Hi Jonathan and LS
On 22 Feb 99, at 9:26, Jonathan B. Marder wrote:
> Does a perfect copy of the Mona Lisa have the same value as the
> original?
Jonathan, this is one of those great questions that raises a whole bunch of other
questions. Unless I am mistaken the value which you refer to is the value relationship
which exists between the copied Mona Lisa and myself (or whoever is looking at it) - at
least that's the angle I'll take on it.
If I am unaware that the copy I am looking at is a copy then there is no reason that I can
think of why the value relationship between myself and the copy of the painting should be
any different to the value relationship between myself and the original.
Once I am made aware that the painting is a copy then the situation may change but I also
think that this would depend on when and how I am made aware that it is a copy and the
reasons for producing the copy. Also, if the 'copy' was actually another identical painting
painted by the same artist responsible for the original then which is the original and which
is the copy. Isn't this just a case of which one came first. Original and copy just become
words to differentiate temporal difference.
Perhaps to relate this to the original PROGRAM question I could rephrase the question:
If two identical Mona Lisa's were placed side by side would the value relationship between
myself and the painting on left hand side be different to that between myself and the
painting on right hand side.
My initial feeling, and I think the one I would go with, would be that it makes no difference.
Why should it make any more of a difference to me than the difference between reading
two identical copies of Lila, listening to two identical CD's or looking at two identical
arrangements of bricks. The value relationship exists between myself and the painting not
in the painting or in me. (Actually there may be a difference in that I would be considering
something other than just the painting, but the basic idea doesn't change)
I think that it is similar to the Clone question. Leaving aside those annoying technical and
technological details, if it were possible to make a perfect physical copy of the original me
in a teleportation machine then who would be able to tell us apart. We each exist not only
as physical relationships between quantum wotsits but as relationships between ourselves
and others in a variety of ways and at different value levels.
As most would agree, on a purely physical level the 'me' typing this email now is not
identical with the 'me' that started the same email half an hour ago, but there is sufficient
continuity for me to finish what I want to say. So it is not even certain that the copy of me
would have to be 100% physically identical with the original.
Would *I* know the difference and if *I* didn't ,then who else would. If, as the copy, my
memories are ever so slightly different to those of the original then does this present a
problem? I can't be sure that my memories of past events and the 'reality' of past events
are concurrent anyway as they are dependent on my relationship with how I interpret the
now and how I recall past events and the resulting realtionships.
So far I have seen no convincing argument to make me change my original position. I'm
not interested in the technical difficulties as this is not a discussion of teleportation
machines and the production problems associated with designing and building one. In the
thought experiment the technical problems are assumed to be surmountable.
Horse
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