Glenn,
I couldn't resist just a quick word here:
The idea that there is a 'real world', objective and just 'out there', is
actually the hypothetical one; in answer to your question as to whether it
is actually possible that there might exist "personalised realities",
apparently "equally true", yet possibly conflicting, is exactly the point of
most such discussion. The best that each of us (I think) can say is that we
have 'empirical proof' of our own particular world-view. When a lot of us
seem to reach agreement, we take this as empirical proof of the possibility
of 'objective proof'. In either case, the suspect concept is that of
'empirical proof'; because the sun has risen for (in my case) the last 46
years, I tend to take this as empirical proof that it will rise tomorrow.
Thus empirical proof rests on a predictive model which is bound up with
probabilities (or 'propensities' as Popper would have it) which do not in
themselves have a sound scientific basis as such, but beliefs in which are
themselves produced by faith in the power of some underlying principles
(such as causality, or gods, or whatever), which principles are deduced by
the (apparent) reliability of past events. Thus empiricism may be a product
of 'hindsight', which is notoriously subjective!
In turn, being apparently self-contained as a metaphysic should be, the
empirical world seems (to me) to qualify as a "world", as real as any other,
yet possibly contradicting other, equally robustly self-contained 'worlds'.
Thus we can observe how two people can argue passionately about a particular
aspect of reality, each convinced they are right - and indeed, each may
indeed be "right", up until they reach the conclusion that their particular
'right' viewpoint necessarily excludes the other.
Hegel banged on about this, I understand, and postulated that the only
"whole truth" was that which incorporated all other (apparently sometimes
contradictory) truths. In other words, only the every-possible-perspective,
past-and-future, every person, possible person, every place-and-time,
etc,etc, could possibly constitute "the complete truth"; anything less would
obviously be shorn of "relatedness" and would be incomplete. So the
"objective truth" could not possibly be had by ignoring the subjective
experiences of individuals, and could not possibly reside in some
'rational'-isation ( which by its nature would be a 'cartoon' representation
of 'reality').
So it turns out that 'cartoon world' is indeed as real as any other (why
else would cartoons 'work' for us?), and is therefore 'true' (in that the
criteria for accepting a 'world' are empirical: "does it work?").
But not, of course, the 'whole truth'.
cheers,
ppl
----- Original Message -----
From: <gmbbradford@netscape.net>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: 17 July 2000 04:43
Subject: Re: MD Many Truths-Many Worlds
Hi Platt,
> PLATT
> My grandchildren have departed after a month's visit which
> necessitated my temporary absence from the ongoing discussion.
I'm in complete agreement with your decision. Though it must have
been tough to choose the morally incorrect position, considering MOQ
puts intellectual patterns (philosophical discussion) above social
ones (visiting grandchildren).
> PLATT
> Even though I don't intend to intervene at this point I can't resist
> reminding Glenn that the belief held by science that truth is what is
> verifiable empirically cannot itself be verified empirically, leaving
> room for other equally "true" interpretations of reality based on
> equally unprovable assumptions, such as Pirsig's theory of
> competing moral levels.
This criticism of science can also be levelled against MOQ, because what
MOQ calls real is *also* what is empirically verifiable.
Saying "what is verifiable empirically cannot itself be verified
empirically" is a clever way to undermine empiricism, but is this really
your intent? And I don't agree what you have left room for are equally
true interpretations of reality. You've basically left the door open for
anything and reality becomes just 'what you like'. Do you believe it's
possible to have personalized realities? How can they be all "equally
true" if my version of reality conflicts with yours?
> PLATT
> Or to put it directly, science, like all worldviews, is ultimately based
> on faith.
True, but this doesn't mean all worldviews require equal amounts of faith.
In my view, deciding what's real should be determined by rationality and
concensus as much as possible, minimizing faith. I'd be cautious. I
wouldn't be too quick to make interpretations of mental experiences unless
the interpretations could be justified and the experiences were widely
held, even ones that subjectively feel "right". For example, I believe
numbers are real but I'd stop short at saying there's a mathematical
world, even though I like numbers a lot.
> PLATT
> Which leads me to speculate that not only is their a material world
> "out there" for us to explore and contemplate (with science at the
> forefront), but also a mathematical world, a moral world and
> indeed an aesthetic world, each one as "real" as the other.
For each case above, is your use of "world" figurative or actual? If
actual, what are the salient features of a world? If I were to propose a
world to add to your list of many worlds (say, cartoon world), what
would be your criteria for accepting or rejecting it?
Glenn
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