Hullo Squonk,
Yes, you are right when you say "the speculation is that experience emerges
from quality. In 'lived' experience one does not speculate, and this is what
Pirsig is really about." The problem with discussing this is that the
discussion becomes 'speculation' too, and this is a seemingly intractable
element of trying to grasp the moon with fingers.
However, I do find a difficulty in Pirsig's formulation, in that the
immediate experience of quality is not quite so simple as it might appear. I
think the best way to put it would be to say "just because it is dynamic
does not make it good". What I am pointing to is that the dynamic is perhaps
the only 'accessible' morality for each individual, but it is indeed
possible to compare moral positions from a static viewpoint, and perhaps to
critique the value of different dynamic viewpoints. In this regard, it is a
bit like art. The purely dynamic perspective is saying "Good art is what I
like", meaning whatever moves me. At one level this is unarguable. But it
means that nothing more can be said about art.
However, we recognise that art appreciation is not just what is appreciated
by a given individual, but that I can be educated to enjoy art that at first
glance seems not very interesting to me. There is an assumption here that
quality is not just what grabs me at the moment, but is also in some sense
inherent in the artwork, if I am prepared to take some time and effort to
learn about and understand it. Indeed, all human experience is open to
refinement, meaning that my appreciation of quality is altered by experience
occurring over time. Much human culture is not immediately satisfying to the
senses, but requires an educated perception. Hence I cannot appreciate the
beauty of a mathematical theorem unless I have taken the time to study
mathematics. Pirsig at one point talks about "quality meats", and this is
perhaps part of what I am pointing to. Put it in terms of a 'good' wine if
you prefer. The principle is the same.
So what I am saying is that quality resides in experiences of 'immediate
awareness', true, but that what is capable of being apprehended in this
immediacy is partly shaped by prior learning. And just to make this more
complex, I would argue that immediate apprehension of, for example,
imaginary voices urging me to kill myself, can be a very real experience for
a schitzophrenic, but does that mean that no further moral assessment can be
entered into? My argument regarding mysticism is that for the mystic the
only moral absolute is immediacy, yet I would also want to say that fantasy
can offer the appearance of immediacy, hence there is a need to be able to
discriminate fantasy from what is, or the result is a very low quality
outcome.
I would be interested in your comments.
John B
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