which is other than the summed causal actions of the lower
grade occasions taken in isolation. For instance the
properties of a molecule are different from the sum of the
properties of its constituent atoms, even though both the
properties and synthesis of the molecule are entirely
dependent on the intrinsic properties of those atoms.

FOR EXAMPLE, CARBON ATOMS. YOU CAN TAKE THE SAME CARBON
ATOMS (ON A RELATIVELY MICRO LEVEL) AND THEN MANIPULATE
THEM EITHER INTO DIAMONDS OR PENCIL LEADS ON THE MACRO
LEVEL.

This is not due to some miraculous addition, but because
the activity of all actual occasions, including mental and
percipient events, is fundamentally relational from the
start...

THE IMPORTANT POINT IN THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS IS THE
DIFFERENTIATION OF "EXPERIENCE" (WHICH IS APPLIED TO ALL
THE STATIC LEVELS OF QUALITY) FROM "MIND" (WHICH IS APPLIED
JUST TO THE SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL LEVELS). NOW, IF THE
MOQ IS ALSO A "PAN-EXPERIENTALIST" THEORY (WHICH I THINK IT
IS) RATHER THAN A PAN-PSYCHIC ONE THAN THIS SOLVES THE
PROBLEM OF MIND AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE MOQ.

...Conclusion:

It is a dangerous thing to change our mode of thinking
— from looking at the world in terms of substances, to
thinking of it in terms of events (AS IN THE MOQ). All,
and not just some, of our old Cartesian images have to go.
Mind and matter are not separate. Mind is not rejected in
preference for matter, and mind does not arise from matter
that initially has no mind. This is because both concepts
undergo a radical change within Whitehead's philosophy of
organism and are replaced by the single concept of
relational events. These events have characteristics that
can be considered matter-like in some respects and
mind-like in others.

As an approach that avoids the many of the pitfalls of
dualism, materialism and functionalism, I believe it is
equally a solid candidate theory of mind, worthy of serious
consideration and discussion within the contemporary debate.

I HOPE THE LILASQUAD THINKS SO AS WELL!

BEST WISHES,

ANTHONY MCWATT.

 



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