Hi Denis, Bo, Jonathan and Squad
Denis, I'd like to start by saying that I agreed completely with everything
else you said in your first post some week ago. If I may summarize our
differences I'd say that you include DQ and IntPoVs in language and I don't.
You said yourself that "It is a social behaviour which carries intellectual
patterns. A Dynamic process.", and of course you can include such features
in language if you like but I think you muddle up the clear borders between
the levels if you do. DQ and SQ is supposed to be the first cut of reality.
When SQ is later divided into four levels, we shouldn't introduce DQ into it
again.
When I think about it, it almost sounds as if I take Aristotle's side against
the sophists. He too was trying to rid intellect from social influence while
the sophists (mis)used the social and behavioural components of language.
But this is not quite the case, I acknowledge that intellectual patterns are
totally dependent on language (social patterns). As you said:
> What else is an intellectual pattern without an inorganic
> pattern (sound, sign) to support it ? An Idea ? Can you express it
> without words ? Can you think of it without words ? Would you even be
> able to think at all without words ?
No, I wouldn't. Aristotle thought he could, but the MoQ says no. On the
other hand, I can, using the MoQ, know how to divide a word I say or write
into four components, each component being a pattern of a certain level.
What I'm saying is that while each level are dependent on the lower, they
are nevertheless separable. And I think we gain much by trying.
Bo asked:
> What strange vessel is Intellect that it can be used by SOM, perhaps
> eptied of it and filled with other contents?
Nah, let me use the dimension metaphor. SOM was probably one of the first
entities that expanded reality much in the intellect dimension. In a way, that's
still a "vessel", it can be emptied and filled with other contents, i.e.
patterns, just as the biological level may be emptied (the dinos 65'' years
ago) and filled again.
And Jonathan said:
> I think find this unconvincing since I consider ALL patterns to require a
> language to sustain them. It may not be a verbal language, but must
> necessarily be a lexical construct of symbolic entities. Otherwise, you
> can't call it a pattern!
> I challenge Magnus to present an example of a pattern for which this does
> not apply.
I know you think that "all pattens require a language to sustain them", but I
don't, and I still don't think the MoQ does. Patterns below the language level,
i.e. biological and inorganic, doesn't require a language. Denis put it:
> the Bohr-Rutherford model of an atom isn't an atom but a model.
The model requires language but the atom doesn't. Your usual complaint about
such assertions is: "But we can't *know* this!". No, we can't, because knowing
is an intellectual excercise and we can't value an atom directly. The next best
thing is to have a metaphysics to guide us. And if we adopt the MoQ, we can
almost know that the atom doesn't require language. We can't come any closer
than that to knowing, and we know about the preconditions, i.e. the MoQ.
Magnus
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Jan 17 2002 - 13:08:52 GMT