Peter
>just a couple of thoughts on "computational theory of mind" - this is still
>a current, viable hypothesis, but you are right that it is not proposed that
>the edifice is completely re-programmable; it is, as you say, proposed that
>there are computational 'centres' which deal with specific types of
>information, communicate laterally and so on. Certainly, the human brain is
>the most behaviourally-flexible brain that we know of, but not infinitely
>so. You can't actually decide not to see the colour 'red' for arguments
>sake, and this does of course have implications for the notion of 'freewill'
>, 'absolute' freewill, and so on.
>A good reference, and certainly readable for anyone on this list, would be
>Stephen Pinker, "How the Mind Works". 1997. - brilliantly indexed, a bit
>long.
I've read Pinker's book, and his earlier one "The Language Instinct". In fact it
was his work plus Chomsky's ideas about a Universal Grammar,
and Steven Mithen's "Prehistory of Mind" that made me see
these errors in Pirsig's work.
The argument for the software theory of social and intellectual patterns only
works if it can be shown that not all people have the same ones. To an extent
that's true, I just don't think it's true to the extent that Pirsig is proposing.
Pirsig points to research that says that the Hopi have no concept of Time.
I suppose this is to show that the concept is some kind of social or intellectual
pattern. But Pinker finds that isn't actually true, it's just a popular misconception
created by a poor anthropologist. Pirsig also cites what I believe is now known
as "The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax", ie the 16 different words for snow.
Allowing for the fact that there are at least ten words for snow in English, it
sill proves nothing except that it's snowy where they live. We all know
jargon relating to our areas of expertise, Americans have 16 different words for
fried eggs, it isn't evidence for a different metaphysical structure and it doesn't
prove that people who don't know these words won't also see differences in the
forms.
Maybe those two examples aren't that bad. It worries me more when he
says that Western languages follow the pattern subject predicate object.
(Sorry I can't find the reference at the moment.) The implication is that
other languages don't. If that was true then it would prove that the
subject-object metaphysics is a kind of software pattern. But I don't think
it is true. Chinese follows that pattern as well, and from what Pinker
says I'm led to believe that all languages have these elements.
>On Causation: Karl Popper, who, as a brilliant philosopher-of-science, has
>severe doubts about the notion that the universe runs according to what he
>calls 'push causality'. A short, readable book would be : "A World of
>Propensities" 1990
>
>
>On "substance" : well, everyone's written on this, from Democritus onwards.
>Whether the basic 'stuff' of the universe is matter, energy, space and time,
>seems extraordinarily hard to pin down. My own way of dealing with this is
>to propose, as a methodological convenience, the notion that "information"
>is not a 'property' of matter, energy flows and so on, but quite the other
>way round. That is, the basic 'stuff' of the universe is actually
>information, and all else is 'properties' thereof.
>I'm not sure if this is what Pirsig is proposing with Quality,...?
Yes, there's plenty written on these subjects. But my real concern is to
establish precisely what Pirsig is saying and what the implications are.
It's just all a bit sketchy.
Diana
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