Dear Wim:
You wrote:
> I'm getting some trouble discussing with you because of the sharp
> tone in too many of your postings.
> You also seem to discard my 28/10 22:21 +0100 posting addressed
> to you with only denigratory remarks:
> 29/10 13:15 -0500 you write in a side note "An 'amorphous soup
> of
> sentiments' such as justice, brotherhood, and peace doesn't give
> us much to go on."
> 3/11 14:27 -0500 you write to someone else "many on this site who
> criticize Pirsig haven't specified a source for their moral
> outlook other than an 'vague, amorphous soup of sentiments' like
> love, justice, peace and 'dialogue'."
Gee. I didn't realize that paraphasing Pirsig would lead to an
accusation of making denigratory remarks. The phrase, "vague,
amorphous soup of sentiments" is straight out of Chapter 24. Pirsig's
point was that such sentiments have no source in a rationally-based
morality. When such concepts as "good" and "evil" have a sentimental
or religious base rather than a metaphysical base, morals become
relative and arbitrary, their meaning determined by whose side you are
on. We are now seeing the result of such arbitrariness in the conflict
between radical Islam and the rest of the world.
> You do indeed act a little bit like a dim bulb when in your 28/10
> 11:05 -0500 posting you
> 1) confuse the "issue of whether the free enterprise system
> works"
> with the issue as you put it 24/10 14:36 -0400:
> "What evidence can you present" for the truth of "the statement
> ... 'that ... free enterprise global economics is a system of
> ideas developed on behalf of the privileged to legitimize their
> (my and your) privileges?'"
> (implicitly confusing a system of ideas with the reality it
> inaccurately describes and
> "legitimizing" with "explaining"),
I understand "legitimize" to mean "to make lawful" and my question
was to explain how the privileged have "made lawful" their privileges
other than to ensure freedom to create, produce, trade and enjoy the
fruits of their labors. It would also help if you would define what you
mean by "privileged."
2) mistake a list of economists who "first developed
> neo-classical economics at the end of the 19th century" for a
> list of "'authorities' who have written about the virtues of free
> enterprise"
Guilty. But a bit picky don't you think?
> On the other hand I am aware of my own hideous habit of wanting
> to say too much with too few words. I have that problem even in
> my Dutch mother tongue, which is less than American a "sound-bite
> language". I don't want to take the time to correct this habit of
> mine in my postings on this list, however, for it would compound
> the imbalance between available time and what I want to say even
> more and ... would induce someone like you to reply even faster,
> leaving me even more breathless :-).
>
> So, I ask you to take your time pondering my postings before you
> reply. It might also to be helpful to reply to the general drift
> before going into details. Your replies give the impression, that
> you haven't read the whole of my posting when you write your
> reply to the first bit.
I apologize for being overly hasty if that's the way it comes across. By
way of explanation, I like to get to the point clearly and quickly and
admire that in other writers. I understand that directness and brevity
can appear brusque and "sharp." In the future I'll try to be brief without
being barbaric.
> Back to your 29/10 13:15 -0500 posting.
> My point was, that Pirsig (in "Lila") was not consistent enough
> in his changeover from SOM to a MoQ. He didn't need to, as he was
> indeed writing a novel and not an academic paper. He was only
> "pointing to the moon" and would have been less persuasive and
> less widely read otherwise.
> Everyday language makes "writing MoQite" difficult, because of
> nouns that are either subjects or direct objects and because of
> (transitive) verbs that presuppose a direct object. It doesn't
> make "writing MoQite" impossible, however. Some nouns however,
> while they can technically be the subject of a sentence, can
> hardly be misunderstood for a subject in a subject-object pair.
> "Quality" is such a noun. And intransitive verbs don't presuppose
> a direct object. E.g. "quality" cannot "act" and cannot do
> something to something else. "Quality" is experience and
> experience is "quality". The only tricky thing with "quality" is,
> that in SOM language one can say that "something has quality (or
> not)". A MoQ states that "quality" precedes the (deduction of)
> "something" (for the "something" would not be experienced if it
> would not "have quality"). So "something having quality" confuses
> SOM and MoQ, because it logically presupposes a something and it
> strongly suggests that this something is valued by a someone.
> So we should try to avoid using "quality" as a direct object in
> sentences and we should try to avoid transitive verbs.
Seems another apology is in order. I didn't make myself clear by what I
mean by "SOM language." I was not referring to parts of speech such
as nouns, verbs, subjects and objects, but to the metaphysical
assumptions that underlie the language. The assumed dualities of
subject/object, mind/matter, self/other, observer/observed,
internal/external, implicit/explicit, above/below, before/after,
static/dynamic, etc., etc. form the basis for language and thought.
Nothing seems more "real" than the separation between what goes on
inside our skins and the world outside. Thus, we look at the world
through, as Pirsig put it, subject-object spectacles, and build our
language to reflect what we think we see.
> This stays true if we analyze Quality, distinguishing it first in
> static and dynamic quality, in patterns-staying-as-they-are and
> patterns-changing, and then distinguishing these patterns in 4
> different types. These patterns are still Quality, experience,
> and neither a subject nor an object. Neither a pattern of values
> (static quality) nor change in such a pattern (Dynamic Quality)
> is a "thing" (the word I use to denote both subjects and
> objects), even if we use the same word for a "thing" and for such
> a pattern.
Sorry. I don't follow.
> A table is a thing (obviously). But this word can also be used to
> denote the pattern of values a toddler experiences when it bumps
> its head every time it rises to its feet at approximately the
> same spot.
OK.
> England is a thing that should or shouldn't have defended itself
> from annexation by Germany (and that may have had far more
> options than surrendering and all-out war...). But this word can
> also be used to denote the pattern of values one experiences when
> one sees a certain flag on different places, certain behavior in
> different people etc.
OK, but are not experiences, behaviors and people "things?"
> When the toddler grows, its will learn that this experience also
> is part of a wider experience that artifacts which elevate a
> roughly horizontal surface between 0,5 and 1,5 metres from ground
> level tend to be used by
> humans to deposit things on to save them the trouble of stooping
> (and should not be used to sit on, as parents and teachers will
> conspire to impart to it).
> Likewise the "England-experience" is part of a wider experience
> that groups of people calling themselves "nations" resist change
> in their habits by excluding others (criminals, spies, soldiers
> etc.) in one way or another. What they do to resist change (for
> instance annexation by another "nation") is "moral" in the sense
> that the pattern stays as it is and "immoral" in the sense that
> it doesn't change.
> A pattern can be stronger (more resistant to change) than another
> pattern (and England proved to be stronger than Germany, although
> ... neither remained unchanged by W.W.II...). The survival of the
> strongest patterns of any type (on a certain level) is "moral" in
> the sense that these are better static latches of Quality AND
> "immoral" in the sense that they better prevent change.
Sorry. Lost again. I couldn't follow your transition from a discussion of
tables to a discussion of the "England-expeience."
> The morality of the MoQ, of static patterns of value migrating
> towards Dynamic Quality (changing and becoming more and more
> complex), is another kind of morality than the SOM morality that
> makes certain kinds of action by subjects legitimate and other
> kinds of action illegitimate. The MoQ has nothing whatsoever to
> say about the question whether (thing) England should have simply
> surrendered to (thing) Hitler or not.
I believe you are mistaken. Pirsig said about Hitler: "This conflict
explains the driving force behind Hitler not as an insane search for
power but an all-consuming glorification of social authority and hatred
of intellectualism. His exaltation of the German volk was fueled by it.
His fanatic persecution of any kind of intellectual freedom was driven
by it." (Chap. 22). The MOQ clearly places the intellectual level, which is
revered in England (ask Horse) (-: , at a higher moral level than "social
authority."
> The fact that "Pirsigs metaphysical somersault" (Bo 6/12 9:04
> +0100) wasn't complete and that he still confused things and
> patterns at the end of "Lila" doesn't excuse us for making the
> same mistake.
>
> Hope this clarifies somewhat my 27/10 22:11 +0100 posting, which
> admittedly doesn't seem to somersault completely either on
> hindsight. As said before: everyday language makes "writing
> MoQite" difficult.
Agree.
I enjoy our discussions, Wim. Although I may unintentionally rile you at
times, I'm grateful that you do not stoop to ad hominem attacks against
me that others in the forum have seen fit from time to time to sadly
engage in.
Best regards,
Platt
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