Jonathan,
Well, I don't see that you answered my objections directly, HOWEVER,...I
think I overall agree with you, but still think we need to distinguish
an intellectual level. I have occasionally remarked that one could get
something very like the MOQ by substituting Reason for Quality, much in
the sense that you are using here:
Jonathan B. Marder wrote:
> I think it is best to regard all the laws, ideas and hypotheses relating
> to each level as a part of that level. Otherwise we end up making a
> separation between a material world and a world of ideas;
Yes, except that we are obviously often mistaken about those laws. In
other words, I agree that there are intellectual laws and ideas (but not
hypotheses) that are a part of each level, but we often get them wrong
-- more than that I think our most basic ideas are fundamentally wrong,
but that's a different essay.
...
>
> The obvious extension is that Intellect decides which social patterns
> are best - that was the original basis of the "next level arbitration"
> idea.
> But this isn't quite right. The analysis of how biology chooses between
> inorganic patterns is ultimately an intellectual process.
> It is always intellect that recognises the conflict, and then "invents"
> the next level pattern that resolves it. It is intellect in the guise
> of a pattern called a cell that recognises that sugar is "good" and
> cyanide is "bad". It is all down to judgements of Quality.
Right, but the fact that WE can evaluate social patterns shows that the
intellectual level has emerged, and needs to be considered in its own
right, independent of any other level. That's why I insist on
considering mathematics as "not social", mainly because it is easier to
see in mathematics than in, say, political science, but it is there as
well. The difference is being aware that it is there, which I believe
not to have been the case in pre-Hellenic societies. For them,
evaluations and improvements in patterns came from the gods. For us, it
seems to come from ourselves. (Not that I think this is the whole story,
but again, some other time).
>
...
> The only discomfort I have in rejecting Intellect as a Level is Pirsig's
> extensive writing on the new intellectual age that came into being after
> WW1. I think he is correct that something DID change. IMO, until the
> industrial revolution hit, the major philosophy driving resolution of
> social conflicts was conservatism. The institutions of social power were
> mainly engaged in keeping things as they were.
> That changed greatly during the Victorian age, and "progress" became
> important. Thus academia, particularly science, as the provider of the
> tools for planning and implementing social change became increasingly
> important. WW1 perhaps marks the point when the old social order reached
> its lowest ebb. The emergence of a new social order reflects not so much
> a new level but a shift in philosophy, a change in the application of
> intellect.
In this regard, I would say that the intellectual level is still too
entrapped in the social level. In my opinion, the only good society is
an invisible one (one that we don't notice unless a supply line is
jammed or something, much like we don't notice the biological level
unless something hurts), and we are a long way from that.
>
> Does that clarify my thoughts?
Yes, though I'm still wondering why you think there can't be an
intellectual activity that is not about social, biological, or inorganic
patterns. Like mathematics.
- Scott
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