Hi again Jonathan
> I think that Magnus's "need" to introduce a quantum level into the MoQ
> reveals his essentially classical approach of reductionism and
> causality.
Causality? There's no causality in quantum mechanics. Things happen at
the same time at different places, effects are seen before the cause, etc.
Regarding reductionism vs. "emerging patterns", I take it you see them as
two opposites? Don't you understand that a dimensional view of the levels
combines them?
Would you understand me better if I said that higher levels emerges from
lower? It's just that the lower level must still be able to grow, so the
higher level emerges in a 90-degree angle.
> This is inevitable as long as he tries to pin down some
> absolute reality out there waiting for him to discover it. This is very
> clear from what he writes
>
> MAGNUS (14 Jan 2002)
> >Anyway, I would *not* enjoy one moment of merely trying to construct an
> >artificial division of reality. I'm trying to *find* the division
> that's
> >already there. That is, I'm trying to find the metaphysics of our
> reality.
>
> That's just my point Magnus. Where are those divisions? Show them to us!
And what kind of a question is that? It's obviously just a waste of time
trying to explain my view of the levels to you. I just hope other readers
have at least tried to understand me.
> Magnus, that's all very well if you stick to your own examples, but what
> about new problems that arise. Do you remember the "Walking is a social
> skill" thread from Oct 1999
> (http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/9910/index.html). At the
> time I was deliberately trying to show that there is no absolute way to
> make a division between social and biological patterns. I'd be genuinely
> interested in your position on this particular example.
There's no absolute way to make a division in your model of the levels no.
But in a dimensional view, walking is three-dimensional - social, biological
and inorganic.
Regarding my examples, they are constructed to show the inconsistensies
of a ladder model of the levels. The walking-example shows that a ladder
model becomes fuzzy at the borders. It's not enough to break the ladder
model completely.
> Also note, that if awareness is dependent on quantum patterns, it is
> absolutely dependent on the quantum behaviour of carbon, hydrogen,
> oxygen, nitrogen, sulphur and a few other types of atom. This means that
> it would be absolutely impossible to recreate an aware system
> artificially using silicon chips and copper wire. The same goes for
> intelligence.
Right, I mention this in my essay too. But there's a deeper mystery buried
in this line of thought. I wasn't into QM when I wrote the essay so I blamed
DQ instead. The funny, (or not so funny), thing is that DQ and quantum
behaviour is interchangeable. Regardless of whether there is a separate
quantum level or not, I think we all agree that quantum effects belong
in or below the inorganic level. DQ on the other hand, doesn't belong in
the static ladder in the first place, so why are the effects of DQ and QM
so similar? Or shouldn't we blame DQ for awareness and intelligence at all?
Or perhaps we shouldn't blame QM?
PATRICK:
> But okay, here's Hodgson's argument in a slightly different form: Could
> you imagine just one 'grandmother'-neuron representing this picture of
> these instantaneous events? I think not. So there must be different
> neurons in the brain responsible for representing the picture of the
> *instantaneous* events in your mind: We can at one moment be aware of
> multiple things, and different *spatially seperated* neuronal events
> (whatever those may be) must be responsible for that, as I just argued.
> So to make our one visual eye and one mind, you need the same so-called
> mysterious *instantaneous* correlations as with the *spatially
> seperated* photons. The mind entails nonlocality.
> Okay, please let me know if *anyone* gets this point. I would surely
> appreciate it if I've been able to put across Hodgson's argument. It
> can't be so hard, can it? I don't understand why some people are having
> such difficulties to understand this. >>>
>
> I think I do understand the argument, but note that you start from the
> unstated assumption that there is something absolute and distinct about
> proximity vs. non-locality. The implication is that this is an example
> of a "division that's already there" (to quote Magnus - see above).
> I state that the very concept of non-locality comes from a particular
> way of looking at the world.
Right! The MoQ with a quantum level has no problem with this. Space, i.e.
locality, only exist in the inorganic level and up. Below, in the quantum
level, there's neither space nor locality.
Magnus
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