To: Struan and Bo
From: Roger
Below is the Pirsig quote that is being analyzed:
RMP:
"In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things: mind,
matter and Quality.
Because something is not located in the object does not mean that it has to
be located in your mind.
Quality cannot be independently derived form either mind or matter. But it
can be derived from the
relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs at the point
at which subject and
object meet. Quality is not a thing. It is an event. It is the event at which
the subject becomes
aware of the object. And because without objects there can be no subject,
quality is the event at
which awareness of both subjects and objects is made possible. Quality is not
just the result of a
collision between subject and object. The very existence of subject and
object themselves is deduced
from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and
objects, which are then
mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the Quality!"
Struan then dissects it piece by piece.
RMP:
1)"In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things: mind,
matter and Quality."
STRUAN:
OK A presupposition, but we know that. I'm not happy with 'Quality' and
nobody thinks that subjects
and objects are all there is, but that comes later.
ROGER:
Just to clarify, this is RMP's starting point on the narrative in ch 19 of
ZMM where Phaedrus slowly unveils his creative thought process regarding
Quality. Is this where you got the quote, or did you get it from someplace
else, perhaps where RMP paraphrases himself? In ch 19 it is clear that he
too rejects this trinity as he does most of the other initial statements you
have listed out here. As for his terms 'mind' and 'matter', I think we can
agree that the 'matter' term is shorthand for what he spells out in Lila as
'the universe of distinguishable things.'
RMP:
2) "Because something is not located in the object does not mean that it has
to be located in your
mind."
STRUAN:
Agreed. The carpet is really blue but my mind is a 'factor' in that reality.
NOTE: A 'factor.' Not,
'the only factor', or even, 'the decisive factor.' The 'blueness' is a
property of the object (UNDER
AYER'S DEFINITION) but it is also contingent upon the mind therefore:
ROGER:
I also agree.
RMP:
3) "But it can be derived from the relationship of mind and matter with each
other."
STRUAN:
Precisely the point.
RMP:
4) "Quality occurs at the point at which subject and object meet"
STRUAN:
Absolutely. Note that mind has become subject and matter, object. Can we use
these interchangeably?
Quality occurs at the point at which mind and matter meet. Fine with me.
ROGER:
Note that in ZMM RMP follows points 3 and 4 with the narrative "That sounded
warm." In other words, this is close, but not quite right. These statements
are corrected and contradicted later on this page as his thoughts evolve.
Just to clarify, you are agreeing to two of the premises that Pirsig goes on
to reject.
RMP:
5) "Quality is not a thing. It is an event"
STRUAN:
Of course
ROGER:
This is indeed a central tenet of the MOQ. Points 1 through 4 are not.
RMP:
6) "It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the object"
STRUAN:
Again. It is the event at which mind becomes aware of matter. Ok
ROGER:
Again, in ZMM this narrates his flowing chain of thoughts. This portion is
"hot" according to the author, but not quite there.
RMP:
7) "And because without objects there can be no subject, quality is the event
at which awareness of
both subjects and objects is made possible."
STRUAN:
Aha! That is why the subtle shift from mind and matter to subject and object
has been made. I agree
that an object pre-supposes a subject, but what about this? "And because
without matter there can be
no mind, quality is the event at which awareness of both mind and matter is
made possible." There is
no logical contradiction in postulating mind without matter. The strong 'a
priori' argument that
objects rely upon subjects has vanished completely. Notice that this is not a
question of whether
mind is contingent upon matter in the sense that it could not have come into
being without it, it is
a question of whether the mind can function without perception of matter.
Notice also that this does
not need to be empirically validated (although I suspect it can), the fact
that it is logically
possible is enough. The argument collapses at this point.
ROGER:
Again, in ZMM he carefully clarifies that this is not the final
answer.......but it is almost complete.
RMP:
8) "Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject and object"
STRUAN:
Hmm . . . . tell me more
ROGER:
I agree, he is NOW beginning to unveil the essence of ZMM, Lila, radical
empiricism and Zen.
RMP:
9) "The very existence of subject and object themselves is deduced from the
Quality event."
STRUAN:
'Deduced.' It is that 'awareness' thing again. Notice that deduction is not
empirical. cf. point 7.
Can I say, "The very existence of mind and matter themselves is deduced from
the Quality event?" Is
deduced by what? The subject? Pirsig has made the huge jump from, Quality
being 'derived from the
relationship of mind and matter,' and occurring, 'AT THE POINT AT WHICH
SUBJECT AND OBJECT MEET,'
to:
10) "The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects, which are
then mistakenly presumed
to be the cause of the Quality!"
STRUAN:
So how does he make this jump from quality 'being DERIVED from the
relationship between mind and
matter' (my emphasis) to it being the CAUSE of mind and matter? The answer is
that he does it with
that short sentence in point 7. He does it by sneakily replacing mind and
matter (which is what he
is really talking about) with subjects and objects in order to give his
reasoning veracity.
ROGER:
You are totally dismissing the narrative development and subsequent rejection
of thoughts in ZMM Ch 19. A fundamental principle of the MOQ indeed is that
"The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects, which are then
mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the Quality!". With a flash of
insight, he goes on to say "IT [Quality] HAS CREATED THEM."
This, as you know, is fundamental to radical empiricism. According to
William James in "Does Consciousness Exist?", primal reality is nondualistic
pure experience. Consciousness and content ( the knower and the known) are
two aspects of the same undivided experience. In James own words:
JAMES:
".....a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of
associates, plays the part of the knower, of a state of mind, of
consciousness; while in a different context, the same undivided bit of
experience plays the part of the thing known, of an objective content .....
in one group it can figure as a thought, in another as a thing"
ROGER [again]:
Pirsig says the same thing throughout ZMM and Lila. He explains in Ch 9 that
Whitehead's "dim apprehension" is DQ and that objects are not primary but
rather "... a complex pattern of static values derived from primary
experience.... In this way, static patterns become the universe of
distinguishable things."
In Ch 29 of Lila, Pirsig directly addresses radical empiricism and James term
"pure experience," equating it to "pure value":
RMP:
"...subjects and objects are not the starting point of experience. Subjects
and objects are secondary. They are concepts derived from something more
fundamental which [James] described as 'the immediate flux of life' .... Pure
experience cannot be called either physical or psychical: it logically
precedes this distinction."
STRUAN:
Now, to the Logical Positivist (and almost everybody else) these problems do
not arise, because most
people do not agree with assumption that subjects and objects (and Quality if
we must) are all there
is. Time is a good example (and I too saw Professor Barbour's lectures) of
something most people
would say exists and is real, yet it is not reducible to a subject or an
object. Space is another.
Radio waves another, and so on. The problem is Bo, that you think, along with
Pirsig, that subjects,
objects and Quality are all there is. If someone disagrees with your
formulation of Quality, then
you automatically assume that for them only subjects and objects are left.
This is not the case and
people like Ayer can quite happily talk about the relationship between
subjects and objects, can
quite happily explain subjects and objects in terms of relationships, can
quite happily talk of
values as being derived from the way subjects and objects relate to each
other and yet still not
have a Subject Object Metaphysics.
ROGER:
As clarified above, you have totally distorted Pirsig's argument in the book.
You are faulting him for inconsistencies in his argument that he himself
rejects. The Space, time and radio waves argument is also weak. All of these
are derived from pure experience. They are all part of "the universe of
distinguishable things." He does customarily abbreviate this to "matter", or
"object", but this is just for ease of understanding.
Thanks for your time,
Roger
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