>ROG:
>It obviously flopped, because I didn't intend to make the "chance" point at
>all. Let me start over. I could have said that "just because virtually every
>car goes North does not mean that cars are teleologically drawn to the
>North." A car's purpose is not to go North.
ERIN: still doesn't due it for me. Isn't it you in the progress thread
that argues the world is getting better. It is not as
directionless as you make it sound. what if the cars were slightly closer to
the North Pole each year.
ROG: Do you think that possibility implies purpose?
ERIN: I agree when you say "the MOQ, you have to
>expand you definition of the word "purpose" to include
>an indefinable concept such as DQ."
But don't agree with you when you say "we are expanding it so wide that it no
longer implies anything of interest."
By that reasoning I think we have talked enough about Quality.
Let's now devote this site to talking about Crap. Does Lila
have crap?
>ROG:
>And if I have a goal to use a car as a weapon to kill someone, does this
>prove cars have killing as a teleological goal? Since the majority of species
>become extinct, does this make the purpose of life "extinction"? No.
ERIN: lay off the analogies, killer cars, c'mon what are you smoking?
ROG:
But this
isn't teleological. Adding a purpose or goal doesn't add anything to the
theory. Does it? What?
ERIN: a direction-- back to your car analogies I can be driving north
without a defined destination.
I was looking up Pirsig's quote about teleology when I came across
this on another website. I would like you to comment on it.
Why did Pirsig adapt classical empiricism to his new philosophy, his
Metaphysics of Quality?
Classical empiricism is essentially inductive. If we look up 'induce' we will
find that its classical definition is causal. Worse, it is predictive and
deterministic based upon historical evidence.
What do we know about Pirsig's MoQ? Certainly, it is not causal. Neither is it
predictive nor deterministic.
To reflect, we can paraphrase Pirsig's words on any causation platypus,
"Instead of A causes B, MoQ prefers to say B values precondition(s) A."
Pirsig did not like classical empiricism, however he really admired William
James' rhetoric on empiricism which harbored a pragmatic flavor, i.e.,
choice/chance/change action outcomes.
Well then, how did Pirsig adapt classical inductive empiricism to MoQ?
Pirsig saw that empiricism could be viewed 'better' as B values precondition
A. In this new MoQ light, empiricism retains much of its former self, but
without causal induction. Pirsig changed 'induction' to 'evolution.'
We may view nature's local preconditions at some/any Quality Event. Those
preconditions do not predict what happens next. Instead, both local and
nonlocal choices made at a Quality Event 'select' nature's next incremental
chance/change outcome.
Pirsig substituted evolutionary natural selection as replacement for
empiricism's former inductive deterministic causation. This is one of his most
brilliant philosophical maneuvers.
We are unsure whether philosophical references classify empiricism this way,
but it is important to understand Pirsig's distinction. Why? Classical
empiricism brooks no Venn with quantum science, where Pirsig's noncausal
empiricism is a perfect fit for stochastic, special, ensemble events in
quantum reality.
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