----- Original Message -----
From: "John Beasley" <beasley@austarnet.com.au>
> jhmau in the 'MD what a mess' strand quotes Pirsig quoting James on the
> subject of Truth. The quote is
>
> "James said, 'Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually
supposed,
> a category distinct from good, and coordinate with it.' He said, 'the
true
> is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief.'
> "'Truth is a species of good.' That was right on. That was exactly
> what is meant by the Metaphysics of Quality. Truth is a static
intellectual
> pattern within a larger entity called Quality."
>
> Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, an Oxford historian, in his recent book 'Truth -
A
> History and a Guide for the Perplexed', writes...
>
> "We need a history of truth ... because truth is fundamental to everything
> else. Everyone's attempt to be good - every attempt to construct happy
> relationships and thriving societies - starts with two questions: How do I
> tell right from wrong? And how do I tell truth from falsehood? The first
> question has more practical applications but it depends on its apparently
> more theoretical twin. There is no social order without trust and no trust
> without truth or, at least, without agreed truth-finding procedures." (p3)
Joe:
Thanks, John, for pointing me to a book I have not read. I, also, want to
thank Persig for writing Lila and pointing to something I find interesting.
I agree with the above quote and ask this question: How do I go from 'I
trust' to 'I experience?' If I don't know it I don't want it! I am not
certain of all that I read, but I certainly do what I do. The social order
based upon communication in its evolution to higher order intellect depends
on trust. My experience of quality, existence, value is instinctive and
certain. I would like to say that by trust good is a species of truth, but
by certainty truth is a species of good.
> Fernandez-Armesto identifies four ways in which people identify truth, and
> makes the point that all four have long histories and still co-exist.
>
> The first is "'the truth you feel', which is detected affectively or by a
> kind of apprehension"
>
> The second is "'the truth you are told' ... truth must be mediated by
> various human, oracular, divinatory or scriptural sources of authority. I
> include the notions of poetic truth, revelation and
> truth-detected-by-consensus and the concept of innate truth."
>
> The third is "'the truth of reason' or 'the truth you think for yourself',
> and covers phases when truth is understood as what reason determines ... a
> history of rationalism ... and of techniques of reasoning which are
commonly
> called logical."
>
> The fourth is "'the truth you perceive through your senses' and covers the
> history of belief in the reliability of sense-perception ... a duel
history
> of science and empiricism". (pp6-7)
>
> [At this point I intrude to point to a superficial 'fit' between these
four
> ways of identifying truth, and the biological, social, and intellectual
> levels, together with James' radical empirical system that Pirsig goes on
to
> discuss immediately after the introductory quote above (near the end of Ch
> 29 of Lila)] [John B]
>
> Fernandez-Armesto identifies three main responses to relativism, which
dates
> at least from Protagorus, with whom Socrates disagreed, and which he
> defines as "Truth is just a name we give to our opinions. Everyone has his
> own reality - as if each of all possible universes, or as many as there
are
> people to experience them, were separately embodied in particular
> individuals. What is true for you is not necessarily true for me." (p 204)
>
> "Three more-or-less positive ways of confronting Protagoras are popular
> today. First, religious fundamentalists respond in panic by irrationally
> affirming beliefs most people cannot share. Secondly, seekers of an escape
> route turn to oriental traditions; there they hope to find an
understanding
> of truth invulnerable to criticisms which have arisen in western thought.
> Finally, professional philosophers use the traditional resources of their
> discipline, with effects which tend to make matters worse by gutting all
the
> traditional strength out of the concept of truth." (p 207)
>
> "Zen is the favourite 'orientalism' of western revellers in uncertainty
> because it seems to represent par excellence an ancient tendency of
Buddhist
> philosophy: the claim that every perspective is evanescent and that none
is
> objectively correct. So the oriental temptation leads back to relativism
or
> to a more radical denial that truth is meaningful or expressible. The
> orienteers return disorientated.
>
> For example, the locus classicus of the western appropriation of eastern
> philosophy in the attempt to escape the limitiations of subjective
thinking
> is Robert Pirsig's 'Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance' ... (1 page
> summary omitted) ...
>
> The enlightenment imparted by Zen is like the indifference enjoyed by
> ancient Greek and Roman sceptics - 'forgetfulness of the sky, retirement
> from the wind'. Yet there is a difference; ancient western sceptics
> professed contentment with things as they seemed, on the grounds that
> appearances could do duty for truths no one can know. The indifference of
> Zen is the inertia of being, beyond thought and language ... Perhaps Zen
is
> ... a bid by mere humans for the reality and objectivity of a clod or a
> rock." (pp 215 - 216)
>
> Philosophers have adopted three approaches to rescuing truth, namely
> correspondence, coherence and consensus. Fernandez-Armesto examines the
> varied outcomes of each, including Rorty's, and dismisses them. He is left
> with Habermas, who "has come to value 'unconstrained consensus-formation'
> ... he prefers to be guided towards truth through collaboration and
> communication ... his greatest enemy is the self; so he directs his
readers
> towards reverence for society; his greatest bugbear is 'subjective
> reasoning', which alienates us and drives us into the hell of Huis Clos;
so
> he advances 'communicative reasoning'. The search for truth is a
collective
> enterprise, in which we learn from each other ... it has merits which so
far
> have been insufficiently praised: it is humane, undogmatic, solidly rooted
> in tradition, optimistic, and in effect, good for the individual who
> practices it and the society which benefits from it." (p 222)
>
> I will not comment further on this thesis here, as the post is already
long.
> If anyone has read this far there may be scope for debate.
>
> John B
>
>
>
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