Part. 9.
Waves, Streams, States, and Self--A Summary of My Psychological Model
(Or, Outline of An Integral Psychology) (page 3 of 10)
Ken Wilber
Phenomenal States
Finally, and following this simple heuristic, within the major structures of
consciousness there appear to be various phenomenal states (joy, happiness,
sadness, desire, etc.). In short, one way of conceptualizing these events is
to say that within broad states of consciousness there are structures of
consciousness, within which there are phenomenal states.[9]
At this stage there is a move back towards familiar concepts and terms.
However, to state, 'One way of' indicates a degree of selection.
Presumably, One way, is one way among many?
Why select one way over all others?
Notice that neither states of consciousness nor structures of consciousness
are directly experienced by individuals.[10] Rather, individuals directly
experience specific phenomenal states. Structures of consciousness, on the
other hand, are deduced from watching the behavior of numerous subjects. The
rules and patterns that are followed by various types of cognitive,
linguistic, moral (etc.) behaviors are then abstracted.
Language is now a matter of expressing sensation.
This raises the danger of solipsistic idealism.
Also, morals are reduced to subjective sensations experienced directly while
consciousness is not.
This approach introduces an ambiguity between Phenomalism and Phenomenology.
In shifting back and forth between these two areas the essay can claim to
discuss that which is directly experienced while at the same time claim to
access underlying states.
These rules, patterns, or structures appear to be very real, but they are not
directly perceived by the subject (just as the rules of grammar are rarely
perceived in an explicit form by native language speakers, even though they
are following them).
Once again, the use of ambiguous assertions: 'Appear to be very real.'
Either something is real or not, there is no requirement to state something
be very real.
To state something appears to be very real is contradictory, e.g. 'I appear
to definitely have my coat on.'
This is why structures of consciousness are almost never spotted by
phenomenology, which inspects the present ongoing stream of consciousness and
thus only finds phenomenal states. This appears to be a significant
limitation of virtually all forms of phenomenology. That is, phenomenology
usually focuses on phenomenal states and thus fails to spot the existence
structures of consciousness. Thus, if you introspect the phenomenal states of
body and mind, you will never see something that announces itself as a
"stage-4 moral thought" (Kohlberg); nor will you find something called "the
conformist stage" (Loevinger); nor will you spot "the relativistic stage"
(Graves). The only way you spot those intersubjective structures is to watch
populations of subjects interact, and then look for regularities in behavior
that suggest they are following intersubjective patterns, rules, or
structures. This suggests that phenomenology is a useful, if limited, aspect
of a more integral methodology.[11]
The suggestion that phenomenology is useful may be in its capacity to
speculate upon ANY underlying structure that one may wish engage
heuristically.
This section has achieved three things:
1. Raised questions about which platform Wilber is using; either Phenomenal
or Phenomenological?
2. Inadequately provided depth with which to explore the areas mentioned.
3. In raising One and Two there is now a wealth of surface over which to roam
without penetration.
The ambiguity of combining phrases such as, 'It appears' in conjunction with
definitive statements may now be explained by shifting from one platform to
another within the same discourse. For example, one may refer to Phenomenal
appearance AND state definite underlying structure as that structure is
extrapolated under Wilber's own theory. Thus appealing to appearance may
support theory.
Developmental Aspects of Spirituality
It appears that all structures of consciousness generally unfold in a
developmental or stage-like sequence, and, as virtually all developmentalists
agree, true stages cannot be skipped (Combs, 1995; Cook-Greuter, 1990;
Gilligan, 1990; Kegan, 1983; Loevinger, 1976; Wade, 1996).
Note the combination of appearance with theoretical structure.
Part. 10. follows.
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