LS 'Out there'


Donald T Palmgren (lonewolf@utkux.utcc.utk.edu)
Fri, 31 Jul 1998 02:30:40 +0100


On Wed, 29 Jul 1998, Platt Holden wrote:

> Hi Donny and LS:
>
> DONNY:
>
> What we experience we don't experience as we (each and everyone of us)
> but as we (all of us together).
>
  PLATT:
> Does this mean if I'm alone I don't experience anything? That can't be
> true, but how else am I to understand experience being "all of us
> together?" Your example indicated that it always takes two (or more) to
> make reality.

        "Sane people are never alone." -- Dwight van de Vate

        (see bellow)

>
> DONNY:
>
> One of the really creative moves that Hegel made that sets him apart
> from all other thinkers lumped under the heading "idealists" is the
> shift from *coqito* to *coqitamus,* from "I know" to "we know." Knowing
> is not an individual being at rest but a collective movement.
>
  PLATT:
> Does this mean that I can know how to ride a bicycle by just reading or
> talking about it?

        If you can you're more talented that I am.
        (see bellow)

>
> No doubt I've misinterpreted "cogitamus" completely, but it sounds
> something like events believed to be real are not really real but we
> believe them to be real because we believe everyone else believes them
> to be real. Or, reality occurs according to the Emperor's New Clothes
> syndrome.

        I didn't say the book on the table isn't real. I just asked
*how*
is the book real. What does it mean to exist? That's the question of
metaphysics. I think it's the most common thing in philosophy to
mistake
metaphysics (1st Phil.) for physics (2nd Phil.). 2nd Phil. is the
systematic construction and deconsstruction of the correct picture of
the
world (ie. partical physics, atomic chemestry, etc.) -- it attempts to
answer "What really exists?" 1st phil., rather, asks "What does it mean
to exist? What does X have to have in order to exist?" In other words,
1st phil. doesn't try to *answer* "What really exists?" but is rather
asking questions about the question as such.
        Anyway, to say "reality isn't really real" as you've represented
me, clearly doesn't make sense. GIVEN: reality is real, but real how?

>
> Against this notion we have our old friend Robinson Crusoe who managed
> to deal with reality quite well without another sole around. What am I
> missing here?

        Well don't miss the fact that Robinson Crusoe exists as a token
that can be passed around in a social/moral exchange.
        (see bellow)

>
> DONNY:
>
> So what really exists? Well, what really exists are moral situations.
> Actually what really exists is THE moral situation --the present one.
> All others are abstractions from that.
>
  PLATT:
> Does this mean Pirsig's intellectual level, consisting mostly of
> abstractions, doesn't really exist?

        Ah! Great question! It depends on how you think of it. If you
think that Int.poVs refers to the timeless ontological catalogue of
Absolute truth that was writ from before time, along w/ the Ling Boa, up
on the Platonic Heavens... F=ma, E=mc2, etc. etc. ...then no, that
doesn't
*really* exist. It exists only as our (logocentric) ideal.
        BUT, if you view Int.PoVs as *living things* -- subjects! Just
as
you and I... existing in time, then, yes, they exist.
        Here we go:
        Stuff like F=ma and E=mc2 are facts.
        A fact is the result of a proof.
        A proof is whatever is the most moraly, socialy best way to
settle
an argument. If you and I disagree on something, then there are a number
of ways that I could persuade you. I could offer you a bribe; I could
withhold some service that I was providing; I could send Rocko and
Knulckles
over to your place to beat the tar out of you; I could chalange you to
pistols at 20 paces. But we, as a society, hold the view that there is
a
moraly superier means of setteling our argument, and that is for me to
offer you an objective proof of my conclusions.
        Proofs are *social* activities; and, thus, facts are the results
of social activities. W/o society you have no facts. Nothing is true.
(Or
even false.)
        F=ma is a fact. It is a *scientific* fact. You can't have any
scientific facts w/o science. And you can't have science w/o scientists.
In other words, facts and theroms, intellectual patterns exist by
*embodying* themselves and thus entering the social discourse. Proof is
the regulatory system for what kinds of facts can (moraly) be embodied.
        Let's say that I don't believe in the existence of the Greenland
icecap. We argue over this. Platt drags me down to the libray and pulls
out a world atlas and says, "There it is: the Greenland Icecap." And I
say, "That's just print on paper. That doesn't prove that it really
exisits." Platt gets so annoyed w/ this that he hiers a jet and we dash
off to Canada, and he hiers a helocopter, and we fly out to the icecap
and
we land. And Platt says, "What do you see all around you?" And I say,
"Snow and ice." And he asks, "Well how do your feet feel?" And I say,
"They're cold!" And Platt says, "Well guess what, Bozo, that's the
frig'en
Greenland Icecap!"
        Now the point of my sillyness is just this: How does the
Grenland
icecap get into our conversation? It doesn't speek for itself. "Hey!
Over
here! I really do exist." It needs Platt to speak for it, to voice it.
        Proof is a social activity. It is the passing around of ideas.

        "An idea that can't be communicated is like money that can't
circulate: IT HAS NO VALUE." (Dwight Van de Vate)

        And I shouldn't have to point out that what has no value does
not
exist. To "exist" (in the MoQ) means "to have value."
        Now from all of this, Platt wants to conclude (or feels compeled
to) that if I walk off in a room alone I blink out of existence. But
Platt, do you cese to be a social pattern by stepping into a room by
yourself? No. You remain a valid social pattern wherever you adhere to
the values and moral patterns of behavier held by your society. Sane
people are never alone. They always have someone looking over their
shoulder. You cese to exist (as a person) as soon as you break too far
from the social patterns. (Phedrus sits in a room and pisses himself in
Montaina = Pheadrus is sick. Pheadrus sits and pisses himself in India =
pheadrus is enlightened.) You cese to exest as a person (something which
has a voice; something we talk *with*) and become a mere thing
(something
we talk *about*; something requiering some other to speak for it).

>
> As you can tell, Donny, I'm confused (as usual). If you would care to
> attempt a clarification I'd be most appreciative. I think maybe we can
> both agree that the "in here, out there" categories are spin-offs of SOM
> and that we need to be deal with them in MoQ terms at some point.
> Perhaps your "moral activity of projection" answers that, but I need to
> have it more fully explained. Thanks.

        I agree that the in-here (subjective)/out-there (objective)
question is both fundamental to metaphysics and very, very tricky.
Certainly deserving of more thought and comment. As for now, however, I
must be away.
                        TTFN (ta-ta for now)
                        Donny

--
homepage - http://www.moq.org/lilasquad
unsubscribe/queries - mailto:lilasquad@moq.org



This archive was generated by hypermail 2.0b3 on Thu May 13 1999 - 16:43:29 CEST